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In The Matter Of Hamish Allan Bell 
In The Matter Of Hamish Allan Bell 
Date Code User Judge 
9/24/2009 NCOT CCDWONCP New Case Filed - All Other Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PETN CCDWONCP Petition for Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/29/2009 OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Judicial Review Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/7/2009 NOTC CCRANDJD Notice of Lodging of Agency Record Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/9/2009 NOAP CCTOWNRD Notice Of Appearance (Kane for State) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTC CCTOWNRD Notice of Court Reporter's Estimate Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/13/2009 STIP CCNELSRF Stipulation to Stay Enforcement of Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Suspending Driving Privileges of Hamish Allan 
Bell 
10/20/2009 ORDR DCTYLENI Order (Staying Enforcement of Order Suspending Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Driving Privileges) 
10/23/2009 NOTC CCRANDJD Notice of Filing of Agency Record Kathryn A. Sticklen 
11/5/2009 NOTC CCSIMMSM Notice of Lodging Transcript Kathryn A. Sticklen 
12/1/2009 NOTC MCBIEHKJ Notice of Filing Transcript Kathryn A. Sticklen 
12/22/2009 BREF CCHOLMEE Petitions Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/19/2010 BREF CCLATICJ Respondent's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/28/2010 MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Augment Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/9/2010 BREF CCDWONCP Petitioner's Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/10/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order (to Augment Record) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/16/2010 NOHG CCMASTLW Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCMASTLW Hearing Scheduled (Petition 04/19/201002:00 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PM) Petn/Judicial Review 
4/19/2010 DPHR DCOATMAD Hearing result for Petition held on 04/19/2010 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
02:00 PM: Disposition With Hearing 
Petn/Judicial Review Nicole Omsberg less than 
50 
6/15/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CD IS DCTYLENI Civil Disposition entered for: Bell, Hamish Allan, Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Subject. Filing date: 6/15/2010 
STAT DCTYLENI STATUS CHANGED: Closed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/14/2010 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dean B. Arnold, ISB #6814 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 W. Main St., Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-1575 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3777 
Attorneys for Defendant Hamish Bell 
SEP 2 4 2009 
DAVID NAVARRO, 
By PATRICIA A DWONCH 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER 
OF THE DRIVING 
PRIVILEGES OF: 










Case No. r/101f;f/ff/f 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Fee Category: L.3 
Fee: $88.00 
COMES NOW, the above-named Petitioner, Hamish Allan Bell, by and through 
his attorneys of record, Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold, and for judicial review of an 
agency action of the Respondent, Idaho Transportation Department, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
1. This Petition is filed pursuant to and in accordance with Idaho Code 
Sections lS-S002A(S) and 67-5270, et seq., and Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84. 
2. Per Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d), Petitioner provides the following 
information and statements: 
a. Idaho Transportation Department (hereinafter "lTD") is the name 
of the agency for which judicial review is sought. 
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b. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the 
County of Ada, is the title of the district court to which the petition 
is taken. 
c. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, entered on or 
about September 14, 2009, In the Matter of the Driving Privileges 
of Hamish Allan Bell, lTD File No. 807001277034 (hereinafter 
"Order), is the action for which judicial review is sought. A true 
and correct copy of the Order is attached and incorporated hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
d. Hearings via teleconference were held on July 9, 2009 and July 23, 
2009. Oral argument and objections were recorded by the lTD on 
both occasions. The Hearing Officer in possession of the 
recordings is David J. Baumann, Idaho Transportation Department, 
Drivers Services Section, P.O. Box 7129,3311 W. State St., Boise, 
Idaho 83707. 
e. The Petitioner intends to raise and assert on review the following 
issues, without limitation: 
1. Whether the hearing procedures afforded the Petitioner by 
lTD amounted to a denial of procedural due process under 
the Constitutions of the United States and the State of 
Idaho; 
11. Whether the hearing procedures afforded the Petitioner by 
lTD were in violation of constitutional or statutory 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 2 
provisions, and/or made upon unlawful procedure; 
111. Whether the findings of fact made by the Hearing Officer 
are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as 
a whole; 
IV. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that the evidentiary test 
administered on Petitioner was conducted in compliance 
with Idaho Code, IDAPA Rules, and the Idaho State Police 
Standard Operating Procedures; 
v. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that the evidentiary testing 
instrument was properly calibrated and approved for use on 
the date Petitioner submitted to evidentiary testing; 
VI. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that the evidentiary testing 
instrument functioned properly when the test was 
administered to the Petitioner; 
Vll. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that the Petitioner was properly 
advised of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required by Idaho Code § lS-S002A(2); 
Vlll. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that the Petitioner was not denied 
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his due process rights; 
IX. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously found that Officer White followed all 
procedures and requirements set forth pursuant to Idaho 
law and the Idaho State Police Standard Operating 
Procedures; 
x. Whether the Hearing Officer's Order is arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion; 
Xl. Whether the Hearing Officer exceeded statutory authority 
and erroneously relied upon the affidavit of Officer White, 
when lTD had actual or constructive knowledge of 
credibility issues of Officer White; 
XlI. Whether lTD's failure to disclose the information 
regarding Officer White's credibility to the Petitioner 
resulted in a denial of due process; and 
xiii. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84( d)(5), other 
issues later discovered. 
f. Petitioner requests that lTD prepare the record and transcripts in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5275. 
DATED this 24th day of September, 2009. 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
By: ~ g-
Dean B. Arnold 
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IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF 
HAMISH ALLAN BELL 
IDAHO D.L. NO. ZE321585H 
FILE NO. 807001277034 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
This matter came initially set for hearing June 30, 2009, by telephone 
conference, in reference to Hamish Bell being served with an Administrative License 
Suspension (ALS). At the request of Bell and at the direction of the Hearing Officer, the 
matter was continued on several occasions, with the hearing ultimately commencing July 
23,2009. Dean B. Arnold, Attorney at Law, represented Bell. Hamish Bell waived his 
right to appear. 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension for Failure of 
Evidentiary Testing served upon Hamish Bell pursuant to I.C. §18-8002A is 
SUSTAINED. 
DOCUMENTATIONIINFORMATION 
The Hearing Examiner received the following exhibits into 
evidence as part of the hearing record: 
1. Notice of Suspension Advisory Form 
2. Evidentiary test results EXHIBIT A 
3. Sworn Statement 
4. Idaho Uniform Citation #1277034 
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5. Idaho Driver's License 
6. Envelope 
7. Certification of Receipt of Law Enforcement Documents 
8. Request for Administrative Hearing 
9. Driver License Record 
10. State of Idaho Response to Discovery Request 
11. Certificate of Calibration 
12. Subpoena Duces Tecum 
13. Subpoena Duces Tecum 
14. Order 
15. Order 
Hamish Bell supplemented the record with the following 
evidence/exhibits: 
A. Proof of Service 
B. Proof of Service 
C. DUI General Report 
D. Evidentiary Test Results 
E. Notice of Suspension Advisory 
F. Vehicle Disposition Report 
G. Narrative Report 
H. CD Rom 
At the request of Hamish Be" and with the approval of the Hearing Officer, the record 
remained open to provide Be" the opportunity to supplement the record with additional 
evidence. 
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Hamish Bell supplemented the record with the following 
evidence/exhibits: 
I. Dean Arnold Correspondence 
J. Facsimile Coversheet 
K. Boise Police Department Correspondence 
L. I ntoxilyzer 5000ENOperations Log 
M. State's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
N. Idaho State Police Correspondence 
O. Certificate of Analysis 
P. Certificate of Analysis 
Q. Subpoena Duces Tecum 
R. Intoxilyzer 5000EN Operations Log 
S. Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checklist 
T. State of Idaho v. Jake L. Jaborra Report Court Decision 
U. George C. Schroeder v. State of Idaho Reported Court Decision 
V. State of Idaho v. Shawn Patrick DeWitt Reported Court Decision 
W. State of Idaho v. John W. Harmon Reported Court Decision 
X. State of Idaho v. Marvin Gibbar Reported Court Decision 
Y. Michael S. Virgil v. State of Idaho Reported Court Decision 
Z. State of Idaho v. Monty W. Griffiths Reported Court Decision 
AA. Delbert Beem v. State of Idaho Reported Court Decision 
BB. State of Idaho v. Benito A. Diaz Reported Court Decision 
CC. Armano Schmerber v. State of California Reported Court Decision 
DO. State of Idaho V. James Ralph Woolery Reported Court Decision 
EE. Florida v. Thomas Bostick Reported Court Decision 
FF. State of Idaho v. Francisco Garcia Reported Court Decision 
GG. Merle R. Schneckloth v. Robert Clyde Bustamonte Reported Court Decision 
HH. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
". Supplemental Documentation in Support of Request to Vacate License 
Suspension 
JJ. Motion to Dismiss 00010 
KK. Notice of Defendant's Non-Opposition to State's Motion to Dismiss 
The Hearing Examiner took Judicial Notice of the following items: 
1. Records regularly maintained by the Idaho Department of Transportation 
(Department) 
2. Idaho Administrative Procedure Act Rules 
3. All manuals adopted under IDAPA Rule 11.03.01 and 39.02.72 
4. Idaho State Police Standards and Procedures for Breath-Testing Instruments 
5. All City and County Ordinances and Procedures 
6. Idaho Statutes 
7. Reported Court Decisions 
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING PROCEEDINGS 
Argument summarized from audiotape record of hearing 
Attorney Dean Arnold raised and/or argued the following points: 
1. The driver requested a Subpoena Duces Tecum for the Instrument 
Operations Log for 30 days prior to the test. 
2. The Subpoena Duces Tecum was issued for June 3,2009, through June 6, 
2009. 
3. The subpoena had a compliance date of June 29, 2009, and the hearing was 
set for June 30, 2009. 
4. The hearing was continued and a subpoena requested for the log of the 
entire month prior to the arrest to determine whether the Standard Operating 
Procedures were met with respect to breath-testing. 
5. The revised subpoena was not issued. 
6. The subpoena's (Exhibits J & K) were served. 
7. The Boise Police Department did not respond to the subpoena and they did 
not produce the logs. 
8. On July 19, 2009, the driver's attorney received 14 pages of the log. 
9. One doesn't know when the logs were produced and where they came from. 
10. The Instrument Operations Log goes back from the first of May to the first of 
June. 
11. The Boise Police Department didn't comply with the subpoena. 
12. The objection was over-ruled on the record. 
13. The driver proffers what would have been disclosed if the subpoenas were 
granted. 
14. The subpoena for Callie Downum would have resulted in her testimony 
asserting that she had no idea when the logs were received. 
15. There is nothing in the Idaho Transportation Department's file showing when 
the logs were received and by whom. 
16. The calibration checks would show a violation of the IDAPA Rule and the 
Standard Operating Procedure. 
17. Administrative License Suspension decisions would show the license should 
have been vacated for subpoena non-compliance. 
18. The request for source simulators would have revealed that Repco who 
provides the simulator solutions for the calibration checks is not an approved 
provider per IDAPA and the Standard Operating Procedure. 
19. Repco provides solutions directly to law enforcement agencies rather than 
the Idaho State Police 
20. A violation of due process is grounds to vacate an Administrative License 
Suspension. 
21. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of State v. Gibbar. 
22. Both IDAPA Rule 11.03.01.013.05 and the Standard Operating Procedure at 
2.2.1 require that the provider of simulator solutions be an approved provider. 
23. Repco is not an approved provider in support of that. 
24. Exhibit M, pages 3 & 4, response to 20 & 25, shows that Repco is the 
provider of the simulator solution and there is no document indicating they 
are an approved provider, and Exhibit M shows the contract was terminated 
on February 19, 2008. 
25. The manufacturer and provider of the simulator solution is not an approved 
provider. 
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26. The driver was not properly informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing. 
27. The advisory must be strictly complied with. 
28. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of State v. Griffiths, State v. 
Virgil and State v. 8eem. 
29. The failure to comply with the statutorily mandated information requires 
reinstatement of driving privileges. 
30. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of Exhibit H, track 2, 
at1 :29:15 through 1 :35:40. 
31. It consists of a conversation between Officer White and the driver. 
32. It occurs right after the advisement of rights. 
33. The driver tells the officer he is not going to provide a breath sample. 
34. Officer White tells the driver we either take the breath test or I am going to 
have someone take your blood because the State of Idaho says I can. 
35. We don't take refusals. 
36. The officer forces him to submit to a blood draw at 1 :32:18. 
37. Nothing that Officer White told the driver was correct 
38. The State of Idaho has not said any peace officer can obtain a forced blood 
draw. 
39. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of I. C. § 18-8002(6) and case 
law. 
40. The officer cannot direct a medical professional or paramedic to draw blood. 
41. He may only request, but they can refuse. 
42. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of State v. Diaz, page 303. 
43. The officer cannot force the driver to provide a blood sample. 
44. The officer cannot use whatever force needed to obtain a blood sample. 
45. It must be done with reasonable force. 
46. The officer cannot force the arrestee to give breath or blood evidence. 
47. The officer negated the advisory given. 
48. The officer misrepresented to the driver what would happen if the driver 
refused to provide a breath sample. 
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49. The officer forced the driver to provide a breath sample through coercion, 
duress and harassment and/or trickery or deceit. 
50. An individual's consent is involuntary as what happened here. 
51. Officer White negated the advisory by mis-representing what the law of 
refusal was. 
52. The breath sample was obtained in violation of the driver's constitutional due 
process. 
53. The Intoxilyzer did not have a proper calibration check as adopted by IDAPA 
and the Standard Operating Procedure. 
54. Failure to properly calibrate the machine is a basis to vacate the suspension. 
55. The Intoxilyzer 5000EN was not checked for calibration as required. 
56. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of IDAPA 11.03.01.013.05. 
57. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of the Standard Operating 
Procedure at 2.2.03. 
58. The Hearing Officer is requested to take notice of the case law. 
59. Exhibit R shows halfway down on June 5, 2009, Officer White's entry for the 
driver's test. 
60. Three days prior, June 3, 2009, there were calibration checks for the .20 and 
.08 solutions. 
61. The calibration checks are only good if there are subsequent checks. 
62. A single calibration check is meaningless. 
63. Exhibit S shows the next calibration check on June 25,2009 by Sergeant 
(Sgt.) Sperry on the .20 solution, but she did not do a .08 calibration check. 
64. This is not proper for the state to rely on June 3, 2009's check because there 
was no subsequent check. 
ISSUES RAISED BY HAMISH BELL 
1. Whether the driver was denied his due process rights because the subpoena 
requests were not complied with? 
2. Whether the subpoenas were timely complied with? 
00014 
3. Whether the simulator solutions utilized in his evidentiary testing procedure 
are valid and approved? 
4. Whether he was properly informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing? 
5. Whether the evidentiary testing instrument was properly calibrated and 
approved for use on the date he submitted to evidentiary testing? 
IDAHO CODE §18-8002A(7) ISSUES 
1. Did the peace officer possess legal cause for the stop of the driver's vehicle? 
2. Did the peace officer possess legal cause to believe the driver was driving or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions 
of Idaho Code (I. C.) §§18-8004, 18-8004C, or 18-8006? 
3. Did the test results show an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or 
other intoxicating sUbstances in violation of I. C. §§18-8004, 18-8004C, 18-
8006? 
4. Was the evidentiary test performed in compliance with Idaho Code, IDAPA 
Rule, and ISP Standard Operating Procedure? 
5. Did the evidentiary testing instrument function properly when the test was 
administered? 
6. Was the driver advised of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing as required by I. C. §18-8002A(2)? 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I having heard the issues raised by Hamish Bell; having considered the exhibits 
admitted as evidence; having considered the matter herein; and being advised in the 
premises and the law, make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §18-8002A(7) THE PETITIONER CARRIES THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING 
ALL IDAHO CODE §18-8002A STANDARDS AND ISSUES. 
1. 
DID OFFICER TUCKER POSSESS LEGAL CAUSE FOR THE STOP OF 
HAMISH BELL'S VEHICLE? 
1. On June 5, 2009, Officer Tucker observed Bell's vehicle driving south on 
Capitol Boulevard, at Front Street, in Boise, Idaho. 
2. This street is a one way street for northbound traffic only. 
3. I. C. §49-636 provides that upon a highway designated for one-way traffic, a 
vehicle shall be driven only in the direction designated at all or such times as 
shall be indicated by traffic-control devices. 
4. Bell violated I. C. §49-636. 
5. Officer Tucker possessed legal cause for the stop of Bell's vehicle. 
2. 
DID OFFICER WHITE POSSESS LEGAL CAUSE FOR HAMISH BELL'S 
ARREST, LEGAL CAUSE TO BELIEVE BELL WAS DRIVING WHILE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL IN VIOLATION OF IDAHO 
CODE §18-8004, AND LEGAL CAUSE TO REQUEST BELL SUBMIT 
TO EVIDENTIARY TESTING? 
1. Bell's driving and actual physical control of the motor vehicle was established 
by the observation of Officer Tucker. 
2. Bell exhibited the following behaviors: 
a. Smelled of an alcoholic beverage 
b. Admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages-two beers 
c. Bloodshot eyes 
()()()1h 
d. Impaired memory 
e. Glassy eyes 
3. Bell met or exceeded the minimum decision points on the following 
standardized field sobriety tests: 
a. Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) 
b. Walk & Turn 
c. One Leg Stand 
4. Officer White possessed legal cause for Bell's arrest, legal cause to believe 
Bell was driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of I. C. §18-
8004, and legal cause to request Bell submit to evidentiary testing. 
3. 
DID HAMISH BELL'S EVIDENTIARY TEST RESULTS INDICATE A 
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE §18-8004? 
1. Bell submitted to breath-testing June 5,2009. 
2. Bell provided breath samples of .1541. 157. 
3. Idaho's legal limit for breath alcohol concentration (BRAC) is .08. 
4. Bell's BRAC results were in violation of I. C. § 18-8004. 
4. 
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH I.C. §18-8004(4), IDAPA RULES, AND THE IDAHO STATE 
POLICE (ISP) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE? 
1. Hamish Bell submitted to evidential breath-testing June 5, 2009, at 0033 
hours. 
2. At the jail and prior to breath-testing, Officer White checked Bell's mouth 
finding it clear and he first observed Bell for plus 15 minutes prior to the 
0001'-' 
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collection of the first breath sample, thus satisfying the requisite15-minute 
monitoring period. 
3. Prior to the observation period, Officer White advised Bell not to burp, belch 
or vomit for the next fifteen minutes. 
4. Officer White was duly qualified to administer evidentiary testing, and he was 
properly certified to operate the evidentiary breath-testing instrument as 
evidenced by his operator certification expiration date of December 2010. 
5. Officer White's sworn statement sets forth that the breath test was performed 
in compliance with statute and the standards and methods adopted by the 
Department of Law Enforcement (DLE)/ISP. 
6. Bell's evidentiary test was conducted in accordance with the requirements of 
I. c. §18-8004, the IDAPA Rules, and ISP's Standard Operating Procedure. 
5. 
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT PROPERLY 
CALIBRATED AND APPROVED FOR USE PURSUANT TO ISP 
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, AND WAS THE 
INSTRUMENT FUNCTIONING ACCURATELY AT THE TIME OF 
BREATH-TESTING? 
1. Hamish Bell submitted to an evidential breath test June 5, 2009, at 0033 
hours, utilizing the breath-testing instrument. 
2. The acceptable simulator solution check #0006, conducted June 5, 2008, at 
0033 hours, immediately prior to the breath test, with calibration results of 
.083, approved the evidentiary testing instrument for evidentiary use in 
accordance with the ISP Standard Operating Procedure. 
3. The Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure at section 2.2.3 sets 
forth that a two sample calibration check using a 0.08 reference solution 
should be ran and the results logged each time a solution is replaced with 
fresh solution. A 0.08 reference solution should be replaced with fresh 
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solution approximately every 100 samples or every month, whichever comes 
first. 
4. Section 2.2.4 sets forth that a two sample calibration check using a 0.20 
reference solution should be run and results logged once per calendar month 
and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 20-25 samples. 
5. In this case, both the 0.08 and 0.20 solution changes were performed two 
days prior to Bell's evidentiary test, thus the solutions were fresh, current and 
valid, and the evidentiary testing instrument was properly calibrated and 
approved for use on the date Bell submitted to evidentiary testing. 
6. Contrary to argument, the Standard Operating Procedure is absent of any 
language that sets forth that calibration checks are only good if there are 
subsequent checks. 
7. Section 2.2.1 of the Standard Operating Procedure sets forth that Intoxilyzer 
5000/EN calibration check is run using 0.08 and/or 0.20 reference solutions 
provided by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services or approved vendor 
and following the procedure outlined in the Intoxilyzer 5000/EN manual. 
8. Exhibit 0, the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Analysis for 
simulator solution lot #8804, has approved the 0.08 solution for calibration 
checks to be run with an expiration date of August 11,2010, with that 
Certificate of Analysis issued September 24, 2008. 
9. Exhibit P, the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Analysis for 
simulator solution lot #8101, has approved the 0.20 solution for calibration 
checks to be run with an expiration date of October 7, 2009, with that 
Certificate of Analysis issued August 12, 2008. 
10. Thus, both the 0.08 and 0.20 simulator solutions used to conduct calibration 
checks are current and valid for evidentiary testing in the State of Idaho. 
11. A reasonable inference can be drawn that if the Idaho State Police has 
certified simulator solution lot #'s 8804 and 8101 to be used to conduct 
calibration checks with respect to breath alcohol examination that it came 
from an approved provider. 
12. Conversely, if the simulator solutions were not certified by the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services for purposes of evidentiary testing, they would not 
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be in the possession of the various law enforcement agencies throughout the 
State of Idaho. 
13. Petitioner's Exhibit N, the contract between Repco and the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services, is an outdated contract with an expiration date of 
February 19, 200B, 16 months prior to Bell's evidentiary test, thus that exhibit 
is insufficient evidence to show that the solutions were not certified by an 
approved provider nor the Idaho State Police. 
14. This record is absent of any factual evidence to show that the simulator 
solutions were not properly certified nor approved for evidentiary use. 
15. Bell's argument fails. 
16. The testing instrument was properly calibrated and approved for evidentiary 
testing of alcohol concentration, and the testing instrument was functioning 
accurately at the time of evidentiary breath-testing. 
6. 
WAS HAMISH BELL ADVISED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SUBMITTING TO EVIDENTIARY TESTING AND THE POSSIBLE 
SUSPENSION OF HIS IDAHO DRIVING PRIVILEGE? 
1. Officer White played Bell the audiotape recording of the Notice of Suspension 
advisory. 
2. I. C. §1B-B002(1) provides that any person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his 
consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, provided that such 
testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable 
grounds to believe that person has been driving or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of I. C. §1B-B004. 
3. Upon review of this record, Officer White properly and substantially advised 
Bell of the true consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing or of 
refusing to submit to evidentiary testing. 
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4. Officer White asserts to Bell that he needs to submit to the breath test, and if 
not, blood will be drawn. 
5. Based on Idaho's Implied Consent law, Officer White's assertion is accurate. 
6. Because Bell had already given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by 
driving on a public highway, he also gave his consent to a blood draw if 
necessary. 
7. In State v. Diaz, 2007 Opinion No. 53, the court held that nothing in Idaho 
Code § 18-8002 limits the officer's authority to require a defendant to submit 
to a blood draw. 
8. Pursuant to Diaz, implied consent to evidentiary testing is not limited to the 
breathalyzer test, but may also include testing the suspect's blood or urine. 
9. The evidentiary test to be employed is of the officer's choosing. 
10. Finally, no evidential blood testing was performed, and secondly, Officer 
White did not order anyone to draw blood from Bell. 
11. Based on the implied consent language set forth in I. C. §18-8002(1}, State v. 
Diaz, and based on Officer White having reasonable grounds to believe Bell 
was driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of the provisions 
of I. C. § 18-8004, Officer White possessed legal cause to request Bell submit 
to evidentiary testing either by means of breath or blood testing. 
12. Prior to being offered the breath test, Bell was substantially informed of the 
consequences of refusal and failure of the test as required by I. C. §§ 18-80()2 
and 18-8002A. 
13. Bell was properly advised of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing, and the possible suspension of his Idaho driving privileges. 
7. 
WAS HAMISH BELL IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS? 
1. I. C. §18-8002A(7) provides that the hearing officer shall not vacate the 
suspension, unless he finds, by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(a) the peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) the peace officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence 
of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C, 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) the test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-
8004C, 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) the tests for alcohol concentration, drugs, or other intoxicating substances 
administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the 
testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
(e) the person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing. 
2. None of those grounds have any correlation with discovery issues or the 
production of the Instrument Operations Log. 
3. The State's Response to a Discovery request is separate and apart from any 
relevant basis for dismissing the suspension in this proceeding, thus it shall 
not affect the validity of Bell's suspension outcome. 
4. In the case of the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho, 2003 Opinion No. 
79, in the matter of Michael Peter Kane v. State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation, the court held that the Hearing Officer is not authorized to 
vacate a suspension unless one of the five enumerated grounds have been 
satisfied. 
5. The argument disregards the plain language of the statute, which enumerates 
five grounds upon which a hearing officer may vacate a license suspension, 
none of which concerns questions of discovery response and production of 
supplemental evidence. 
6. It is Bell's burden to present evidence affirmatively showing one or more of 
the grounds for relief enumerated in I. C. §18-8002A(7). 
(l(l(l?? 
7. In this case, Bell was provided with the subpoenaed Instrument Operations 
Log albeit untimely Oust prior to the scheduled hearing time), but a 
continuance was granted to allow Bell's legal counsel the opportunity to 
timely and properly prepare for the rescheduled hearing date. 
8. Additionally, the Boise Police Department timely complied with the Subpoena 
Duces Tecum although the subpoenaed material got misplaced at the Idaho 
Transportation Department. 
9. The purpose of the Subpoena Duces Tecum is to obtain the requested 
documents/information and to make that information a part of the record 
which was the case in Bell's Administrative License Suspension hearing, 
thus any argument regarding timeliness of receipt of the requested 
information is irrelevant and not grounds for dismissal of the suspension. 
10. The Hearing Officer has the sole authority for the conduct of the hearing and 
will determine if documents being offered are relevant. 
11. Bell submitted to evidentiary testing June 5, 2009, with the .08 and .20 
solutions changes and calibration checks performed June 3, 2009, two days 
prior to Bell's evidentiary test, thus the Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by 
the Hearing Officer for the period of June 3, 2009, through June 6,2009, 
provided all the relevant information Bell needed. 
12. Bell was not denied the opportunity to present evidence affirmatively showing 
one or more of the grounds for relief enumerated in I. C. §18-8002A. 
13. Bell presented no factual evidence to vacate the suspension based on any of 
the grounds mandated by I. C. § 18-8002A. 
14. Bell's suspension will not be vacated solely on claims of a discovery 
argument and the production of supplemented evidence beyond the requisite 
documents that need submitted to the Department pursuant to I. C. §18-
8002A. 
15. Bell's arguments fail. 
11. Bell was not denied his due process rights. 
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8. 
DID OFFICER WHITE FOLLOW ALL PROCEDURES AND 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH PURSUANT TO IDAHO LAW AND 
THE ISP STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE? 
1. Officer White followed all procedures and satisfied all requirements pursuant 
to I. C. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004, and the ISP's Standard Operating 
Procedure was properly adhered with. 
CONFLICTING FACTS, IF ANY, WERE CONSIDERED AND 
REJECTED IN FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING CITED FACTS. 
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, I CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE 
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR SUSPENSION OF HAMISH 
BELL'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES WERE COMPLIED WITH IN THIS 
CASE. 
THE FOLLOWING ORDER IS RENDERED: 
ORDER 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension, served pursuant to I.C. §18-
8002A, is SUSTAINED and shall run for a period of one year commencing 
July 5, 2009, and shall remain in effect through July 5, 2010. 
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EXHIBIT 9, HAMISH BELL'S DRIVER'S LICENSE RECORD, SETS FORTH 
THAT THIS IS BELL'S SECOND FAILURE OF EVIDENTIARY TESTING WITHIN 
THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEEDING FIVE YEARS. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 2009 
DAVID J. BAUMANN 
CERTIFIED HEARING OFFICIAL 
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FINAL ORDER 
(Hearings pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-802A) 
This is a final order of the Department. 
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho 
Transportation Department's Administrative License Suspension 
Hearing Unit, PO Box 7129, Boise, 10 83707-1129 within fourteen 
(14) days of the issue date of this order. If the hearing officer fails to 
act upon this motion within twenty-one days of its receipt, the motion 
will be deemed denied. 
Or pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho Code, any party 
aggrieved by this final order or orders previously issued in this case 
may appeal this final order and all previously issued orders in this case 
to district court by filing a petition for judicial review in the district court 
of the county in which: 
1. A hearing was held; 
2. The final agency actions were taken; or 
3. The party seeking review of the order resides. 
An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the issue date 
of this final order. The filing of an appeal to district court does not itself 
stay the effectiveness or enforcement of the order under appeal. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 24th day of September, 2009, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Driver Services Section 
P.O. Box 7129 
Boise, Idaho 83707-1129 
Facsimile: (208) 332-2002 
~ U.S. Mail 
o Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy (Fax) 
for Law Offices of Dean B. rnold 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVIGN 
PRIVILEGES OF: 
Case No. CVOT0918414 
HAMISH ALLAN BELL ORDER GOVERNING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petition for Judicial Review having been filed herein, and it appearing that the 
issues presented on appeal are questions of law and fact; and it further appearing that a 
record/transcript is necessary to process this appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That upon completion of the record the agency shall mail or deliver a notice of 
lodging of transcript and record to all attorneys of record or parties appearing in person 
and to the district court. 
2) That the notice shall inform the parties before the agency that they pick up a 
copy of the transcript and record at the agency and that the parties have fourteen (14) 
days from the date of the mailing of the notice in which to file with the agency any 
objections, and the notice will further advise the petitioner to pay the balance of the fees 
for preparation before the transcript and record will be delivered to the petitioner. 
3) That the Agency shall transmit the settled transcript and record to the district 
court within forty-two (42) days of the service of the petition for judicial review. 
ORDER GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW - Page 1 
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4) That the Agency, upon filing with the Court the record, shall send notice of 
such filing to all parties; 
5) That the Petitioner's brief shall be filed and served within thirty-five (35) days of 
the date the transcript and record are filed with the Court. 
6) That the Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within twenty-eight (28) 
days after service of Petitioner's brief. 
7) That Petitioner's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within twenty-one 
(21) days after service of Respondent's brief. 
8) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument after all briefs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so 
notice for oral argument, the Court will deem oral argument waived and decide the case 
on the briefs and the record. 
Dated this 29th day of September, 2009. 
KATHRYN STICKLEN 
Senior District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 30th day of September, 2009, I mailed (served) a true 
and correct copy of the within instrument to: 
DEAN B. ARNOLD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
300 W MAIN ST, STE 250, OFFICE 202 
BOISE, ID 83702 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
LEGAL DEPARTMENT 
POST OFFICE BOX 7129 
BOISE IDAHO 83707-1129 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition for judicial review of the Idaho Transportation Department's 
("lTD") decision to uphold the administrative suspension of Hamish Bell's driving 
privileges for failure of evidentiary testing following his arrest for driving under the 
influence. Mr. Bell asks this Court to vacate the suspension based upon numerous 
grounds, including but not limited to: 
• the Hearing Officer failed to provide Mr. Bell due process throughout the 
hearing process; 
• the Hearing Officer refused to issue necessary subpoenas and produce 
relevant discovery; 
• the Hearing Officer erroneously concluded that the Boise Police 
Department complied with lTD's subpoenas; 
• the Hearing Officer erroneously concluded that the breath testing 
equipment was properly maintained, accurate, and functioning properly; 
• the Hearing Officer erroneously concluded that Mr. Bell was properly 
informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing; and 
• the Hearing Officer erroneously relied upon the police officer's affidavit 
after the officer had been deemed unreliable by the Boise Police 
Department. 
B. Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings. 
i. Mr. Bell's Arrest. 
On or about June 4, 2009, Mr. Bell was stopped by police for a driving infraction 
and subsequently arrested by Boise Police Officer Tony White for misdemeanor driving 
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under the influence. (R p. 6.) Mr. Bell was transported to the Ada County Sheriff's 
Department for processing. At the jail, Officer White played an audio recording of the 
administrative license suspension (ALS) advisory. (R. p. 62A.) Thereafter, Mr. Bell 
informed Officer White that he would not submit to a breath-alcohol test. (R pp. 264-
267.) Officer White then made numerous incorrect statements of Idaho law governing 
the officer's ability to forcibly obtain a blood draw from Mr. Bell, eventually coercing 
Mr. Bell into submitting two breath samples. (Id.) 
Most notably, Officer White informed Mr. Bell that if he refused to provide a 
breath sample Officer White and other officers would use any amount of force 
necessary to strap Mr. Bell into a chair and obtain a forced blood draw from Mr. Bell's 
body. (Id.) During this time period, Officer White stated he was "forcing" Mr. Bell to 
submit to evidentiary testing, and that he would use as much force as was necessary in 
order to accomplish the requested testing, including getting into a "fight fight." (R pp. 
265-266.) 
The machine recorded test results of .154/.157. (R p. 3.) Officer White served 
Mr. Bell a notice of driver's license suspension. (R pp. 1-2.) 
ii. State's Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Action. 
Based upon Officer White's actions, Mr. Bell filed a Motion to Suppress in the 
criminal case, seeking the exclusion of the breath testing results. (R pp. 263-271.) The 
basis of the motion was that Officer White's conduct constituted an unreasonable search 
and seizure because the test results were obtained through coercion and duress 
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amounting to police misconduct. (Jd.) The State then filed a Motion to Dismiss the 
case with prejudice (R pp. 277-278) which was granted by the magistrate judge. At the 
time, defense counsel believed the State's motion was filed solely in response to the 
Motion to Suppress. 
However, it was subsequently discovered that Officer White had been terminated 
from the Boise Police Department for "conduct unbecoming an officer" after an internal 
investigation in which Officer White made "inconsistent statements"-police jargon for 
an officer who is no longer deemed credible by his department. (A true and correct 
copy of a formal disclosure by the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office is 
attached hereto as Attachment A.) Accordingly, Mr. Bell is currently without 
knowledge whether the criminal case was dismissed upon the strength of his motion, 
Officer White's credibility issues, or both. 
iii. Subpoenas Requested By Mr. Bell In Support of ALS Hearing. 
Mr. Bell requested a hearing pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A regarding the 
administrative suspension of his driving privileges. (R pp. 10-11.) lTD relied upon 
Officer White's affidavit in support of Mr. Bell's suspension. (R pp. 4-5; see also R p. 
292, ~ 6.) Mr. Bell's counsel requested lTD issue various subpoenas for information 
needed at the ALS Hearing (R pp. 10-11) some of which were denied or reduced in 
scope (R pp. 17-19). 
For example, the Hearing Officer refused to issue a subpoena for a copy of 
Officer White's certification for the breath testing device used in this case (the "Intox 
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5000"). (R p. 19.) The Hearing Officer also refused to issue a subpoena for records 
relating to the Intox 5000 beyond the time period June 3-6, 2009. (R p. 18.) Counsel 
for Mr. Bell submitted a letter to the Hearing Officer requesting reconsideration of this 
issue and specifically explained why the additional information was relevant to the 
hearing. (R pp. 27-28.) No response was ever received from the Hearing Officer. 
Mr. Bell's counsel served the original subpoenas as issued by the Hearing 
Officer, all of which had a compliance date of June 29, 2009 for a 10:00 a.m. hearing 
on June 30, 2009. (R pp. 21, 30-33, 52-53.) Due to the anticipated limited timeframe 
to review the subpoenaed information, Mr. Bell's counsel requested a continuance. (R 
pp. 27-28.) The hearing was rescheduled for July 9, 2009. (R p. 34.) On June 25, 
2009, the Boise Police Department acknowledged receipt of the subpoenas for the 
various documents and audio recordings, but specifically stated it did "not have the 
Intoxilyzer logsheets yet for the period of June 3 thru June 6." (R p. 54.) 
iv. July 9, 2009 ALS Hearing. 
As of July 9, 2009, Mr. Bell had still received no information from the Boise 
Police Department in response to the subpoena for information concerning the Intox 
5000. (Tr Vol. I, p. 6, Is. 10-17.) Less than two hours before the scheduled hearing Mr. 
Bell's counsel submitted additional exhibits clearly indicating he intended to raise the 
Boise Police Department's failure to comply with the subpoena as a basis to vacate Mr. 
Bell's suspension. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 3-4, Is. 22-5; R p. 70.) Approximately 1 hour before 
the hearing, lTD faxed Mr. Bell's counsel 14 partially redacted pages of Intoxilyzer log 
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sheets. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 6-7, Is. 24-19; R pp. 71-83.) Mr. Bell's counsel then spoke with 
Callie Downum of lTD, who was unable to state when, where, or from whom the logs 
sheets had been produced. (Tr Vol. II, p. 3, Is. 14-24.) When questioned why the 
documents far exceeded the scope of the subpoena, and appeared inconsistent with the 
subpoena itself, Ms. Downum had no answer. (Id.) 
Mr. Bell's counsel appeared at the hearing and requested the suspension be 
vacated due to Boise Police Department's non-compliance with the subpoena. (Tr Vol. 
I, pp. 5-6, Is. 10-1.) The Hearing Officer denied that request stating, "I'm not going to 
dismiss the suspension just based on a Subpoena issue." (Tr Vol. I, p. 8, Is. 3-4.) The 
Hearing Officer acknowledged Mr. Bell's counsel had been given insufficient time to 
review the belatedly produced documents, but only offered to continue the hearing-an 
offer which Mr. Bell's counsel conceded he was "forced" to accept under the 
circumstances. (Tr Vol. I, p. 8, Is. 2-24.) 
Mr. Bell's counsel then requested subpoenas for and production of the following 
documents: 1) Ms. Downum's testimony concerning the source of the lntoxilyzer 
logsheets; 2) copies of all calibration checks for the lntox 5000 (requested for the third 
time); 3) documents showing the source of the simulator solutions used on the Intox 
5000; 4) documents showing the source of the simulator solutions was an "approved" 
provider as required by IDAPA; 5) documents showing the lntoxilyzer logsheets were 
actually produced by the Boise Police Department in response to Mr. Bell's subpoena; 
and 6) copies of lTD decisions in which other licensed drivers had their privileges 
5 
reinstated when police agencies had failed to comply with a subpoena issued by ITO. 
(R pp. 39-40.) The Hearing Officer produced copies of two certificates of analysis for 
simulator solutions #8804 and #8101 (R pp. 99-100) but denied all requests for the 
subpoenas and refused to produce the information in the possession of lTD (R p. 20). A 
new hearing date was set for July 23, 2009. (R p. 37.) 
v. July 23, 2009 ALS Hearing. 
At the subsequent hearing, Mr. Bell raised numerous due process arguments 
concerning the Hearing Officer's refusal to issue subpoenas for relevant and material 
information. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 3-5, Is. 3-18.) Mr. Bell's counsel submitted oral proffers 
to what that evidence would have shown had the subpoenas been issued. (Id.) For 
example, Mr. Bell's counsel proffered that had the Hearing Officer produced the 
requested ALS decisions, they would show that other individuals had their driving 
privileges reinstated based solely upon an agency's non-compliance to an lTD 
subpoena. (Tr Vol. II, p. 4, Is. 12-16.) Similarly, Mr. Bell's counsel proffered that had 
Ms. Downun been required to testify, her testimony would show the Intoxilyzer 
logsheets produced by lTD had not been produced by the Boise Police Department in 
response to Mr. Bell's subpoena. (Tr Vol. II, p. 3, Is. 14-24.) Mr. Bell's counsel also 
proffered that had the information concerning the simulator solutions and calibration 
checks been provided, those documents would show the Intox 5000 was not maintained 
in compliance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (lDAPA) and the Idaho 
State Police Standard Operating Procedures (the "SOP's"). (Tr Vol. II, pp. 4-5, Is. 7-2.) 
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However, because Mr. Bell had been denied access to the requested information, 
he was forced to submit documents from other cases which supported these same 
arguments. For example, Mr. Bell submitted documentation produced by the State of 
Idaho and the Boise Police Department in a separate proceeding proving affirmatively 
that the Boise Police Department failed to conduct the required 0.08 calibration check 
on the Intox 5000. (R pp. 101-104.) Thus, the Intox 5000 was not properly maintained 
as required by IDAPA and the SOP's. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 16-19, Is. 1-10.) Moreover, Mr. 
Bell submitted documents authenticated by the State of Idaho in discovery in a separate 
case that the provider of the simulator lot solutions was no longer under contract with 
the State of Idaho. (R pp. 84-94.) Thus, the source of the simulator solutions was not 
an "approved" provider as required by IDAPA and the SOP's. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 4-5, Is. 
17-2; Tr Vol. II, pp. 5-6, Is. 19-20.) 
Mr. Bell also submitted the audio recording of Officer White's interaction with 
Mr. Bell documenting the fact Officer White admitted to "forcing" Mr. Bell to submit 
to evidentiary testing, and had threatened to use any amount of force to obtain a blood 
draw from Mr. Bell if he would not submit to a breath test. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 7-10, Is. Il-
lS, citing Exhibit H (R p. 62A).) Mr. Bell's counsel argued that Officer White's 
incorrect statements concerning Officer White's ability to obtain a forced blood draw 
violated Idaho law that required Mr. Bell be properly informed of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 6-12, Is. 21-23.) Mr. Bell's counsel 
also argued that Officer White's coercive tactics nullified the audio advisory because 
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instead of relying upon the plain language of the statutory advisory Officer White chose 
to obtain a breath sample from Mr. Bell through coercion and duress amounting to 
police misconduct. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 12-25, Is. 24-25.) 
vi. Hearing Officer's Decision. 
On September 14,2009-53 days after the hearing and 102 days after Mr. Bel/'s 
arrest-the Hearing Officer issued a written decision finding against Mr. Bell on every 
issue raised by him and sustaining Mr. Bell's one-year driver's license suspension 
beginning on July 5, 2009. (R pp. 282-299.) On September 24, 2009, Mr. Bell filed a 
timely Petition for Judicial Review. (R pp. 300-323.) On October 20, 2009, the Court 
issued an Order staying Mr. Bell's suspension beginning on October 23,2009. On 
December 1, 2009, lTD filed its Notice of Filing of Transcript, thereby initiating the 
briefing schedule pursuant to the Court's Order Governing Judicial Review. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the subpoenas issued by the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due 
process rights? 
2. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by 
impermissibly extending the administrative hearing process? 
3. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing 
to issue subpoenas regarding Officer White's lntox 5000 certification? 
4. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing 
to issue subpoenas regarding calibration checks? 
5. Did the Hearing Officer err by finding the Boise Police Department 
complied with lTD's subpoena? 
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6. Did the Hearing Officer err in concluding that Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension could not be vacated based upon the Boise Police 
Department's failure to comply with lTD's subpoenas? 
7. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing 
to issue subpoenas and produce documents regarding Boise Police 
Department's compliance with lTD's subpoena? 
8. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State failed to 
comply with IDAPA and the Standard Operating Procedures? 
9. Did the Hearing Officer err in sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State's adopted 
procedures do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning of the breath 
testing device. 
10. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the provider of the 
simulator solutions was not an "approved" provider as required by IDAPA 
and the Standard Operating Procedures? 
11. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed Officer White failed 
to properly inform Mr. Bell of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing? 
12. Did the Hearing Officer err by relying on Officer White's affidavit when 
the State was in actual or constructive knowledge that Officer White had 
been deemed unreliable by the Boise Police Department? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review ofITD 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's 
license. In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941,155 P.3d 1176,1180 (Ct. App. 2006), citing 
I.C. § 67-5270. "When a district court entertains a petition for judicial review, it does 
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so in an appellate capacity." Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646, 648 (2009). The Court does not substitute its 
judgment for that of the lTD as to the weight of the evidence presented. In re Gibbar, 
143 Idaho at 941,155 P.3d at 1180. Instead, the Court defers to the lTD on findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
"A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed 
the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion." Id. at 941-42, 155 P.3dat 1180-81, citingI.C. § 67-5279(3). 
B. The Hearing Provided by lTD Violated Procedural Due Process. 
Mr. Bell has a right to procedural due process l throughout the administrative 
hearing proceedings. Id. at 945, 155 P.3d at 1184. The private interest in Mr. Bell's 
driver's license is substantial. Id. at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186, citing Matter of McNeely, 
119 Idaho 182, 191,804 P.2d 911, 920 (Ct. App. 1990). 
i. The Hearing Officer's Subpoenas Denied Mr. Bell Due Process. 
In ALS proceedings, the petitioner can request the Hearing Officer issue 
subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary or 
tangible evidence. IDAPA § 39.02.72.300.01. The petitioner is required to serve the 
1 Unless otherwise noted, all references to due process include all protections afforded 
by both the United States Constitution as well as the Idaho Constitution. 
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sUbpoenas. IDAPA § 39.02.72.300.02. However, the lTD has taken it upon itself to 
issue subpoenas that order the respondents to produce the documents and tangible items 
directly to lTD. (R pp. 17-18.) Then, lTD provides the documents, etc., to the 
petitioner. Documents can be forwarded by lTD to the petitioner via facsimile. But 
tangible objects such as compact discs of video and audio recordings must be sent by 
mail. Thus, under no set of circumstances do the subpoenas ensure that the subpoenaed 
information will be received by the petitioner until the day after the compliance date set 
by lTD on the subpoena. 
Here, the subpoenas were issued by the Hearing Officer with a compliance date 
of June 29, 2009. The Hearing Officer set the Hearing for 10:00 a.m. on June 30, 2009. 
This case, like just about all DUI cases, included a request for all audio and video 
recordings. (R pp. 17, 62A.) Accordingly, under no set of circumstances would the 
subpoenas issued by the Hearing Officer ensure that all the information would be 
received by Mr. Bell before the Hearing-let alone with sufficient time for Mr. Bell and 
his counsel to review that information in preparation for the Hearing. 
These subpoenas-on their face-are constitutionally unsound because they are 
designed to prevent the petitioner from receiving relevant information with sufficient 
time prior to the ALS Hearing to prepare to carry the petitioner's statutory burden. See 
I.e. § 18-8002A(7). There can be no better proof of a system that denies due process 
than the very subpoenas issued by lTD in this ALS proceeding. 
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ii. The Hearing Officer Impermissibly Extended the Hearing Process. 
An administrative license suspension goes into effect 30 days after service of the 
notice of suspension. I.C. § lS-S002A(4)(b). The hearing process is set up to have a 
hearing and ruling prior to the driver's license suspension going into effect. IDAPA § 
39.02.72.600.01. This is accomplished by requiring the driver to request a hearing 
within seven days, and then requiring a hearing before a Hearing Officer within 20 days 
from the driver's request, thus allowing at least three days for the Hearing Officer to 
render a decision before the suspension begins. I.C. § lS-S002A(7). The Hearing 
Officer may extend this time period for one ten-day period "for good cause shown." Id. 
Here, the Hearing Officer had already extended Mr. Bell's hearing ten days until 
July 9, 2009. At that point, the Boise Police Department had failed to produce the 
subpoenaed documents. Mr. Bell's counsel appeared at the July 9, 2009 hearing and 
requested Mr. Bell's driving pri vi leges be reinstated based upon the failure of the Boise 
Police Department to respond to the subpoena. The Hearing Officer acknowledged that 
Mr. Bell and his counsel had been denied a reasonable opportunity to review the 
documents that had been sent over by lTD just minutes before the Hearing, but the 
Hearing Officer refused to vacate the suspension for that reason, and merely offered 
Mr. Bell a continuance. However, the Hearing Officer was without authority to extend 
the Hearing any further because the statutory maximum ten days had already been used. 
(R pp. 21, 34.) Thus, the Hearing Officer, having acknowledged Mr. Bell was denied a 
reasonable opportunity to review the documents subpoenaed by lTD prior to the 
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Hearing, was required to vacate the suspension. 
In addition, the Hearing Officer's failure to issue a prompt decision also violated 
due process. IDAP A requires the Hearing Officer issue a written decision prior to the 
expiration of the 30 day permit. IDAPA § 39.02.72.600.01. Here, after the July 23, 
2009 hearing had occurred, the Hearing Officer took another 53 days to issue a 
decision. Thus, by the time the decision was issued, Mr. Bell's driving privileges had 
already been administratively suspendedfor 72 days-well beyond that permitted by 
statute or the constitutional protections of due process-without a ruling. 
Accordingly, Mr. Bell's driving privileges were suspended in violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-8002A(7) and his constitutional rights to due process. 
iii. The Hearing Officer Wrongfully Refused Mr. Bell's Request for 
Subpoenas Regarding Officer White's Certification. 
The officer conducting a breath alcohol test must be certified on the machine. 
IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.04. Mr. Bell has a right to confirm whether the officer 
conducting the test is currently certified to use the machine in question. Mr. Bell 
requested a subpoena for this information (R p. 11), which the Hearing Officer denied 
(R p. 19). The Hearing Officer, by denying this request, denied Mr. Bell due process. 2 
2 As explained later in this brief, Officer White's affidavit should not be considered 
sufficient evidence of his breath testing certification because he has been deemed 
unreliable and terminated by the Boise Police Department because of his credibility 
lssues. 
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iv. The Hearing Officer Wrongfully Refused Mr. Bell's Requests for 
Subpoenas Regarding Calibration Checks. 
Mr. Bell was entitled to challenge the breath testing results from the Intox 5000 
by showing the machine was inaccurate or not functioning properly. In re Gibbar, 143 
Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. IDAPA and the SOP's require the State to conduct a 
0.08 calibration check approximately every 100 samples or every month, whichever 
comes first. SOP § 2.2.3. The required calibration checks are recorded on the 
corresponding logsheets and, in certain circumstances, calibration checklists. (R pp. 
73, 78, 83, 104.) "Failure to abide by the regulations set forth in the standard operating 
procedures and training manuals renders the test inadmissible as evidence absent expert 
testimony that the improperly administered test nevertheless produced reliable results." 
In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 210 P.3d 584, 586 (Ct. App. 2009); cf Wheeler v. 
Idaho Transp. Dept., No. 35839,2009 WL 3299003, at *6 (Ct. App. Oct. 15,2009), 
petition for rev. filed (Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2009) (violation of calibration check allows 
driver to attack test result with evidence that violation rendered result unreliable). 
Mr. Bell first requested the Hearing Officer issue a subpoena for the logsheets to 
the Intox 5000 for the 30 days before and after Mr. Bell's arrest (approximately from 
May 4 thru July 4, 2009). The Hearing Officer denied that request, and only issued a 
subpoena for June 3-6, 2009. Mr. Bell immediately requested the Hearing Officer 
reconsider this subpoena as the "information was specifically requested in order to 
determine whether the calibration of the Intoxilyzer machine at issue had been properly 
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checked as required by Idaho law and standard operating procedures." (R p. 28, ~ 6.) 
No response was received from the Hearing Officer. After the initial hearing on July 9, 
2009, Mr. Bell sent another request specifically requesting a subpoena for "[a] copy of 
all documents reflecting any and all calibration checks performed from May 1, 2009 to 
July 13, 2009 on the breath-alcohol testing device used in this case." (R p. 39, ~ 2.) 
That request was denied as well. (R p. 20.) 
Accordingly, Mr. Bell was denied due process because the Hearing Officer 
refused to issue a subpoena for the only records that would allow Mr. Bell to determine 
whether the Intox 5000 was accurate, operating properly, and had been maintained as 
required by Idaho law. The subpoena issued by the Hearing Officer was insufficient on 
its face because under no possible set of circumstances would it produce the 
information to which Mr. Bell was entitled. 
v. The Hearing Officer Erred in Finding the Boise Police Department 
Complied With the lTD Subpoena. 
The Hearing Officer has discretion to admit or exclude evidence. I.e. § 67-5251. 
However, the Hearing Officer cannot offer exhibits on behalf of Mr. Bell, regardless of 
whether that information was obtained pursuant to a subpoena or not. 
Here, the Hearing Officer offered and admitted the belatedly produced Intox 
Logs into evidence over Mr. Bell's objection. Specifically, Mr. Bell's counsel objected 
to the documents, inter alia, that Mr. Bell had not offered them as an exhibit, but more 
importantly, that they had not been produced in response to lTD's subpoena, but 
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instead, lTD had merely supplied numerous pages of intoxilyzer logsheets once it 
became apparent Mr. Bell was going to raise the Boise Police Department's failure to 
respond to the subpoena as a basis to vacate his suspension. The Hearing Officer 
overruled the objection and admitted the documents as Exhibit L. (R pp. 71-83.) 
Under the circumstances, Mr. Bell was clearly entitled to discovery on the source 
of those documents (now admitted as an exhibit), especially in light of Ms. Downum's 
previous inability to explain either how these documents mysteriously appeared just 
minutes before the hearing or why they far exceeded the scope of the subpoena served 
on the Boise Police Department. However, when Mr. Bell requested subpoenas to 
determine whether Exhibit L had in fact been produced in response to the lTD 
subpoena, the Hearing Officer denied those requests. Then, without taking any 
testimony from Ms. Downum as requested by Mr. Bell, and without subpoenaing any 
documents that could answer these questions as requested by Mr. Bell, the Hearing 
Officer made the following findings of fact: 
1. The Boise Police Department timely complied with the Subpoena Duces 
Tecum; and 
2. The subpoenaed material got misplaced at the Idaho Transportation 
Department. 
(R p. 297, 8) (emphasis added.) 
The problem is there is absolutely no evidence in the record supporting either of 
these two findings of fact. In fact, the Hearing Officer precl uded himself from making 
any such findings when he denied Mr. Bell's requests for subpoenas on these precise 
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issues. Moreover, both findings of fact directly contradict Mr. Bell's counsel's proffers 
(based upon his conversation with Ms. Downum) as to what the evidence would have 
shown had Mr. Bell been provided this information. Furthermore, no logical inference 
can be made that these documents were provided in response to the lTD subpoena 
because Exhibit L (covering April 28-June 6) is entirely inconsistent with the scope of 
the subpoena that was served on the Boise Police Department (covering June 3-6). The 
only logical inference is that the documents were not produced by the Boise Police 
Department in response to that subpoena. 
These "findings of fact" are clearly erroneous and cannot stand. Also, the 
Hearing Officer's decision to admit Exhibit L violated due process, was made on 
unlawful procedure, exceeded statutory authority, was not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
vi. The Hearing Officer Wrongfully Refused Mr. Bell's Requests for 
Subpoenas and Discovery Regarding Boise Police Department's 
Compliance With lTD's Subpoena. 
The Hearing Officer refused to vacate Mr. Bell's suspension based upon the 
Boise Police Department's failure to comply with the subpoena. (R p. 297, ~ 14.) This 
alone violated due process. 
Mr. Bell is permitted to request a document directly from lTD which "is a public 
record, relates to the petitioner hearing, and is in the possession of the Department." 
IDAPA § 39.02.72.400.01. At the July 9, 2009 Hearing, the Hearing Officer stated that 
subpoena non-compliance was not a basis to vacate Mr. Bell's suspension. In response 
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to this legal conclusion, Mr. Bell's counsel requested that ITO produce "[a] copy of all 
ALS Hearing decisions issued in the last twelve (12) months vacating an administrative 
driver's license suspension based upon a failure to comply with a subpoena issued by 
the ITO." (R p. 40.) That request was denied by the Hearing Officer. (R p. 43.) 
The Hearing Officer's refusal to disclose this information violates due process 
because it precluded Mr. Bell from obtaining the very information necessary to 
establish the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion was incorrect. Mr. Bell's counsel had a 
good faith basis to request these documents because he had personally viewed at least 
one ITO decision vacating a driver's license suspension solely for subpoena non-
compliance. Notably, the Hearing Officer did not respond by stating no such decisions 
exist. Instead, the Hearing Officer claimed the requested documents were "not clearly 
relevant." (R p. 43.) ITO, by refusing to disclose this information, precluded Mr. Bell 
from information within ITO's possession, custody, and control that would have refuted 
the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that treated Mr. Bell differently than other ALS 
petitioners. 
Not only did ITO's conduct violate due process, it shows the Hearing Officer's 
decision was made upon unlawful procedure and exceeded statutory authority. 
Moreover, had this information been disclosed, it would have shown the Hearing 
Officer's decision upholding Mr. Bell's driver's license suspension was not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
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C. Mr. Bell Affirmatively Proved He Is Entitled to Have His Driver's License 
Suspension Vacated. 
In order to prevail at the Hearing, Mr. Bell was required to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
1. The tests results did not show an alcohol concentration in violation of 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004; or 
2. The tests for alcohol concentration were not conducted in accordance with 
Idaho Code Section 18-8004(4); or 
3. The testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
4. Mr. Bell was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required by Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2). 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(c), (d) & (e). The first three issues allow the driver to challenge the 
results of the Intox 5000 by showing the testing equipment was inaccurate or was not 
functioning properly, or that the State's adopted procedures do not ensure accuracy and 
proper functioning of the equipment. In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. 
The last isssue allows the driver to challenge whether the State completely advised him 
of his rights and duties under the statute. In re Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 
182, 183 (Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis in original). Because Mr. Bell established each of 
these requirements at the Hearing, the Hearing Officer's decision must be set aside. 
i. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded the Breath Testing 
Instrument Had Been Maintained In Accordance With IDAP A and the 
Standard Operating Procedures. 
IDAPA sets forth exacting standards the State must comply with in order for the 
results from the Intox 5000 to be valid: 
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Each breath testing instrument shall be checked on a 
schedule established by the Department for accuracy with a 
simulator solution provided by the department or by a source 
approved by the department. These checks shall be 
performed according to a procedure established by the 
department. 
IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.05 (emphasis added). The SOP's require: 
A two sample calibration check using a 0.08 reference 
solution should be ran and results logged each time a 
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 reference 
solution should be replaced with fresh solution 
approximately every 100 samples or every month, whichever 
comes first. 
SOP § 2.2.3 (emphasis added). Failure to meet any of these conditions is grounds to 
have the breath testing device disapproved for use until the deficiency is corrected. 
IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.07. Here, Mr. Bell affirmatively showed the State failed to 
comply with both IDAP A and the SOP's. 
First, the Hearing Officer denied Mr. Bell's request for a subpoena for this very 
information. (See, e.g., R p. 297, ~ 11) (stating the subpoena issued for records from 
June 3-6, 2009 "provided all the relevant information Bell needed.") That alone is 
sufficient cause for this Court to set aside Mr. Bell's suspension because the denial of 
the subpoena denied Mr. Bell his right to procedural due process. 
Second, despite the Hearing Officer's refusal to allow Mr. Bell access to the very 
information he needed to meet his burden, Mr. Bell affirmatively proved the State failed 
to comply with IDAPA and the SOP's through the use of documents obtained by Mr. 
Bell's counsel in a separate case. Exhibit S, a Calibration Checklist, affirmatively 
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proves that on June 25, 2009, Officer Sperry of the Boise Police Department conducted 
the 0.20 calibration check, but did not complete the 0.08 calibration check. (R p. 104.) 
Third, the Calibration Checklist proves that the reason for the calibration check 
was "100 tests." (Id.) This is significant for at least three reasons: 1) the purpose of the 
calibration checks on June 25, 2009 was to perform a 0.08 calibration check; 2) 0.08 
calibration checks are required every 100 samples-not tests; and 3) by waiting 100 
tests, the State had waited twice as long to conduct the statutorily required calibration 
checks because there are two samples in every test. 3 
Fourth, the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion that "the Standard Operating 
Procedure is absent of any language that sets forth that calibration checks are only good 
if there are subsequent checks" completely ignores the express language of both the 
SOP's and IDAPA. (R p. 293, ~ 6.) As set forth previously, the SOP's are required by 
IDAPA, and both the SOP's and IDAP A require both prior and subsequent calibration 
checks. In fact, IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.07 expressly states that failure to perform these 
required checks is grounds to remove the machine from use. The Hearing Officer's 
decision completely ignores these statutory requirements-as well as the affirmative 
evidence showing the State failed to comply with them. 
3 A valid breath alcohol test includes two separate breath samples. SOP § 3.2. 
Therefore, each time a subject successfully blows into the Intoxilyzer 5000 it 
constitutes one sample. See State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 428-29, 913 P.2d 1196, 
1198-99 (Ct. App. 1996) (discussing breath test with Intoxilyzer 5000 requires two 
separate breath "samples" per subject). Accordingly," 1 00 tests" equals 200 samples. 
Id. 
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Fifth, the Hearing Officer improperly relied upon Officer White's boilerplate 
affidavit as evidence that Mr. "Bell's evidentiary test was conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004, the IDAPA Rules, and ISP's Standard Operating 
Procedure." (R p. 292, ~ 6.) It is established Idaho law that such generalized 
statements in an officer's sworn affidavit are not sufficient when confronted by credible 
evidence that demonstrates a violation of proper procedures. Bennett v. State, Dept. of 
Transp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505, 508-09 (Ct. App. 2009). The Intox Logsheets 
(Exhibit L) and Officer Sperry's Calibration Checklist (Exhibit S) are credible evidence 
the Intox 5000 was not maintained in accordance with IDAPA and the SOP's. (R pp. 
71-83,104.) 
Sixth, even using the documents offered and admitted into evidence by the 
Hearing Officer, the evidence proves the State failed to comply with IDAP A and the 
SOP's. Exhibit L shows that there were 164 samples tested between the 0.08 
calibration checks on May 15,2009 and June 3, 2009. (R pp. 78-83.) Accordingly, 
Exhibit L-which was relied upon by the Hearing Officer-proves the State failed to 
comply with IDAPA and the SOP's. 
Seventh, the Hearing Officer failed to acknowledge Officer Sperry's Calibration 
Checklist (Exhibit S; R p. 104) in his findings of fact, or to justify why it should not be 
considered. 
Therefore, the evidence admitted by the Hearing Officer affirmatively proves the 
State checked the 0.08 calibration on May 15, 2009, then again on June 3, 2009 after 
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164 samples, and then again at some time unknown, but not before 100 tests, and not 
before June 25, 2009. Thus, no matter which documents are analyzed, they all establish 
the State failed to comply with IDAPA and the SOP's. The Hearing Officer's decision 
to the contrary violated due process, exceeded statutory authority, was made upon 
unlawful procedure, was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
ii. The State's Adopted Procedures for the Intox 5000 Do Not Ensure 
Accuracy and Proper Functioning. 
Of course, if the Hearing Officer was correct, and there is no requirement to 
perform prior and subsequent calibration checks, the "standards" themselves are 
therefore illusory, and do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning. If so, the 
Hearing Officer erred by not vacating Mr. Bell's driver's license suspension for this 
reason. See In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. 
In other words, the State cannot have it both ways. It either violated its own 
standards associated with maintaining the Intox 5000, or its standards are too vague and 
unenforceable to ensure the functioning and accuracy of the machine. IDAPA requires 
the Idaho State Police to establish standards that must be complied with. See, e.g., 
IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.03. The Idaho State Police has attempted to do so in the SOP's. 
If the SOP's do not require an exacting standard by which the Hearing Officer or this 
Court can determine as a matter of fact whether the State has complied with or violated 
those standards, there are essentially no standards at all. 
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Here, the State performed the required 0.08 calibration check on May 15, 2009. 
Then, 164 samples later, it performed another 0.08 calibration check. Two days later, 
Mr. Bell submitted to evidentiary testing. Then, "100 tests" later, the State prepared to 
conduct the required 0.08 calibration check, but failed to do so. If such actions by the 
State do not rise to the level of violations of IDAP A and the SOP's that would vacate a 
driver's license suspension, there are essentially no enforceable standards to ensure 
these machines are operating as they are supposed to. If there are no enforceable 
standards to ensure accuracy and proper functioning of the breath-testing devices, Mr. 
Bell's driver's license suspension must be vacated because "the state has adopted 
procedures that do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning." In re Gibbar, 143 
Idaho at 947,155 P.3d at 1186. 
Under either scenario, the Hearing Officer's decision violated due process, 
exceeded statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
iii. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded the Simulator Solutions 
Came From An "Approved" Provider In Accordance With IDAP A and 
the Standard Operating Procedures. 
IDAPA requires that the simulator solutions used in the calibration checks be 
"provided by the department or by a source approved by the department." IDAP A § 
11.03.01.013.05. The SOP's also contain this requirement. SOP § 2.2.1. Mr. Bell 
requested subpoenas for "[a] copy of all documents identifying the source of the 
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simulator solution(s) used from May 1, 2009 to July 13, 2009 to check the calibration of 
the breath-alcohol testing device used in this case." (R p. 39.) This subpoena was 
refused by the Hearing Officer. (R p. 20.) Nonetheless, Mr. Bell affirmatively showed 
the source of the simulator solutions was no longer an approved provider. 
First, the Hearing Officer denied Mr. Bell's request for a subpoena for this very 
information. That alone is sufficient for this Court to set aside Mr. Bell's suspension 
because the denial of the subpoena denied Mr. Bell his right to procedural due process. 
Second, despite the Hearing Officer's refusal to allow Mr. Bell access to the very 
information he needed to meet his burden, Mr. Bell affirmatively proved the State failed 
to comply with IDAPA through the use of documents obtained by Mr. Bell's counsel in 
a separate case. As proffered by Mr. Bell's counsel at the Hearing, the provider of the 
simulator solutions used by Idaho law enforcement agencies is Repco Marketing, Inc. 
("Repco"), and Repco provides the simulator solutions directly to the law enforcement 
agencies. (Tr Vol. II, pp. 4-5.) Exhibit N, an addendum to Idaho State Police Contract 
Number ISP-06-48, affirmatively proves the contract between ISP and Repco expired on 
February 19, 2008-approximately 16 months prior to Mr. Bell's arrest. (R p. 94.) 
This contract was authenticated by the State of Idaho on May 1, 2009, when it produced 
the same in criminal discovery in a separate case. (R pp. 84-92.) Specifically, in 
Exhibit M, the State of Idaho stated in Response 20: "the city responds by disclosing a 
copy of a contract between Idaho State Police and RepCo Marketing, Inc. It is the 
City's understanding that there is not a current contract and was not a current contract 
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at the time of the testing of this Defendant." (R p. 86) (emphasis added.) 
Third, the Hearing Officer ignored the expired contract because it was "an 
outdated contract with an expiration date of February 19,2008." (R p. 294, ~ 13.) Yet, 
that is exactly the point. The contract had expired, and Repco was no longer an 
"approved" provider as required by IDAPA and the SOP's. The State even admitted no 
such contract was in effect as of May 1, 2009. It is implausible to infer that such a 
contract had been renewed sometime between May 1 and Mr. Bell's arrest on June 4, 
when no such contract had been entered for 16 months.4 Similarly, it was an abuse of 
discretion for the Hearing Officer to determine the contract was "insufficient evidence" 
simply because it was expired, when in fact, it had been offered to affirmatively prove 
Repco's "approval" status had expired with the contract. 
Fourth, the Hearing Officer found there was no "factual evidence to show that 
the simulator solutions were not properly certified nor approved for evidentiary use." 
(R p. 294, ~ 14.) This finding is clearly erroneous as it directly conflicts with Exhibits 
M and N which established no current contract existed. Especially in light of the 
Hearing Officer's denial of any subpoenas for this information, Mr. Bell went far above 
and beyond that which could have been expected of him under the circumstances. To 
then reject this information produced by and confirmed by the State exceeded the 
Hearing Officer's statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, was not 
4 Of course, had such a contract been entered, the requested subpoena would have 
produced this document. Here, the Hearing Officer denied the subpoena and then infers 
one must exist. Such procedure is entirely unlawful. 
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supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion. 
Fifth, the Hearing Officer relied solely on Exhibits 0 and P as a "reasonable 
inference" that the simulator solutions came from an approved provider. (R pp. 293-94, 
~~ 7-12.) However, these certificates of analysis are merely a boilerplate document 
signed by a forensic scientist for the Idaho State Police containing a legal conclusion 
beyond his legal capacity to assert. The expired contract with Repco proves it was no 
longer an "approved" provider. Such credible evidence overcomes the purported legal 
conclusions to the contrary by a forensic scientist. See Bennett, 147 Idaho 141, 206 
P .3d at 508-09 (holding officer's generalized affidavit concerning employment of 
proper procedures with alcohol breath-testing device is insufficient when contradicted 
by credible evidence demonstrating violation of proper procedures). "Thus, the hearing 
officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in compliance with procedural 
standards is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Id. at 509. 
And in any event, the simulator solutions relied upon by the Hearing Officer 
were purportedly "certified" on August 12, 2008 (R p. 100) and September 24, 2008 (R 
p. 99)-dates when the State has admitted there was no contract in effect. 
iv. The Hearing Officer Incorrectly Concluded Mr. Bell Was Completely 
and Properly Informed of the Consequences of Submitting to 
Evidentiary Testing. 
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(2) requires that certain information be provided 
prior to evidentiary testing. Idaho law requires strict adherence to the statutory 
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language of the advisory. In re Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Ct. App. 
1995) ("Idaho law requires strict adherence to the statutory language"); accord In re 
Beem, 119 Idaho 289, 292, 805 P.2d 495, 498 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Our Supreme Court has 
emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial gloss upon the legislature's 
license suspension scheme"). This requirement must be met "in no uncertain terms." 
Id. When the State fails to properly advise the individual of the information regarding 
refusal the license suspension will not be upheld. I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(e); In re 
Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,368,744 P.2d 92, 96 (1987). 
Here, Officer White played the audio advisory for Mr. Bell. However, when 
Officer White asked Mr. Bell if he had any questions about the advisory, Officer White 
completely misrepresented the law of refusal and the State's ability to have a forced 
blood draw taken from Mr. Bell. 
The following consists of relevant portions of the audio recordings made at the 
Ada County Sheriff's Jail, beginning immediately after the conclusion of the audio 
advisory:5 
Officer: Mr. Bell, do you have any questions about that, sir? 
[29: 17] 
Hamish Bell: Umm ... I'm not going to give evidence. 
Officer: OK. Well if you don't take this then I am going to have 
to call someone to come take your blood. We're going to 
5 A true and correct copy of the audio recording is Exhibit H to the Agency Record. (R 
p.62A.) The relevant portions recited herein appear on Track 2 of the compact disc, at 
approximately 29: 17-35 :35. 
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take your blood. 
Hamish Bell: You can force that? 
Officer: Dh-uh. 
Hamish Bell: Why's that? 
Officer: Because the State of Idaho says I can. 
Hamish Bell: I am not a resident of America - I'm not a citizen of 
America. 
Officer: Doesn't matter. You're in Idaho. If you don't take this 
breath test I am going to call a paramedic down and take 
your blood. Which way-which one are you going to do? 
Hamish Bell: How do you get to take my blood? 
Officer: Because you are driving on the roads of Idaho. 
Hamish Bell: So I can't talk to anyone? 
Officer: Not until we're done. 
Hamish Bell: Would you normally get to take someone's blood? 
Officer: Yep. 
Hamish Bell: No matter who it is? 
Officer: No matter who it is. 
Hamish Bell: As evidence [recording unintelligible.] 
Officer: Yep. So, Mr. Bell, are you going to take the breath test 
or are we going to take your blood? 
Hamish Bell: So why do you get the right to draw blood from me? 
Officer: Because the State of Idaho says I can. You were driving 
on the roads in Idaho. We don't take refusals. We'll take 
your blood. We'll put you in that chair if we have to and 
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take your blood. That's why it's here. 
Hamish Bell: I guess so ... 
Officer: OK . 
Hamish Bell: ... because you-because you are forcing me. 
Officer: 
[31:31J 
Yeah. And it's being recorded. And I am forcing you to 
take this. Yes. 
*** 
Officer: So no matter what, you'll take some evidence from me? 
[31 :48] 
Officer: Yep. 
Hamish Bell: Really? 
Officer: Yep. 
Hamish Bell: Does everyone get treated like that? 
Officer: Yep. 
Hamish Bell: [Recording unintelligible] ... didn't have to give evidence. 
Officer: [Recording unintelligible] ... do you know what case law 
is, Mr. Bell? 
Hamish Bell: No ... no ... no ... 
Officer: OK. 
Hamish Bell: ... I'm just saying. I'm just.. .. So that's what that's for? 
Officer: What? 














That's what it's for. That's why it's sitting here. 
So, if I fought as hard as I could, you'd lock me up-lock 
me into it and take blood? 
You got it. 
[Recording unintelligible] ... I'm not into a fist fight 
tonight. 
Good. Either am I. Can't burp. No more burping, OK? 
Or else I have to take your blood, OK? 
*** 
So you can force every single person to give evidence? 
Yep. 
[Recording unintelligible.] 
We strap you in the chair. We call a paramedic over here 
and they take your blood and we send it off. 
Exhibit H (emphasis added) (R p. 62A.) The problem is that practically none of the 
information provided by Officer White is consistent with Idaho law, and therefore, 
nullified the information given as part of the statutorily-required audio advisory. 
First, the State cannot obtain a forced blood draw in every DUI case. For 
starters, Idaho Code Section 18-8002(6)(b) expressly limits the police officer's 
authority to order a forced blood draw, and misdemeanor DUI is not one of those 
enumerated situations. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303-04, 160 P.3d 739, 742-43 
(2007). Moreover, a forced blood draw cannot be obtained in all situations-e.g., 
where the subject has a legitimate fear of needles. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 
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at 372,744 P.2d at 100. Therefore, Officer White's representations that no limitations 
existed were false. 
Second, the State cannot order a paramedic or any other medical professional to 
conduct a forced blood draw in a misdemeanor DUI investigation. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 
303-04,160 P.3d at 742-43. In fact, Idaho case law clearly states that in such situations 
the officer may only request that a medical professional draw someone's blood. Id. 
Accordingly, such a request can be refused. In other words, Officer White, as a matter 
of law, could not order a paramedic to draw Mr. Bell's blood, and even if Officer White 
only requested the paramedic to do so, the paramedic could have lawfully refused. 
Officer White's representations to the contrary were false. 
Third, the State cannot use whatever force it wants in order to obtain a blood 
sample. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 
160 P.3d at 742. Instead, the State's forced blood draws must be accomplished without 
unreasonable force. Id.; State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 714, 184 P.3d 215,220 (et. 
App. 2008) (holding blood draws must be done in a medically accepted manner and 
without unreasonable force). Therefore, Officer White's representations that he and his 
fellow officers could use whatever force they wanted, up to and including a "fist fight," 
is clearly contrary to the law. Accordingly, these statements by Officer White were 
also false. 
Fourth, the State cannot force every single person arrested for misdemeanor DUI 
to submit to breath or blood testing. The Hearing Officer apparently believes that Diaz 
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authorizes an officer to "require" a driver to provide a blood sample without any 
limitations. (R p. 295, , 7.) However, this legal conclusion is clearly incorrect. In 
addition to the case law set forth above, Idaho's appellate courts have clearly 
established there is a difference between implied consent and forcing someone to 
physically consent to evidentiary testing. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372, 775 
P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989) ("By implying consent, the statute removes the right ofa 
licensed driver to lawfully refuse, but it cannot remove his or her physical power to 
refuse") (emphasis in original); see also DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 713, 184 P.3d at 219 
(stating advisory is intended to enforce the driver's previously implied consent without 
the use of force; the legislature provided administrative revocation "rather than condone 
a physical fight"). Here, Officer White admits he told Mr. Bell the "blood draw would 
be taken from him without his consent ifneed be." (R p. 61.) Both the Hearing Officer 
and Officer White misconstrue the scope of Diaz and what is and is not permitted in 
obtaining a blood sample. Quite simply, Officer White's statement that he could 
lawfully "force" Mr. Bell to provide a breath or blood sample was false. 
Fifth, as set forth above, there is no Idaho case law supporting the legal 
assertions made by Officer White. Thus, when Mr. Bell rightfully questioned Officer 
White's misrepresentations of the law, and Officer White claimed his statements were 
supported by "case law," this assertion was also false. Officer White either doesn't 
understand the limitations on forced blood draws or purposely misrepresented them. 
Either way, Mr. Bell's suspension must be vacated. 
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Sixth, Officer White's coercive tactics nullified the audio advisory because no 
matter what Mr. Bell was initially told, Officer White succeeded in convincing Mr. Bell 
that he did not have a right to physically refuse to submit to evidentiary testing. As set 
forth above, Officer White misstated the law, told Mr. Bell he had to take the test, and 
indicated his refusal would be meet with force up to and including a "fist fight" if 
Officer White were to order a forced blood draw. Accordingly, the evidentiary testing 
was accomplished through "trickery or deceit amounting to police misconduct," and 
therefore, renders the request unreasonable and in violation of law. See State v. 
Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85-86, 952 P.2d 402, 407-08 (et. App. 1998) (stating that 
officer's conduct in misstating the law, telling driver he "had to" submit to evidentiary 
testing, or threatening physical harm would render request unreasonable and in 
violation of law). 
Seventh, the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Officer White properly advised 
Mr. Bell of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing is simply wrong and 
the reasoning clearly flawed. Mr. Bell's counsel identified numerous statements by 
Officer White and cited to the binding Idaho case decisions and statutes which 
contradict Officer White's statements. The Hearing Officer did not make any findings 
of fact as to what was said. Instead, the Hearing Officer merely summarized the 
lengthy conversation into a single sentence that completely omits the actual 
conversation and its context; and then, based upon that one sentence summary, the 
Hearing Officer concluded all of Officer White's statements complied with Idaho law. 
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For example, the Hearing Officer found that Officer White merely told Mr. "Bell 
that he needs to submit to the breath test, and if not, blood will be drawn." (R p. 295, 1 
4.) To the extent this is considered a finding of fact, it is clearly erroneous. Then the 
Hearing Officer concluded that this paraphrased summary is an accurate statement of 
law. (R p. 295, 1 5.) Of course, applying this "straw man" technique, no one could 
ever prevail on this issue. 
Similarly, the Hearing Officer erroneously stated the Idaho Supreme Court held 
in Diaz that "nothing in Idaho Code § 18-8002 limits the officer's authority to require a 
defendant to submit to a blood draw." (R p. 295, 1 7.) That legal conclusion is 
certainly wrong. Diaz, as well as other Idaho case law (including that set forth above), 
provides very specific limits on forced blood draws and proves the Hearing Officer's 
statement is nothing more than an incorrect overgeneralization of very detailed and 
complex case law. However, the Hearing Officer's incorrect interpretation of Diaz 
further explains why his decision upholding Mr. Bell's suspension is flawed and cannot 
be upheld. 
For all these reasons, Officer White's statements contradict Idaho law generally 
as well as the information mandated to be provided Mr. Bell by Idaho Code Section 18-
8002A(2). Therefore, Mr. Bell was not properly advised of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing. Accordingly, his license suspension must be vacated. 
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D. The Hearing Officer Erred In Relying On Officer White's Affidavit Because 
the State Had Constructive Knowledge Officer White Had Been Deemed Not 
Credible and Terminated By the Boise Police Department. 
The arresting officer is not required to provide live testimony at the Hearing. 
I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Instead, the State can rely upon the sworn statement of the 
arresting officer. Id. Here, Officer White did not testify. Rather, the Hearing Officer 
accepted the State's version of events based solely upon Officer White's affidavit. (R 
pp.4-5.) The Hearing Officer relied upon Officer White's sworn affidavit in upholding 
Mr. Bell's suspension. (See, e.g., R pp. 292, , 5.) 
The problem is Officer White-prior to the Hearing Officer issuing his 
decision-was found to have made false statements during an internal investigation and 
was terminated from the Boise Police Department. (Attachment A.) This information 
was known to prosecutors representing the State of Idaho. Id. Therefore, lTD, a 
political subdivision of the State of Idaho, had actual or constructive knowledge of 
these facts. Thus, not only should the Hearing Officer have taken this into account, 
lTD should have informed Mr. Bell that Officer White had been found to have made 
false statements in the past. 
Because neither the criminal prosecutor's nor lTD ever disclosed this 
information to Mr. Bell, he was prevented from raising this issue before the Hearing 
Officer. However, the Court should consider this information in light of the fact all 
evidence submitted against Mr. Bell was established through Officer White's affidavit. 
At the very least, this omission requires the Hearing Officer's decision be remanded so 
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that this issue may be developed. 
Officer White-now Mr. White-is simply not credible. The Hearing Officer, by 
relying upon Mr. White's affidavit when the State was in constructive knowledge of his 
veracity issues, violated Mr. Bell's right to due process and rendered a decision which 
exceeded statutory authority, was made upon unlawful procedure, was not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of 
discretion. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should set aside the Hearing Officer's 
decision and order that Mr. Bell's driving privileges be reinstated. Because there is 
sufficient evidence that Mr. Bell established his right to prevail at the administrative 
hearing, there is no need to remand this matter. 
DATED this 21 st day of December, 2009. 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
By: __________________ +-__ __ 
Dean B. Arnold 
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(3) Defendant's Prior Record: NI A 
(4) Documents and Tangible Objects: NI A 
(5) Reports of Examinations and/or Tests: N/A 
(6) Witnesses: 
It has come to our attention that Officer Tony White has separated from 
employment with the Boise Police Department. The Boise Police Department has 
issued sustained departmental policy violations against Officer Tony White for 
non-conformance to laws and conduct unbecoming an officer. The sustained 
violations are based upon an internal investigation, which disclosed sufficient 
evidence to conclude that Officer White failed to register his vehicle in Idaho as 
required by law, failed to timely pay sales tax on the vehicle, and attempted to 
protect the asset from seizure during an IRS audit process. 
During proceedings regarding the internal investigation, Officer White gave 
inconsistent statements. 
Pursuant to our obligations under Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. u.s. and their 
progeny, as well as our obligation pursuant to Idaho Professional Rule of Conduct 
3.8, the State makes this disclosure to you as it may be relevant to the officer's 
credibility. 
Because this involves a confidential personnel matter, to the extent you wish to 
explore this issue further, we can seek an en camera review before the handling 
Judge. Should you seek this en camera review, please contact the handling 
attorney. 
DATED This r I day of August 2009. 
By: Tessie Buttram 
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Pagel 000 173 
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COMES NOW the Respondent, IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, by and 
through its counsel of record, Michael 1. Kane of the firm Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC, and 
hereby submits the Respondent's Brief on review to the above-entitled Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 4, 2009, Officer Tucker observed a vehicle driving south on Capitol Blvd., which is 
a one-way street designated for n011hbollnd traffic only. CR. 4-5). Officer Tucker made contact with 
the driver who identified himself as Petitioner. (R. 5, 61). Petitioner admitted consuming alcohol so 
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Officer Tucker called Ot1icer White for assistance. (R. 5, 61). Officer White made contact with 
Petitioner and had him exit the vehicle. (R. 61). Petitioner told Officer \vl1ite that he had consumed 
two (2) beers and had stopped drinking about twenty (20) minutes ago. (R.61). Ot1icer White 
noticed that Petitioner's eyes were glassy and bloodshot. (R. 61). Ot1icer White then administered 
the horizontal gaze nystagmus test which Petitioner failed. (R. 5, 61). Petitioner then perfonl1ed the 
walk and turn and the one leg stand and failed both tests. (R. 5, 61). Officer White placed Petitioner 
under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and transported him to the Ada County Jail. 
(R. 5, 61). At the jail, Officer White confinned that nothing \vas in Petitioner's mouth and asked 
Petitioner not to burp, belch or vomit for the next fjfteen (15) minutes. (R. 61). Ot1icer White then 
played the administrative license suspension tape for Petitioner, complied \vith the fifteen (15) 
minute observation period and ofTered Petitioner the Intoxilyzer 5000 (Intox 5000) instrument. (R. 
() 1). Petitioner initially told OHicer White that he would not submit to the breath test, but OtIlcer 
vVhite advised Petitioner that ifhe refused to take the breath test, a blood sample would be taken 
from him without his consent if necessary. (R. 61). Petitioner decided to submit to the breath test 
and provided two breath samples of .154 and .157 (R. 3, 5, 61). 
Petitioner requested a hearing as to the administrative license suspension on June 10, 2009. 
(R. 10). The telephonic hearing was scheduled for June 30, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. (R. 21). In his 
request t()f hearing, Petitioner requested subpoenas for audio/video tapes, police reports, logsheets 
for the Intox 5000 for thirty (30) days prior to the time Petitioner was tested and thirty (30) days after 
Petitioner was tested, evidentiary test results, the calibration certificate and the "testing officer's 
ce11ification for the [lntox 5000] used to administer a breath alcohol test to the [Petitioner)." (R. II). 
On June 16, 2009, the hearing officer issued subpoenas to the Boise Police Department for the 
audio/video tapes, police reports, and "instrument operations logsheets for [lntox 5000] for the 
period of June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009." (R. 18). These subpoenas had compliance dates of 
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June 29, 2009. (R. 17, 18). The hearing officer denied Petitioner's "request for the issuance of a 
subpoena duces tecum for the officer's certification card" because "[t]he probable cause affidavit 
states that Officer T. White's operator certification is valid until December 20 10" and therefore he 
deemed the certitication card "not clearly relevant." (R. 19). 
On June 16, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the hearing and reconsideration of 
the hearing officer's decision regarding the subpoena for the lntox 5000 logsheets. (R. 27). 
Petitioner claimed that the compliance date on the subpoenas \vas June 29, 2009 with a hearing date 
of June 30, 2009, so he needed additional time to review the documents received pursuant to the 
SUbpoenas. (R. 27). Regarding the subpoena for the lntox 5000 logsheeets, Petitioner stated that he 
"specifically requested" the logsheets for thirty (30) days prior to and after his breath test to 
determine whether the Intox 5000 was properly calibrated. (R. 28). As a result, Petitioner claimed 
that he "is unable to determine whether the lntoxilyzer machine's calibration was checked in 
compliance with Idaho law." (R. 28). Thus, Petitioner requested a subpoena for the Intox 5000 
logsheets "thm1 May 1, 2009 to the present (with a response date of June 29, 2009, to cotTespond 
with the other subpoenas previously issued in this matter)." (R.28). On June 16,2009, Respondent 
issued a Notice of 10 Day Extension of Hearing, rescheduling the hearing for July 9, 2009 at 10:00 
a.m. (R. 34). 
On July 9, 2009 at approximately 8:57 a.m., Respondent faxed Intox 5000 logsheets to 
Petitioner lor April 28, 2009 through June 6, 2009. At the hearing, Petitioner summarized the 
procedural matters that had previously OCCUlTed. He noted that he first requested a subpoena for the 
Intox 5000 logs for thirty (30) days prior to his an'est, but that the subpoena actually issued by the 
hearing officer was for June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009. Administrative License SlLspensioll 
Hearing, Jlf~}' 9, 2009, p. 5. He further noted that he revised his request, asking for the lntox 5000 
logs for the entire month prior to Petitioner's arrest. ld. at 6. Petitioner made such a request "so that 
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\ve could deten11ine whether standard operating procedures were met with regard to the breath-
testing machine this [sic] case." Jd. Petitioner then stated that the Boise Police Department failed to 
comply with the subpoena requiring them to produce the Intox 5000 logsheets for June 3, 2009 
through June 6, 2000 since he did not receive the logsheets until one (I) hour prior to the hearing. 
!d. at 6-7. Petitioner also noted that the logsheets had no cover letter with them, did not appear to be 
in response to the subpoena since they went back to April 28, 2009, they failed to provide 
information regarding when they were received by Respondent, and there was no information as to 
who produced the logsheets. !d. at 7. As a result, Petitioner claimed that since the Boise Police 
DepaI1111ent failed to comply with the subpoena, his license suspension should be vacated. Jd. at 7. 
The hearing officer declined to vacate the suspension 'just based on a Subpoena issued [sic]. 
That's not one of the exclusive grounds pursuant to Statute that is the basis for vacating of the 
suspension." !d. at p. 8. The hearing officer then offered Petitioner a continuance "due to the delay 
in providing the logs to you." Id. Petitioner claimed to feel "forced" into asking tor the continuance 
so he could "properly review those documents." !d. On July 10, 2009, Respondent issued a Notice 
of Rescheduled Telephone Hearing, rescheduling the hearing for July 23, 2009 at 12:00 p.m. (R. 
37). 
On July 13, 2009, Petitioner requested additional subpoenas "based on the disputed 
instrument operation logsheets that were disclosed immediately prior to [Petitioner's] previously 
scheduled hearing on July 9, 2009." (R. 39). Specifically, Petitioner requested the following 
subpoenas: (l) Callie Downum, Idaho Transp0l1ation Department, requiring her to testify at the 
hearing as to the source of the Intox 5000 logsheets produced on July 9, 2009; (2) Boise Police 
Department, tor copies of documents "reflecting any and all calibration checks performed from May 
1,2009 to July 13,2009" on the Intox 5000; (3) Idaho State Police, for copies of "all documents 
identifying the source of the simulator solution(s) used from May I, 2009 to July 13, 2009 to check 
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the calibration of the [Intox 5000] used in this case;" (4) Idaho State Police, for copies of "all 
documents identitying the source(s) that provided the simulator solution(s) used from May 1, 2009 
to July 13, 2009 on the [lntox 5000] in this case is/was an 'approved' provider as required by 
IDAPA and ISP-SOP." (R. 39, 40). Petitioner requested that Respondent produce copies "of all 
documents, correspondence, and other infom1atiol1 showing when, where and how the instrument 
operation logsheets disclosed in this matter were received from the Boise Police Department in 
response to the subpoena served on it.. .. " (R. 40). Petitioner also requested that Respondent 
produce copies of "all ALS Hearing decisions issued in the last twelve (12) months vacating an 
administrative driver's license suspension based upon a failure to comply \vith a subpoena issued by 
the ITO." (R.40). 
On July 14, 2009, the hearing officer denied Petitioner's request for subpoenas for "Callie 
Downum-l.T.D., all documents regarding calibration checks, the source of the simulator solutions, 
LT.D. cOlTespondence/doClll11ents regarding the receipt of the instrument operation logsheets, and 
twelve (12) months of ALS Hearing decisions" because he deemed them "not clearly relevant in this 
matter." (R.43). The hearing officer did provide the Certificate of Analysis for Simulator Solution 
Lot #8804 and #8101. (R. 42,43, 100). 
On July 23, 2009, the administrative hearing was held. Petitioner reincorporated his 
argument regarding the subpoena from the July 9th hearing, citing to In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 
155 P.3cI 1176 (Ct. App. 2007), stating that had he reeeived the infom1ation he requested, it "would 
confirm that noncompliance of the Subpoena is a basis to vaeate a suspension." Administrative 
Licensc Suspcnsion Hearing, Jllly 23, 2009, p. 5. Next, he argued that the provider for the simulator 
solutions for the Intox 5000 was not an approved provider as required by IDAPA 11.03.01.013.05 
and Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures ("SOP"). /d. In SUppOlt of this argument, 
Petitioner cited to Exhibit M whieh demonstrated that RepCo Marketing, Inc. was the provider of 
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the simulator solutions. ld. at 6. He also cited to Exhibit N which was an expired contract between 
Repeo Marketing, Inc. and Idaho State Police. ]d. Petitioner further argued that he was not 
properly infoll11Cd of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as is required by Idaho 
Code § 18-8002A(2) becallse he was incorrectly advised by Officer White as to the law regarding 
tC)I"ced blood draws. ld. Specifically, Petitioner stated that Idaho law limits forced blood drmvs to 
the ceJ1ain circumstances set forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002(6). ld. Since Officer White implicd 
that blood could be drawn from every sllspect, Petitioner argued that Idaho Code was violated. ld. 
Hc also argued that Officer White stated that he would force a paramedic to draw Petitioner's blood 
which is untrue. ld. In addition, Petitioner claimed that Officer White could not use "whatever force 
he wants to obtain a blood sample" and that "[i]t must be done without unreasonable force." ld. at 
I I. Petitioner also claimed to have submitted to evidentiary testing "through coercion, duress, and 
harassment, and/or by trickelY and deceit, all of which are in violation of the due process clause, 
\vhich would also invalidate the advisory." ld. at 12-13. 
Finally, Petitioner argued that the Intox 5000 was not properly calibrated "as required by 
IDAPA and the standard operating procedures." ld. at 16. He cited the following language from 
IDAPA 11.03.01.013.05: "Each breath-testing instrument shall be checked on a schedule 
established by the DepaIiment for accuracy with the simulator solution provided by the Depaliment 
or by a source approved by the DepaJ1ment. These checks shall be performed according to a 
procedure established by the Department." He fmiher stated that the SOPs, section 2.2.3 state that a 
"tvvo-sample calibration check using a .08 reference solution should be ran and results logged each 
time the solution is replaced with tJ'esh solution. It also says the .08 reference solution should be 
replaced with a fresh solution approximately every 100 samples or every month, whichever comes 
first." ld. at 17. 
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Petitioner pointed out that pursuant to Exhibit R, the Intox 5000 logsheets, the .20 and the 
.08 solution \vere calibrated on June 3, 2009. ld. Petitioner submitted to the breath test on June 5, 
2009. Hmvever, Petitioner claimed that "the calibration checks are only significant at all and in 
compliance if there are subsequent checks." ld. He then pointed out that Exhibit F shows that the 
next calibration check was done on June 25, 2009 by Officer Sperry, but that only the .20 calibration 
check was completed and not the .08 calibration check. ld. at 18. He also said that on Exhibit F is a 
hand\vritten note saying" 100 tests." Petitioner argued that this is "significant because the only basis 
to do a calibration check after 100 tests is for the .08 solution, so that's what needed to be done on 
this date" but Officer Sperry only performed the .20 calibration check. Ie!. He claimed that it is not 
]d. at 19. 
proper for the State to rely upon the June 3rd calibration check, 
because that's meaningless without a subsequent one that shows that 
things were presumably operating properly in the meantime. So for 
whatever reason, the ot1icer did the wrong check. She did the .20 
instead of the .08, and based upon that, we would - it's our argument 
that ... the State's records show that it failed to check the calibration of 
the Intoxilyzer machine as required by IDAPA and the standard 
operating procedures. 
On July 23, 2009, a Request for Additional Time for Evidence was issued at the request of 
Petitioner to permit him to obtain and present additional evidence (the case Imv in support of his 
claims). (R.47). The hearing officer granted Petitioner's request and left the record open for fifteen 
(15) days, stating that Petitioner's license suspension \vould not be stayed nor would his temporaty 
permit be extended. (R.47). 
On August 7, 2009, Petitioner supplemented the record and provided case decisions to the 
hearing officer in support of the arguments made at the administrative hearing. (R. 105-262, 275). 
On August 18, 2009, Petitioner provided additional supplements to the record. (R. 275-281). 
Specifically, he provided the State's Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Defendant's Non-Opposition 
to State's Motion to Dismiss, both documents prepared during Petitioner's criminal prosecution. (R. 
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275-28 I). Petitioner argued that these documents contained infonnation "which closely mirrored 
one of the arguments made before the Hearing Officer" at the administrative hearing. (R.275). 
The hearing oHicer issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on 
September 14, 2009. (R. 232-299). He found that Petitioner's evidentiary test was conducted in 
accordance with Idaho Code, IDAPA and the SOPs because Otlker White properly pert<mned the 
observation period, he was properly certified to operate the Intox 5000 "as evidenced by his operator 
cenification expiration date of December 2010, and his "swom statement sets forth that the breath 
test was performed in compliance with statute and the standards and methods adopted by the 
Depm1ment of Law Entorcement." (R. 292). With respect to whether the Intox 5000 was properly 
calibrated, the hearing otJicer found that the acceptable simulator solution check #0006 which \vas 
conducted on June 5, 2009 immediately before Petitioner's breath samples, had calibration results of 
.mu and "approved the evidentiary testing instrument for evidentiary use in accordance with the ISP 
Standard Operating Procedure." (R. 292). He further tound that "both the .08 and .20 solution 
changes were performed two days prior to [Petitioner's] evidentimy test, thus the solutions were 
fresh, current and valid." (R. 293). The hearing officer also noted that the SOPs contain no 
language stating that calibration checks are invalid ifthere are no subsequent checks. (R. 293). 
Regarding whether the simulator solutions were from an approved provider, the hearing 
otTiccr stated that "[ s ]ection 2.2.1 of the Standard Operating Procedure sets forth that Intoxilyzer 
5000/EN calibration check is run using a 0.08 andlor 0.20 reference solutions provided by the Idaho 
State Police Forensic Services or approved vendor and following the procedure outlined in the 
Intoxilyzer 5000/EN manual." (R. 293). He noted that "Exhibit 0, the Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services Certificate of Analysis for simulator solution lot #8804, has approved the 0.08 solution for 
calibration checks to be run with an expiration date of August 11, 2010, with that Certificate of 
Analysis issued September 24, 2008." In addition, Exhibit P, the Idaho State Police Forensic 
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Services Certificate of Analysis for simulator solution lot #Sl 0 1, "has approved the 0.20 solution for 
calibration checks to be run \vith an expiration date of October 7, 2009, with that Certiticate of 
Analysis issued August 12, :WOS." (R.293). As a result, the O.OS and 0.20 simulator solutions that 
are used to perfom1 calibration checks "are cun'ent and valid for evidentiary testing in the State of 
Idaho." (R.293). The hearing officer filrther stated that "[a] reasonable inference can be drawn that 
if the Idaho State Police has certified simulator solution lot #'s SS04 and SlO 1 to be used to conduct 
calibration checks with respect to breath alcohol examination that it came trom an approved 
provider." (R. 293). Finally, the hearing officer found that Exhibit N, the expired contract between 
RcpCo Marketing, Inc. and the Idaho State Police is insufficient to demonstrate that the solutions 
"were not certified by an approved provider nor the Idaho State Police." (R.294). 
The hearing officer also found that Petitioner was properly advised of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing. In so finding, the hearing officer noted that Ot1icer White's 
statement that Petitioner had to submit to a breath test or his blood would be drawn was COlTect 
based on Idaho's implied consent law. (R. 295). The hearing officer also noted that no blood was 
drawn, and Officer White did not order anyone to take Petitioner's blood. (R.295). 
With respect to vvhether Petitioner's due process rights were violated because the hearing 
otticer refused to issue certain subpoenas and other discovery, the hearing otticer noted that he is not 
authorized to vacate a suspension unless one of the reasons listed in Idaho Code § lS-S002A(7) is 
satisfied. Further, none of the reasons listed in Idaho Code § IS-S002A(7) "have any correlation 
with discovery issues or the production of the Instrument Operations Log." (R. 296). He also noted 
that "[t]he State's Response to a Discovery request is separate and apart from any relevant basis for 
dismissing the suspension in this proceeding, thus it shall not affect the validity of [Petitioner's] 
suspension outcome." (R. 295). The hearing officer specifically addressed the subpoena regarding 
the Intox 5000 logs and stated that Petitioner was provided with sllch logs and even though they 
RESPO'.IDE'.ITS BRIEF P.9 
00083 
were untimely, Petitioner was granted a continuance to have time to review the documents. (R. 
2(7). Also, since Petitioner's breath test was perfom1ed on June 5, 2009, the subpoena for the lntox 
5000 logs for June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009 was sufficient to provide the infom1ation Petitioner 
needed. (R. 297). In addition, the hearing officer stated that the Boise Police Department did timely 
comply with the subpoena but the documents were misplaced at the Idaho TranspOltation 
Department. (R.297). Further, the hearing officer noted that "[t]he purpose of the Subpoena Duces 
Tecum is to obtain the requested documentslinfom1ation and to make that information as a part of 
the record which was the case in [Petitioner's] Administrative License Suspension hearing, thus any 
argument regarding timeliness of receipt of the requested infom1ation is irrelevant and not grounds 
for dismissal of the suspension." (R.297). Consequently, the hearing officer found that Petitioner's 
due process rights were not violated. 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review. (R. 300-323). 
STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
"The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence on questions of fact." IDAHO CODE § 67-5279(1). The court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the cOUl1 finds "that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 
IDAHO CODE § 67-5279(3). 
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ARGUMENT 
Before beginning an analysis of Petitioner's claim, it is important to identify those issues 
that are properly before a hearing officer in a given case. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) lists the 
five areas to be dealt with by the hearing officer in a hearing on a suspension. These are: 
I. Whether the peace officer had legal cause to stop the person; 
2. Whether the officer had legal cause to believe the person had been driving under 
the influence; 
3. Whether the test results showed an alcohol concentration in violation of Idaho 
Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006; 
4. Whether the test results for alcohol concentration were conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) or whether the testing equipment was functioning 
properly when the test \vas administered; or 
5. Whether the person was infon11ed of the consequences of submitting to an 
cvidentiary test. 
In all cases, the burden of proof is on the person requesting the hearing to a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Indeed, the statute directs the hearing officer not to 
vacate the suspcnsion unless one of the five aforementioned findings occurs. 
Because Petitioner'S Brief addresses numerous issues, for ease of reVIew, this 
Respondent's Brief will address each of the issues as they arc set forth in the "Issues Presented 
on Appeal," pages 8 and 9 of Petitioner's Brief. 
1. Did the subpoenas issued by the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due 
process rights? 
Petitioner claims that the system set up by Respondent is flawed because Respondent 
issucs subpocnas and then orders the recipient to produce documents directly to Respondent. 
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Then, Respondent provides the documents to Petitioner. Petitioner argues that "under no set of 
circumstances do the subpoenas ensure that the subpoenaed information will be received by the 
petitioner until the day alier [he compliance date set by ITO on the subpoena." Petitioner's 
Brief; p. 11. Because the compliance date on the subpoenas issued in this case was June 29, 
2009 with a hearing date of 10:00 a.m. on June 30, 2009, Petitioner argues that he had 
insufficient time to review the information prior to the hearing. As a result, he claims that the 
subpoenas are unconstitutional and denied him due process. 
Petitioner has cited no authority supporting his claim that the subpoenas, or the process 
regarding subpoenas in administrative license suspension hearings, are unconstitutional. Neither 
the rules governing administrative license suspensions ("IDAPA") nor Idaho Code provide any 
time frame to \vhich the subpoenas must adhere, other than the rule stating that witnesses are not 
required to appear and testify at a hearing unless they are served with a subpoena at least 
seventy-two (72) hours prior to the hearing. IDAPA 39.02.72.300.02. Other than this specific 
time frame, there is no other language in the applicable statute or rules requiring subpoenas to 
comply with time schedules. Regardless, this issue is moot because the hearing officer accepted 
the claim that Petitioner did not have enough time to review the lntox 5000 logsheets produced 
in response to the subpoena, so he granted a continuance to permit Petitioner additional time to 
review the documents. As a result, Petitioner had adequate time to prepare for the hearing 
regardless of the compliance date set forth in the subpoena. 
2. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by 
impermissibly extending the administrative hearing process? 
The hearing was first set in this matter for June 30, 2009. It was then rescheduled for 
July 9, 2009 and then rescheduled again for July 23, 2009 so that Petitioner would have adequate 
opportunity to review the documents produced by the subpoena. Petitioner points out that Idaho 
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Code ~ 18-8002A(7) states that a "hearing shall be held within twenty (20) days of the date the 
hearing request was received by the department unless this period is, for good cause shown, 
extended by the hearing officer for one ten (10) day period." Petitioner relies on this language, 
arguing that the bearing officer impermissibly extended the hearing process beyond the one ten 
(10) day period set forth in the statute. As a result, Petitioner claims that the hearing officer 
"\vas required to vacate the suspension." Petitioner's Brief, p. 12-13. 
Petitioner can point to no authority providing that vacating a suspension is required if the 
administrative license suspension hearing is extended for more than ten (10) days. In fact, the 
hearing officer: 
shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by preponderance 
of the evidence, that: 
a. The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the 
person; or 
b. The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person 
had been 
driving ... while under the intluence of alcohoL .. ; or 
c. The test results did not show an alcohol concentration ... in 
violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho 
Code; or 
d. The tests for alcohol concentration ... administered at the 
direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not ftmctioning 
properly when the test was administered; or 
e. The person was not informed of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) 
of this section. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) (emphasis added). Nowhere in this list is there any mention of vacating 
a license suspension because a hearing is extended beyond ten (10) days. The hearing officer's 
decision not to vacate the suspension was mandated by Idaho Code because according to the statute, 
he is not permitted to vacate the suspension for reasons other than those listed above. 
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As stated above, the hearing officer permitted an additional extension of the hearing so 
that Petitioner \vould have time to review the subpoenaed documents. Petitioner complained that 
he did not have enough time to review the documents for the June 30th hearing and is now 
complaining that the hearing officer pel111itted an extension to give Petitioner the time he needed 
to review the documents. Simply put, Petitioner cannot have it both ways. The hearing officer 
acted in accordance with Idaho Code in deciding to reschedule the hearing. 
Petitioner also argues that pursuant to IDAPA, the hearing otTicer must issue a written 
decision "prior to the expiration of the temporary thil1y day permit" but did not issue his findings 
for fifty-three (53) days. As a result, Petitioner argues that his license was suspended for 
scventy-two (72) days, "well beyond that permitted by statute or the constitutional protections of 
due process .... " Petitioller's Brief; p. 13. 
IDAPA specifically states that failure to issue a written decision prior to the thirty (30) 
days "shall not be grounds for staying or vacating the sLispension." IDAPA 39.02.72.600.01. In 
addition, Petitioner fai Is to mention that the hearing officer agreed to keep the record open for 
fi tteen (15) days after the July 23,d hearing so that Petitioner could submit additional evidence. 
In t~lct, Petitioner submitted evidence as late as August 18, 2009. Consequently, the hearing 
officer could not have even begun to prepare his written findings until August 18,2009, when he 
had received all of Petitioner's evidence. The hearing officer's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order were issued on September 14, 2009. Taking into account the fact 
that Petitioner submitted evidence as late as August 18,2009, Petitioner's claim that the hearing 
officer took fi fty-three (53) days to issue his written findings is misleading. Regardless, as stated 
in IDAPA, the hearing officer's failure to issue his written decision prior to the thiI1Y (30) days 
is not grounds for vacating the suspension. 
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Petitioner further claims that his due process rights were violated since his license was 
suspended for seventy-two (72) days due to the extension of the hearing and due to the delay of 
the hearing officer's written findings. An individual's driver's license "may not be taken away 
without procedural due process." III re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 945, 155 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Ct. 
App. 1991). To determine whether a due process violation exists, three t~lctors must be 
considered: 
. [F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.' 
!d. at 946, 1185 (quoting MatheH's v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 96 S.Ct. 893, 903,47 
L.Ed.2d 18,33 (1976». 
With respect to the first bctor, Respondent admits that Petitioner's interest in his driver's 
license is substantial. This is presumably why the hearing officer rescheduled the hearing to 
permit Petitioner adequate time to review the subpoenaed documents. 
However, \vith respect to the second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of his 
driver's license \vould not have been decreased if the hearing would have been held sooner or 
had the hearing officer issued his written findings sooner. As stated by the Ohio Court of 
Appeals when discussing this factor: 
For a police officer to suspend an individual's driver's license, 
cCl1ain basic steps must be followed. First, the officer must have 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist is operating a 
vehicle in violation of the law to make an initial traffic stop. 
Hamiltoll v. LaH'soJl (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 462. If, during that 
brief detention, the officer develops probable cause to believe the 
suspect is driving under the influence of alcohol, the officer may 
place the individual under arrest. State v. Antill (1993), 91 Ohio 
App.3d 589. Next, if the officer requests the individual to submit 
to a chemical test and the individual either refuses or has an 
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alcohol level over the legal limit, R.C. 4511.19 I requires the 
officer to immediately seize and suspend the individual's driver's 
license. Before the officer requests a chemical test, however, the 
officer is required to advise the individual of the consequences for 
refusing to submit to a chemical test or for being found over the 
legal alcohol level by the test. 
Stale v. Powell, 2006 WL 1851710, (Ct. App. Ohio 2006). 
Therefore, "[t]he risk of erroneous observation or deliberate misrepresentation by the 
reporting police otlicer of the facts forming the basis for the suspension is insubstantial." 
Alackey l'. MOflll),ln, 443 U.S. 1,2,99 S.Ct. 2612, 2613, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979). Here, there was 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Petitioner was violating traffic laws since he \vas going the 
\\Tong way down a one-way street. Once he made contact with Petitioner, Officer White 
possessed probable cause to believe that Petitioner was driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Officer White advised Petitioner of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing. 
Petitioner submitted to a breath test and his results showed that his alcohol concentration was 
above the legal limit. In light of the statutory safeguards in place and the fact that OtTicer White 
complied with these safeguards, the risk that Petitioner's license suspension was erroneous is 
very small. In addition, the timing of the hearing and the timing of the written findings has no 
bearing on the actual evidence in the case. The evidence would have been the same regardless. 
Finally, there is obviously a compelling interest in keeping Idaho roads safe and free of 
drunk drivers. "This Court held that the state's strong interest in preventing intoxicated persons 
from driving and in avoiding overly burdensome procedures outweighed the driver's interest in 
maintaining his driver's license, even though the driver's interest was substantia!." III re Gibbar, 
143 Idaho at 946, 1185 (discussing Matter (~fMcNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 191,804 P.2d 911, 920 
(CLApp.1990)). This compelling interest, combined with the fact that the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is very low, justifies Petitioner's I icense suspension in this case. 
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3. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing to 
issue subpoenas regarding Officer White's Intox 5000 certification'? 
Petitioner argues that the hearing officer wrongfully refused to issue subpoenas regarding 
Officer White's Intox 5000 certification. According to IDAPA, "the hearing officer assigned to 
the matter may, upon written request, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or 
the production of documentary or tangible evidence at a hearing." In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 
945, 1184 (citing IDAPA 39.02.72.300.01) (emphasis added). Also, a hearing officer "may 
exclude evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or 
statutory grounds .... " Idaho Code ~ 67-5251(1). The hearing officer has "broad discretion in 
the extent of discovery that he or she orders." !d. Obviously if a hearing officer must comply 
with every single request for documents, at some point it becomes over burdensome and akin to 
a "fishing expedition." Here, the hearing officer determined that a subpoena demonstrating that 
Officer's White was certified to operate the Intox 5000 was irrelevant and unduly repetitious 
because Oilieer White's sworn affidavit states that his operator certitication expiration date was 
December 2010. The hearing officer found that this was enough evidence to determine that 
OtTicer White was properly certified to operate the Intox 5000. His decision was well within his 
rights as a hearing officer as set forth in IDAPA and Idaho Code § 67-5251 (I). 
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the hearing officer's decision violated his due 
process rights, the same argument discussing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors presented above in 
IssLie 2 applies. Petitioner's interest in his driver's license is substantial. However, in light of 
the statutory safeguards in place and the fact that Officer White complied with these safeguards, 
the risk that Petitioner's license suspension was erroneous is very small. In addition, the 
exclusion of documents demonstrating that Officer White was certified on the Intox 5000, 
especially given that Officer White's sworn statement demonstrated that he was certified at the 
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time of Petitioner's breath test, has no bearing on the actual evidence in the case. The evidence 
would have been the same regardless. 
Finally, the state has a strong interest in keeping drunk drivers otT the roads. The state 
also has a strong interest "in avoiding overly burdensome procedures." In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 
at 946, 1185. These strong state interests outweigh "the driver's interest in maintaining his 
driver's license, even though the driver's interest [is] substantial." Id. As a result, the hearing 
officer's decision did not violate Petitioner's due process rights. 
4. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing to 
issue subpoenas regarding calibration checks? 
Petitioner argues that he "was entitled to challenge the breath testing results from the 
lntox 5000 by showing the machine was inaccurate or not functioning properly." Petitioner's 
Brief; p. 14. He then notes that he first requested a subpoena be issued for the lntox 5000 
Iogsheets for thirty (30) days prior to and after Petitioner's arrest (from May 4, 2009 through 
July 4, 2009). The hearing officer denied Petitioner's request and issued a subpoena for Intox 
5000 logsheets for June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009. After the July 9th hearing, Petitioner 
requested a subpoena for the Intox 5000 Iogsheets for May 1, 2009 through July 13, 2009. The 
hearing officer denied this request. Petitioner claims that "the subpoena issued by the Hearing 
Officer was insufficient on its face because under no possible set of circumstances would it 
produce the information to vvhich Mr. Bell was entitled." Petitioner's Brief; p. 15. 
It is true that Petitioner was entitled to challenge the breath test results by showing the lntox 
5000 was inaccurate or not functioning properly. He claims that the subpoena for the logsheets for 
June 3, 2009 through June 6, 2009 did not provide him adequate information to make such a 
detemlination. However, the lntox 5000 logsheets from June 3, 2009 demonstrate that a both a .08 
and .20 calibration check were performed on that date. In addition, on July 9, 2009, prior to the 
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hearing, Respondent faxed Petitioner the Intox 5000 logsheets from April 28, 2009 through June 6, 
2009. So, Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to the logsheets for thirty (30) days prior to his 
breath test is moot because he did receive those documents. Petitioner, in a different issue in his 
briee claims that he was also entitled to the logsheets through July 13, 2009 because one (1) 
calibration check is not enough to demonstrate the Intox 5000 was functioning properly. 
Pelitjoller's Briel: p, 21. He argues that a subsequent calibration check is necessary to make such a 
determination. This argument will be discussed in more detail below, but as the hearing officer 
found, the SOPs contain no language stating that calibration checks are invalid if there are no 
subsequent checks. In light of the above, it is clear that Petitioner received all the documents 
necessary to determine whether the Intox 5000 was functioning properly. As a result, his argument 
that the subpoena issued by the hearing officer was improper is moot. 
Furthermore, Petitioner's claim that his due process rights were violated fails, and the 
same Mathe~I":'; v. Eldridge factors presented above apply. Petitioner's interest in his driver's 
license is substantial. However, in light of the statutory safeguards in place and the fact that 
Officer \Vhite complied with these safeguards, the risk that Petitioner's license suspension was 
erroneous is very small. In addition, the exclusion of the Intox 5000 logsheets from June 7, 2009 
through July 13, 2009 has absolutely no bearing on the case since the logsheets from that time 
frame are irrele\·ant. Finally, the state has a strong interest in keeping dnmk drivers otf the 
roads. The state also has a strong interest "in avoiding overly burdensome procedures." III re 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 946, 1185. These strong state interests outweigh "the driver's interest in 
maintaining his driver's license, even though the driver's interest [is] substantial." Id. As a 
result, the hearing officer's decision did not violate Petitioner's due process rights. 
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5. Did the Hearing Officer err by finding the Boise Police Department complied 
with ITO's subpoena'? 
Petitioner admits that the hearing ofticer has discretion when deciding to admit or 
exclude evidence. Petitioner's Brie}; p. IS. But, he claims that "the Hearing Officer cannot 
oller exhibits on behalf of Mr. Bell, regardless of whether that information was obtained 
pursuant to a subpoena or not." Petitioner takes issue with the hearing officer's decision to 
admit the "belatedly produced" lntox 5000 loghseets from April 28, 2009 through June 6, 2009 
(Exhibit L), claiming that the logsheets "had not been produced in response to lTD's subpoena, 
but instead, ITO had merely supplied numerous pages of Intoxilyzer logsheets once it became 
apparent ,~Ir. Bell was going to raise the Boise Police Depm1ment's failure to respond to the 
subpoena as a basis to vacate his suspension." Petitioner fU11her argues that he was entitled to 
discovery as to the source of those lntox 5000 logsheets since Ms. Downum could not give him 
that infi.)rmation. Petitioner requested a subpoena for Ms. Downum's testimony as well as any 
other documents as to the source of the "belatedly produced" Intox 5000 logsheets. The hearing 
officer denied the subpoena, and in his written findings stated that the Boise Police Department 
timdy complied with the subpoena but that the documents were misplaced by Respondent. 
Petitioner claims there is no evidence in the record Supp011ing the hearing officer's statements. 
First, Petitioner points to no authority stating that the hearing officer was not permitted to 
admit the lntox 5000 logsheets into evidence. Interestingly, Petitioner has previously argued that 
the hearing ofticer violated his due process rights by not issuing a subpoena for lntox 5000 
logsheets beyond the June 3'd through June 6th timeframe. Now he argues that his due process 
rights \vere violated because the hearing officer admitted logsheets from April 28, 2009 through 
June 6, 2009, claiming that they are beyond the scope of the subpoena and must not have been 
produced in re.spollse to the subpoena. Petitioner argues that "lTD had merely supplied 
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numerous pages of intoxilyzer logsheets once it became apparent Mr. Bell \-vas going to raise the 
Boise Police Department's failure to respond to the subpoena as a basis to vacate his 
suspension." Petitioner's Brief; p. 16. This is pure speculation, and the hearing officer 
speci fically stated in his written findings that the Boise Police Department did comply with the 
subpoena but that the documents were misplaced at the Idaho Transportation Department. 
Petitioner obviously believes that the hearing officer is not being truthful. There is no reason to 
believe, and no evidence proving, that the hearing ofticer is lying. 
Regarding Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to discovery as to the source of the 
lntox 5000 loghseets, as stated above, according to IDAPA, "the hearing officer assigned to the 
matter may, upon \vritten request, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or the 
production of documentary or tangible evidence at a hearing." In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 945, 
111-14 (citing IDAPA 39.02.72.300.01) (emphasis added). Also, a hearing officer "may exclude 
evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or statutory 
grounds .... " Idaho Code § 67-5251(1). The hearing officer has "broad discretion in the extent 
of discovery that he or she orders." !d. Again, if a hearing ofticer must comply with every 
single request for documents, at some point it becomes over burdensome and akin to a "fishing 
expedition." 
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the hearing officer's decision violated his due 
process rights, the same argument discussing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors presented above 
appl ies. Petitioner's interest in his driver's license is substantial. However, in light of the 
statutory safeguards in place and the fact that Officer White complied with these safeguards, the 
risk that Petitioner's license suspension was erroneous is very small. In addition, the exclusion 
of documents demonstrating the source of the Into x 5000 logsheets has no bearing in this case, 
especially since the hearing officer stated that the Boise Police Department did comply with the 
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subpoena. The state has a strong interest "in avoiding overly burdensome procedures" and 
requiring the hearing officer to permit discovery as to the source of the Intox 5000 logsheets is 
certainly overly burdensome under these circumstances. In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 946, 1185. 
The state also has a strong interest in keeping drunk drivers off the roads. ld. These strong state 
interests outweigh "the driver's interest in maintaining his driver's license, even though the 
dri\'Cr's interest [is] substantiaL" lei. As a result, the hearing officer's decision did not violate 
Petitioner's due process rights. 
6. Did the Hearing Officer err in concluding that Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension could not be vacated based upon the Boise Police Department's 
failure to comply with lTD's subpoenas'? 
Petitioner argues that the hearing ot1ker's decision to vacate Petitioner's license 
sLlspension based on the Boise Police Department's failure to comply with the subpoena violated 
his due process rights. He also argues that the hearing officer was incorrect in refusing to 
produce a copy of ALS hearing decisions over the last twelve (12) months that vacated license 
suspensions based on subpoena noncompliance. In support of this argument, he cites to IDAPA 
39'()2. 72.400.0 I, stating that he is permitted to request documents from ITD that are public 
records. \vhich relate to the petitioner hearing, and are in possession of Respondent. 
Regarding the hearing officer's refusal to produce t\velve (12) months of ALS hearing 
decisions, IDAPA 39.02.72.400.01 states that "[t]o obtain a photocopy of a document whieh is 
public record, relates !O the petitioner hearing, and is in the possession of the DepaIiment, 
petitioners shall make a written request to the Department." (emphasis added). Clearly other 
ALS cases do not relate to Petitioner's hearing, so the hearing officer's decision not to produce 
the docllments was proper and well within his authority. 
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the hearing officer's decision not to vacate 
Petitioner's driver's license and not to produce prior ALS decisions violated his due process 
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rights, the same argument discussing the Mathe'tvs v. Eldridge factors presented above applies. 
Petitioner's interest in his driver's license is substantial. However, in light of the statutory 
safeguards in place and the t~lct that Officer White complied \vith these safeguards, the risk that 
Petitioner's license suspension was erroneous is very small. Finally, the state has a strong 
interest in keeping drunk drivers otT the roads. III re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 946, 1185. This 
strong state interest outweighs "the driver's interest in maintaining his driver's license, even 
though the driver's interest [is] substantial." Id. As a result, the hearing officer's decision did 
not violate Petitioner's due process rights. 
In addition, as stated above, the hearing officer 
shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by preponderance 
of the evidence, that: 
a. The peace officer did not have legal calise to stop the 
person; or 
b. The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person 
had been 
driving ... while under the influence of alcohol ... ; or 
c. The test results did not show an alcohol concentration ... in 
violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho 
Code; or 
d. The tests for alcohol concentration ... administered at the 
direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning 
properly when the test was administered; or 
e. The person was not infom1ed of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentimy testing as required in subsection (2) 
of this section. 
Idaho Code ~ 18-8002A(7) (emphasis added). Nowhere in this list is there any mention of 
vacating a license suspension due to subpoena noncompliance. As a result, the hearing officer's 
decision was appropriate. 
RISPOi\DEi\rS BRIEF - p, 23 
00097 
7. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State failed to comply 
with IDAPA and the Standard Operating Procedures? 
Petitioner claims that "the State failed to comply with both IDAPA and SOP's" with 
respect to the Intox 5000. Petitioner's Brie}; p. 20. Specifically, he argues that "Exhibit S, a 
Calibration Checklist, affirmatively proves that on June 25, 2009, OtTicer Sperry of the Boise 
Police Department conducted the 0.20 calibration check, but did not complete the 0.08 
calibration check." Petitioner's Brief; p. 20-21. He also argues that the Calibration Checklist 
demonstrates that reason the calibration check was done was ,,' 100 tests. '" Petitioner states that: 
This is significant for at least three reasons: I) the purpose of the 
calibration checks on June 25, 2009 was to perform a 0.08 
calibration check; 2) 0.08 calibration checks are required every 
100 samples not tests; and 3) by waiting 100 tests, the State had 
waited lfvice as long to conduct the statutorily required calibration 
checks because there are two samples in every test. 
Peri/ioller's Brief; p. 21. (footnote omitted). 
Petitioner also argues that "the SOPs and mAPA requIre both prior and subsequent 
calibration checks. In fact, mAPA 11.03.0 l.0 I 3.07 expressly states that failure to perform these 
required checks is grounds to remove the machine from use." ld. 
Next, Petitioner argues that the hearing of Ticer erred in relying on Officer White's 
"boilerplate affidavit" to demonstrate that Petitioner's breath test complied with Idaho law. He 
claims that "generalized statements in an officer's sworn affidavit are not sufficient when 
confronted by credible evidence that demonstrates a violation of proper procedures." 
Petitioner's Briel; p. 22. He then claims that the Intox 5000 logsheets and the Calibration 
Checklist "are credible evidence the Intox 5000 was not maintained in accordance with IDAPA 
and the SOP's." ld. 
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Petitioner argues that the Intox 5000 logs prove that the State did not comply with 
I DAPA and the SOPs. In support of his argument, Petitioner points out that "there were 164 
samples tested between the 0.08 calibration checks on May 15, 2009 and June 3, 2009. 
Accordingly, Exhibit L - which was relied upon by the hearing officer - proves the State failed 
to comply with IDAPA and the SOP's." Petitioner's Brief: p. 22. 
With respect to Petitioner's argument regarding Exhibit S, the Calibration Checklist, 
Respondent submits that it is iITelevant. All this document shows is that on June 25, 2009, 
Officer SpeITY conducted a calibration check and that a handwritten note on the document says 
"100 tests." Petitioner argues that this document with the note is important because "1) the 
purpose of the calibration checks on June 25, 2009 was to perform a 0.08 calibration check." 
Respondent fails to see how Petitioner knows for certain that the purpose of the calibration check 
on June 25, 2009 was to perform a 0.08 calibration check. In fact, it \vould seem that because 
the Calibration Checklist consists of information relating to only a 0.20 calibration check, its 
purpose may not have been to perform a 0.08 calibration check. Petitioner then argues that the 
Calibration Checklist is impOliant because "2) 0.08 calibration checks are required every 100 
samples-not tests." Respondent agrees that pursuant to the language of the SOP's, 0.08 
calibration checks are required every 100 samples. However, a handwritten note on the 
Calibration Checklist that says" 1 00 tests" is not conclusive evidence that the State waited twice 
as long to conduct the required calibration checks. It is unknown why Ot1icer Spen"y wrote" 1 00 
tests" or why she failed to fill calibration check results for the 0.08 solution. Frankly, it does not 
matter. The Intox 5000 logs demonstrate that a calibration check was performed on June 3, 2009 
- two (2) days prior to Petitioner's breath test. Contrary to Petitioner's claim, there is nothing in 
either the SOPS or IDAP A that requires a subsequent calibration check. Consequently, arguing 
over the Calibration Checklist from June 25, 2009 is ridiculous because it has no bearing on this 
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case. Petitioner notes that the hearing officer did not acknowledge the Calibration Checklist in 
his written findings. Perhaps the hearing officer did not acknowledge the Calibration Checklist 
because he found it irrelevant. In light of the above, it is easy to see why the hearing officer did 
not acknowledge it or address it in his written findings - because it does provide any useful 
information to this case. 
With respect to Petitioner's argument that the hearing ofticer improperly relied on 
Officer White's boilerplate atTidavit to demonstrate that his breath test complied with Idaho law, 
this is simply not the case. The hearing otJicer did rely on Officer White's affidavit but also 
relied on the Intox 5000 logs vvhich demonstrated that a calibration check was performed just 
two (2) days before Petitioner submitted to a breath test. 
Petitioner also claims that the lntox 5000 logs prove that the State did not comply with 
IDAPA and the SOPs because there were 164 samples tested between 0.08 calibration checks on 
l'vlay 15,2009 and June 3, 2009. The SOPs state that: 
A two sample calibration check using a 0.08 reference solution 
should be ran and results logged each time a solution is replaced 
with fresh solution. A 0.08 reference solution should be replaced 
with fresh solution approximately every 100 samples or every 
month, whichever comes first. 
SOPs. 2.2.3. What happened between May IS, 2009 and June 3, 2009 does not matter for 
purposes of this case. Again, a calibration check was performed on June 3, 2009 and Petitioner 
submitted to a breath test on June 5, 2009. The fact that 164 samples were tested at one point 
with no calibration check is ilTelevant to Petitioner. r f he is arguing that a breath testing machine 
should never be used again because a calibration check was not done in accordance \vith the 
SOPs at some point in the past, that argument is absurd. In this case, the calibration check was 
performed two (2) days prior to Petitioner's breath test which demonstrates the State's 
compliance with IDAPA and the SOPs. 
RFSP00:DI';-..;rs BRIEF - P. 26 
00100 
8. Did the Hearing Officer err in sustaining IVlr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State's adopted 
procedures do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning of the breath 
testing device? 
Petitioner claims that "if the Hearing Officer was correct, and there is no requirement to 
perform prior and subsequent calibration checks, the . standards' themselves are therefore 
illusory, and do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning." Petitioner's Brie}; p. 23. As 
stated above, the SOPs do contain a requirement to perform calibration checks to ensure 
accuracy and proper functioning of breath testing equipment. Simply because no sub'''''equelll 
calibration check is mandated by the SOPs does not mean that the SOPS are illusory. Petitioner 
fails to provide any authority whatsoever supporting this argument. 
9. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the provider of the 
simulator solutions was not an "approved" provider as required by IDAPA 
and the Standard Operating Procedures'? 
Petitioner claims that both IDAPA and the SOPs require "that the simulator solutions 
used in the calibration checks be 'provided by the department or by a source approved by the 
department. '" Petitioner's Brie}; p. 24 (quoting IDAPA 11.03.01.013.05). Petitioner requested 
the hearing officer issuc a subpocna for documents that would identify '·the source of the 
simulator solution(s) used from May I, 2009 to July 13, 2009 to check the calibration of the 
breath-alcohol testing device used in this case." Petitioner's Brief; p. 25. He claims that the 
hearing officer's denial of this subpoena violated his due process rights. 
Petitioner also argues at length that because there is no current contract between the 
Idaho State Police and RepCo Marketing, Inc., the purported provider of the simulator solutions, 
that RepCo Marketing, Inc. is not an "approved" provider pursuant to IDAPA and the SOPs. 
As stated above, the hearing officer found that "[ s ]ection 2.2.1 of the Standard Operating 
Procedure sets f0l1h that Intoxilyzer 5000/EN calibration check is run using a 0.08 and/or 0.20 
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reference solutions provided by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services or approved vendor and 
riJllowing the procedure outlined in the Intoxilyzer SOOO/EN manual." (R. 293). He notes that 
"Exhibit 0, the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Analysis for simulator solution lot 
#8804, has approved the 0.08 solution for calibration checks to be run with an expiration date of 
August 11,2010, with that Certificate of Analysis issued September 24, 200S." In addition, Exhibit 
p, the Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Analysis for simulator solution lot #SlO 1, 
has approved the 0.20 solution for calibration checks to be run vvith an expiration date of October 7, 
2009, with that Certificate of Analysis issued August 12, 200S." (R. 293). As a result, the 0.08 and 
0.20 simulator solutions that are used to perform calibration checks "are current and valid for 
evidentiary testing in the State of Idaho." (R. 293). The hearing officer further stated that "[a] 
reasonable inference can be drawn that if the Idaho State Police has certified simulator solution lot 
#' s 8804 and 810 1 to be used to conduct calibration checks with respect to breath alcohol 
examination that it came from an approved provider." (R.293). Finally, the hearing officer found 
that Exhibit N, the expired contract between RepCo Marketing, Inc. and the Idaho State Police is 
insufticient to demonstrate that the solutions "were not certified by an approved provider nor the 
Idaho State Police." (R. 294). The hearing officer adequately refuted Petitioner's argument. His 
decision thoroughly demonstrates that the simulator solutions used in this case were from an 
approved provider. Petitioner's argument fails because his entire argument hinges on the tact that no 
current contract exists between RepCo Marketing, Inc. and the Idaho State Police. There is no 
requirement in IDAPA or the SOPs that a contract must exist in order for the source of the simulator 
solution to be an approved provider. Thus, the hearing officer correctly concluded that the source of 
the simulator solutions was an approved provider. 
As has already been stated many times, with respect to Petitioner's claim that the hearing 
officer's decision not to issue a subpoena for documents identifying the source of the simulator 
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solutions was in violation of his due process rights, the same argument discussing the Mathews 
v. Eldridge f~lCtors presented above applies. Petitioner's interest in his driver's license is 
substantia!' Hmvever, in light of the statutory safeguards in place and the fact that Officer White 
complied with these safeguards, the risk that Petitioner's license suspension was erroneOllS is 
very small. Finally, the state has a strong interest in keeping drunk drivers off the roads. III re 
Gihhar, 143 Idaho at 946, 1185. This strong state interest outweighs "the driver's interest in 
maintaining his driver's license, even though the driver's interest [is] substantia!." ld. As a 
result, the hearing otlicer's decision did not violate Petitioner's due process rights. 
10. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed Officer \Vhite failed to 
properly inform Mr. Bell of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary 
testing'? 
Petitioner argues that he was not properly advised of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing pursuant to Idaho Code ~ 18-8002A(2). In support of his argument, he cites 
to the audio recording of his conversation with Officer White regarding whether he could be 
forced to have his blood drawn ifhe did not provide a breath sample. 
In essence, Petitioner argues that the information provided by Officer White regarding 
forced blood draws was untrue and inconsistent with Idaho law. He claims that a forced blood 
dra'vv cannot be obtained in every DUI case, including misdemeanor DUI cases. He also claims 
that, contrary to Officer White's representations, blood draws cannot be obtained in every 
situation, sllch as 'vvhere the sllspect is afraid of needles. As a result, he claims that "Officer 
White's representations that no limitations existed were false." Petitioner's Brief; p. 31. 
Petitioner then argues that "the State cannot order a paramedic or any other medical 
professional to conduct a forced blood draw in a misdemeanor DUI investigation." Petitioller's 
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Brief; p. 32 {citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303-04 160 P.3d 739, 742-43 (2007». He 
claims this is contrary to \vhat Officer White represented. 
Petitioner also argues that "the State cannot use whatever force it wants in order to obtain 
a blood sample" because reasonable force is required. Petitioner's Brief; p. 32 (citing Schmerber 
v. Cali/omia, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742)). 
Consequently, Petitioner claims that "Officer White's representations that he and his fellow 
officers could use whatever force they wanted, up to and including a 'fist fight,' is clearly 
contrary to the law." Id. 
Petitioner argues that "the State cannot force every single person atTested for 
misdemeanor DUI to submit to breath or blood testing." He claims that Ofticer White's 
statement that "the 'blood draw would be taken from him without his consent if need be'" is 
untrue and outside the scope of Diaz. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that because Officer White misstated the law, told him that he 
must take the test, that his refusal would be met with force including a fist fight if necessary, 
Officer White used "coercive tactics," trickery and deceit, which "nullified the audio advisory." 
Petitioner's Brief; p. 34. 
In Idaho, any person who operates a motor vehicle within the State is "deemed to have 
given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" in instances where "a peace 
officer [has] reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provision of section 18-8004." IDAHO CODE § 18-
8002( I). A person who is required to submit to chemical testing under § 18-8002( 1) "shall be 
informed that if he refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidentiary testing" he is 
subject to a civil penalty and his driver's license will be seized. IDAHO CODE § 18-8002(3)(a), 
(5). The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that there is no statutory right of refusal. Slate 
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v. WOO/elY, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). It has further reiterated that the implied 
consent statute includes consent to blood draws. State v. Dice, 144 Idaho 300 (2007). 
In H7oo/el)', the court began its analysis by reviewing Schmerber v. C([l~farnia, 384 u.s. 
757 (1966). The Court in Schmerber held that a warrantless procedure was reasonable and 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment, since a delay to obtain a \varrant would threaten the 
destruction of the evidence. 384 U.S. at 1834-1836. The Waalel}' court, following SciJlIlerber, 
held that "the destruction of the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an 
inherent exigency which justifies the warrantless search." 116 Idaho at 370. The court \vent on 
to note that, prior to the enactment of Idaho Code § 18-8002, courts held that there was no 
constitutional right to refuse to take a blood alcohol test. In enacting the implied consent Im\/, 
the legislature "has acknowledged a driver's physical abili(v ta rejilse to submit to an evidentiary 
test, but it did not create a stClllltOlY right for a driver to withdraw his previously given consent to 
an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances." Id. at 
372 (cmphasis in original). The statute itsclfwas part ofa legislative "get tough" policy in DUI 
cases. In enacting the statute, the legislature had len out a provision of the prior law, which 
stat cd that when a person refused to take the test, no test would be given. Id. at 372. The court 
went on to hold that the results of the blood test were not subject to suppression, even though the 
officer had not foilowed the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002: 
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit 
to an evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is 
difficult to believe that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual 
with the statutory right to prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant 
evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe 
that individual has committed a crime - whether it would be driving under 
the inf1uence, vehicular manslaughter, sale of controlled substances, or 
murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures is complied with, the state should not be prevented 
from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol content of the 
driver's blood. 
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ld. at 373; see State v.lvfcCormack, 117 Idaho 1009,1014,793 P.2d 682,687 (1990) ("Although 
under I.e. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test, 
that section did not create a statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent or to 
refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcoholleve!."). 
In this case, Officer White had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for suspicion of driving 
under the influence. By choosing to operate a motor vehicle in Idaho, Petitioner impliedly 
consented to submit to chemical testing to determine whether he was operating his vehicle while 
under the influence of alcoho!. Officer White informed Petitioner of the penalties for refusing to 
submit to evidentiary testing, and after Petitioner refused, he informed Petitioner that if he didn't 
provide a breath sample he would have someone take his blood. Petitioner asked Officer White 
if he could force him to provide a blood sample, and Officer White told him that he could 
pursuant to Idaho lavv. Officer White informed Petitioner that he had no right to refuse the blood 
draw, and that he'd put him in a chair if necessary to obtain his blood. Based on the law set forth 
above, Officer White's representations were correct. Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, he had 
no right to refuse to submit to evidentiary testing. Further, Petitioner's argument that a forced 
blood draw cannot be obtained in misdemeanor DUI cases is false, as has been demonstrated by 
numerous case law. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 94 Idaho 548, 494 P.2d 146 (1972); State v. 
Cooper, 136 Idaho 697,701,39 P.3d 637,641 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483, 
489,680 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing Turner and Schmerber); see also Halen v. 
Stale, 136 Idaho 829, 834, 41 P.3d 257, 262 (2002) (in deciding whether Halen had sufficient 
cause for refusal to submit to a BAC test, the Court noted "an officer's authority to require a 
defendant to submit to a blood withdrawal, under I.e. § 18-8002, does not tum on whether 
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aggravating factors are present" and thereby implicitly rejected the notion that a forced blood 
draw in "routine" DUI cases is inappropriate). 
Petitioner seems to think that Officer White was required to infonn Petitioner of every 
single aspect related to the law of forced blood draws. For example, he states that Officer White 
did not inform Petitioner that forced blood draws cannot be obtained in situations \vhere a 
suspect has a fear of needles. Officer White adequately and correctly advised Petitioner that he 
\vas required to submit to evidentiary testing and that his blood would be taken if he refused to 
provide a breath sample. He did not have to provide Petitioner with a lesson in all relevant case 
law with respect to forced blood draws. 
Petitioner also argues that "the State cannot order a paramedic or any other medical 
professional to conduct a forced blood draw in a misdemeanor DUI investigation." As stated in 
Petitioner's Brice OtTicer White said, "Well if you don't take this then r am going to have to call 
someone to come take your blood ... If you don't take this breath test I am going to call a 
paramedic down and take your blood." Petitioner's Brief; p. 28-29. Respondent fails to see how 
this argument is even relevant since OffIcer White did not tell Petitioner that he would order a 
paramedic to draw his blood. And obviously since there was never a blood draw in this case, 
Officer White did not order a paramedic to take his blood. 
Next, Petitioner argues that the State must use reasonable force to obtain a blood sample. 
The portion of the conversation between Otllcer White and Petitioner that is the subject of this 
argument began with Petitioner stating, "So, if I fought as hard as I could, you'd lock me up -
lock me into it and take blood?" Oftlcer White stated, "you got it." Petitioner's Brief; p. 31. 
Petitioner then stated, ''I'm not into a fist tIght tonight" and OffIcer White said, "Good. Either 
am I." fd. 
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Idaho courts have clearly read the implied consent statute to include consent to forced 
blood draws and to mean that there is no right to refuse a blood test, even though it is possible to 
plil'sicalfr refuse. If an individual can physically refuse, but pursuant to Idaho law they have no 
right to withdraw their previously given consent to submit to evidentiary testing, how else is a 
suspect's blood alcohol content to be determined? An individual can physically refuse to blow 
into a breath testing machine and an officer cannot force that person to do so. However, a person 
can be forced to submit to a blood draw to determine his blood alcohol content. In 
circumstances like Petitioner's, a forced blood draw is the only \vay to make such a 
determination and it is clearly permitted under Idaho's implied consent statute. 
Petitioner is correct that a blood draw must be reasonable. To be reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, "the procedure must be done in a medically acceptable manner and without 
unreasonable force." Diu:::, at 301. The United States Supreme Court has held that whether a 
particular use of force in the course of a seizure is appropriate under the Fourth Amendment 
depends on "whether the officers' actions [were] 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." 
Graham v. COllllor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). The reasonableness inquiry involves attention to 
the circumstances of the police action, which are often uncertain, rapidly evolving, and possibly 
posing an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. !d. at 396. Further, the 
reasonableness of the force used by the police is "judged from the perspective of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. 
In this case, Officer White's response to Petitioner's question about whether he \vould be 
locked up and his blood drawn even if he fought as hard as he could did not indicate that 
unnecessary force would be used or that unnecessary force is acceptable during forced blood 
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draws. In fact, Officer White's statement that Petitioner would be locked up if he fought the 
blood draw is consistent with Idaho law. In Slate v. Worthington, court of appeals stated that: 
Worthington refused to perform any tield sobriety tests and 
informed the anesting officer that he would not submit to any 
procedures to determine the alcohol content of his blood or breath. 
Instead, he told the an'esting officer "that if [the ofticer] was going 
to get blood out of him, that [the ot1icer] was going to have to fight 
him." Two other officers thereafter transported W 0l1hington to the 
Gooding Hospital to have his blood drawn for testing. No warrant 
had been issued authorizing the procedure. 
At the hospitaL Worthington became very combative. Three 
police officers and two nurses held him onto a table so that a 
laboratory technician could draw his blood. During this process, 
Worthington was handcuffed with a belly restraint. The blood was 
taken from W0l1hington's ankle because the technician could not 
tind a usable vein in either of his arms. 
Stale v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 471-472, 65 P.3d 211, 212-213 (Ct.App. 2(02). Despite 
the nlct that it took three police ot1icers, two nurses, and a belly restraint to draw blood from 
Worthington, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the forced blood draw (and test results) 
\vere reasonably obtained under the FOUl1h Amendment. Based on Worthington, clearly Officer 
White's statement to Petitioner regarding the force that could be used to obtain his blood is 
supported by Idaho law. 
Finally, Petitioner's argument that the audio advisory was nullified because Officer 
White used "coercive tactics, trickery and deceit" when he said that Petitioner's refusal "would 
be met with force including a fist fight if necessary" is inconect. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
held that police officer's use of subterfuge and trickery to gain a suspect's compliance IS a 
reasonable and acceptable tool that does not violate a suspect's rights. State v. Bentley, 132 
Idaho 497, 975 P.2d 785 (1999). The United States Supreme Court stated that "[c]riminal 
activity is sLlch that stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police 
otTicer." Sherman v. United Slates, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). It is 
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also noteworthy that the use of trickery and subterfuge by police has been approved in a number 
of circumstances. See Fra::ier 1'. CllPP, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420,22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) 
(holding that an officer's lie to the defendant that his co-conspirator had confessed was 
insufficient to make an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible); Lewis v. United States, 
385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424,17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966) (finding no violation of defendant's privacy 
when a policeman lied about his identity in order to gain admittance to defendant's home and 
purchase illegal drugs); United States 1'. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.1993) 
(holding that where police used deception to induce an occupant to open the door, the knock and 
announce statute was not implicated); Leahy 1'. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.1960) 
(upholding the validity of an arrest made after an agent gained admittance to the appellant'S 
premises by stating that he was an agent from the County Assessor's OfTice); United States v. 
Salter, 815 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.1987) (holding police action in inducing defendant to open door 
by means ofa ruse did not constitute intrusion within meaning of knock and announce statute). 
Officer White did not use coercive tactics, trickery or deceit because his statements to 
Petitioner were true and in accordance with Idaho law. However, even assuming Officer White 
did engage in such conduct, as stated above, trickety and subterfuge are reasonable and Im\"ful 
actions. 
11. Did the Hearing Officer err by relying on Officer \Vhite's affidavit when the 
State was in actual or constructive knowledge that Officer White had been 
deemed unreliable by the Boise Police Department? 
Petitioner argues that prior to the hearing, Officer White "was found to have made false 
statements during an internal investigation and was terminated from the Boise Police 
Department." Petitioller's Brief: p. 36. Petitioner also notes that prosecutors "representing the 
State of Idaho" knew of this information. Consequently, Petitioner claims that "ITO, a political 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, had actual or constmctive knowledge of these t~ictS." Id. He 
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claims that the hearing officer should have considered this information and should have informed 
Petitioner "that Officer White had been found to have made false statements in the past." ]d. As 
a result, Petitioner argues that "he was prevented from raising this issue before the Hearing 
OtTireI'." ld. Therefore, Petitioner claims that: 
The Hearing Officer, by relying upon Mr. White's affidavit when 
the State was in constructive knowledge of his veracity issues, 
violated Mr. Bell's right to due process and rendered a decision 
which exceeded statutory authority, was made upon unlawful 
procedure, was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 
Pelitioller's Brief; p. 37. 
First, Petitioner's argument that Respondent had constructive notice of the information 
regarding Officer White is a stretch. The Idaho Transportation Department is not a criminal 
division of the State of Idaho. It is not even located in the same building as the prosecutor's 
oilier. To impute prosecutors' knowledge to Respondent is outrageous and there is absolutely 
no reason to conc lude that Respondent should know the facts of all cases being handled at the 
prosecutor's oftice. 
Because Respondent did not have constructive knowledge, it cannot be argued that the 
hearing oHicer wrongfully withheld the information from Petitioner and that his decision was 
otherwise improper. In addition, Petitioner's due process rights were not violated. As 
repeatedly stated above, Petitioner's interest in his driver's license is substantial, but the risk that 
Officer White lied about the facts of Petitioner's arrest is very small. Also, the state has a strong 
interest in keeping drunk drivers off the roads, which outweigh "the driver's interest in 
maintaining his driver's license, even though the driver's interest [is] substantia!''' III re Gibbar, 
143 Idaho at 946, 1185. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, it is respectfully submitted that this Court should affirm the findings of 
the hearing officer and leave the suspension of Petitioner undisturbed. 
DA TED this __ day of January, 2010. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BY 7tJ~LvJ--
MICHAEL J. KANE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Mr. Dean B. Arnold /U.S. Mail 
Law Otlices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 'v\!. Main Street, Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, ID 83702 
[Facsimile: 11342-3777] 
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Dean B. Arnold, ISB #6814 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 W. Main St., Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-1575 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3777 
Attorneys for Defendant Hamish Bell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVING ) 
PRIVILEGES OF: ) Case No. CV-OT-2009-0018414 
) 




COMES NOW, the above-named Petitioner, Hamish Allan Bell, by and through 
his attorneys of record, Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold, and moves this Court pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 30, for an order augmenting the record in the above-entitled 
appeal with: 
A copy of the following documents submitted by Mr. Bell's counsel to 
Respondent, State of Idaho Department of Transportation, during the administrative 
hearing process: 
1. E-mail dated July 23, 2009, from attorney Dean B. Arnold to ITO Hearing 
Officer Dave Baumann. 
2. E-mail dated August 7, 2009, from attorney Dean B. Arnold to lTD Hearing 
Officer Dave Baumann. 
The specific grounds for the request are as follows: 
MOTION TO AUGMENT-l 
Respondent, in Respondent's Brief, seeks to attribute certain delays to Mr. Bell. 
The above e-mails are evidence that Respondent's contentions are incorrect. Although 
most of the documents attached to the above e-mails were made part of the Agency 
Record, Respondent failed to include the corresponding e-mails as part of the record. 
Undersigned counsel apologizes to the Court for failing to recognize their 
absence previously, but given the rather disorganized Agency Record that was 
submitted by Respondent, hopes the Court understands this oversight. Moreover, Mr. 
Bell did not anticipate an argument by Respondent that is contrary to the facts as known 
by Respondent. 
In any event, the Agency Record should be augmented with the above-listed 
documents so that Mr. Bell can refute a factual allegation asserted by Respondent which 
is demonstrably false. 
True and correct copies of the above e-mails are attached hereto. 
DATED this 28th day of January, 2010. 
MOTION TO AUGMENT- 2 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
B 6-- '. y:---------~----------~----­
Dean B. Arnold 
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Dean B. Arnold [dean@deanarnoldlaw.comJ 
Thursday, July 23,20092:32 PM 
'dave.baumann@itd.idaho.gov' 
Hamish Bell 
Attachments: In re Schroeder; State v. Jaborra; State v. Garcia; Florida v. Bostick; State v. Woolery; 
Schnekloth v. Bustamonte; Schmerber v. California; State v. Diaz; In re Beem; In re Virgil; In 
re Griffiths; In re Gibbar 
Mr. Baumann, 
Attached are the case decisions cited to today in my argument on behalf of Hamish Bell, File No. 
807001277034. If you need anything else, please let me know. 
Regards, 
Dean 
Dean B. Arnold I Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 W. Main St., Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: 208.342.1575 I Fax: 208.342.3777 
Email: dean@deanarnoldlaw.com 
NOTICE: This communication may contain privileged or other confidential information. If you 
have received it in error, please advise the sender by reply email and immediately delete the 
message and any attachments without copying or disclosing the contents. Thank you. 
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Dean B. Arnold [dean@deanarnoldlaw.comJ 
Friday, August 07,20092:25 PM 
'dave.baumann@itd.idaho.gov' 
In re Hamish Bell 
Bell - Memo in Supp Mot to Suppress. pdf; Jaborra.doc; Schroeder.doc; DeWitt. doc; 
Harmon.doc; Gibbar.doc; Virgi/.doc; Griffiths.doc; Beem.doc; Diaz.doc; Schmerber.doc; 
Schneckloth.doc; Woolery.doc; Bostick.doc; Garcia.doc 
In response to the request I received from your office this weekJ I have attached 
the case decisions cited to during the ALS Hearing of Hamish Bellon July 23 J 
2009J with pertinent sections highlighted. I have included two case decisions 
(DeWitt and Harmon) that were not attached to my previous email J dated July 23 J 
2009. With the exception of the highlightingJ the remaining twelve decisions are 
the same as the previous email. 
I have also attached a copy of a similar brief filed in the corresponding 
criminal case. Although the arguments are slightly different J I hope the 
underlying facts and relevant case law will be of assistance. 
If there is anything further we can do to helpJ please let me know. 
Regards J 
Dean 
Dean B. Arnold I Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 300 W. Main St' J Suite 250J Office 
262 Boise J Idaho 83702 
Tel: 208.342.1575 I Fax: 208.342.3777 
Email: dean@deanarnoldlaw.com 
NOTICE: This communication may contain privileged or other confidential 
information. If you have received it in errorJ please advise the sender by reply 
email and immediately delete the message and any attachments without copying or 
disclosing the contents. Thank you. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 










for Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
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PETITIONER'S REPL Y BRIEF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW FROM THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLE!',! 
Senior District Judge 
Dean B. Arnold, ISB #68 I 4 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 W. Main St., Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-1575 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3777 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Iv1ichael J. Kane, ISB #2652 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 
Telephone: (208) 342-4545 
Fax: (208) 342-2323 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Mr. Bell, through his counsel of record, replies to the Respondent's Brief as 
follows: 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Hearing Officer Is Required to Ensure Driver's Are Afforded Due 
Process. 
Respondent contends that because Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) does not 
specifically list due process violations as a basis to vacate a suspension, the Hearing 
Officer is precluded from doing so. (Respondent's Brief at 11 & 13.) This is not the 
law. No state is permitted to statutorily circumvent the constitutional guarantees of due 
process, and there is nothing in the Idaho Code that says the legislature even attempted 
to remove these protections when it enacted the administrative license suspension 
statutes. 
In fact, the Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, in no uncertain terms, "the hearing 
officer's discretionary decision must comply with the procedural due process 
guarantees of the United States and Idaho Constitutions." In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 
945, 155 P.3d 1176, 1184 (Ct. App. 2006). Similarly, "driver's licenses may not be 
taken away without procedural due process." Id., citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 
112 (1971). Respondent's argument is nothing more than a regurgitation of the Hearing 
Officer's supposed justification not to address any of the procedural errors raised by 
Mr. Hull-that due process is not expressly listed in J. C. 18-802A(7}. 
However, Respondent's argument is interesting because it is an apparent 
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admission by the State that no due process protections exist at the administrative level, 
as such can only apparently be addressed on judicial review months after the suspension 
has gone into effect. If the State's argument was true, there would be no doubt such a 
system is unconstitutional as it would limit due process only to those financially 
capable of filing a petition for judicial review, and in the end, render the due process 
protections essentially meaningless as the suspension for most driver's would nearly be 
complete by the time they could even seek a stay of their driver's license suspension. 
For example, Mr. Bell's suspension was in effect for 72 days before even 
receiving the Hearing Officer's decision. (Petitioner's Brief at 8 & 13.) For those 
facing the standard 90-day suspension, see I.C. § 18-8002A(2)(d), Respondent's 
position facially denies those driver's any due process rights because, as stated by the 
United States Supreme Court, the state "will not be able to make a driver whole for any 
personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered by reason of any delay in 
redressing an erroneous suspension through post-suspension review procedures." 
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
Regardless, it is indisputable that this Court is empowered to address due process 
violations. See, e.g., In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 945-950, 155 P.3d at 1184-1189. And 
Mr. Bell is asking the Court to review the entirety of the process afforded him to 
determine whether it complied with due process. 
B. The Subpoenas Issued By the Hearing Officer Facially Denied Due Process. 
Respondent does not dispute the Hearing Officer issued subpoenas that allowed 
2 001.24 
the law enforcement agencies to respond to them in a manner that would deny Mr. Bell 
sufficient time to review and analyze the information. Nor does Respondent deny that 
pursuant to the subpoenas the physical items-such as compact discs of the audio 
recordings-would not be provided to Mr. Bell until after the hearing. Instead, 
Respondent claims nothing in Idaho Code or IDAPA requires Respondent to provide 
this information to Mr. Bell in advance of the hearing. (Respondent's Brief at 12.) 
Once again, the mere absence of a statutory requirement does not exempt 
Respondent from the due process requirements of the United States and Idaho 
constitutions. Regardless, the Court of Appeals provided us some insight on this issue 
in In re Gibbar when it found the discovery process constitutionally sufficient because 
it had "enabled Gibbar to receive, a few days in advance of the hearing, the log for the 
breath testing instrument used in this case as well as all materials forwarded to the lTD 
by the Clearwater County Sheriffs Office .... " 143 Idaho at 948,155 P.3d at 1187 
(emphasis added). 
Unlike Mr. Gibbar, the timeframe for discovery in Mr. Bell's case was not "long 
enough to provide him with discovery responses in sufficient time that he could utilize 
them for the hearing." Id. Accordingly, subpoenas which permit disclosure of 
documentary evidence only hours before the hearing, and actually permit disclosure of 
audio recordings after the hearing has occurred, are the definition of unconstitutional. 
C. The Hearing Officer Had No Authority to Extend the Hearing Process. 
Respondent-apparently realizing the above problems with the subpoenas are 
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significant-next contends the Hearing Officer corrected the above situation by forcing 
Mr. Bell to choose between proceeding without an opportunity to review the documents 
or continuing the hearing until another date. (Respondent's Brief at 13.) However, 
Respondent also recognizes the Hearing Officer is statutorily limited to only one 10-day 
extension, which had been previously used by the Hearing Officer on July 9, 2009. Id. 
Seemingly cornered on this issue, Respondent seeks to circumvent the statute by 
arguing there is no legal authority that a license suspension must be vacated if the 
Hearing Officer extends the hearing for more than 10 days. Respondent either misses 
the point or is attempting to divert the Court from the real issue. 
The Hearing Officer did not have authority to extend the hearing past July 9, 
2009, because he had previously used the one 10-day extension permitted by I.C. § 18-
8002A(7). However, on that same date, the Hearing Officer acknowledged Mr. Bell had 
insufficient time to review the belatedly produced documents. Accordingly, the 
Hearing Officer had two options: 1) proceed with the hearing; or 2) vacate Mr. Bell's 
suspension. However, the Hearing Officer could not proceed with the hearing because 
he had acknowledged Mr. Bell was not given any time to review the intoxilyer log 
sheets and calibration checks. Thus, the only option was to vacate the suspension. 
Respondent's argument that the "hearing officer acted in accordance with Idaho 
Code in deciding to reschedule the hearing" is expressly refuted by the time limitations 
set forth by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7). The statute permits the Hearing Officer one 
lO-dayextension. Id. Nothing more. Respondent's assertion to the contrary is false. 
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D. The Hearing Officer's Delay Violated Due Process. 
Respondent argues that the Hearing Officer's delay in issuing a written decision 
which resulted in Mr. Bell's driving privileges being suspended for 72 days without a 
ruling did not violate due process. In support of its position, Respondent relies upon 
IDAPA 39.02.72.600.01, which states: 
The Hearing Officer shall issue the Findings of Fact, 
Conc1 usions of Law and Order prior to the expiration of the 
thirty (30) day temporary permit, but failure to do so shall 
not be grounds for staying or vacating the suspension. 
Granted, the failure to issue a written decision before the suspension goes into effect is 
not a statutorily-based right to have the suspension vacated. But, once again, neither 
IDAPA nor the Idaho Code can circumvent the protections of due process. And in any 
event, Mr. Bell is not asking the Hearing Officer to vacate the suspension for missing 
the deadline by a day or two. He is asking the Court to vacate the suspension because 
after the 30 days had run, the Hearing Officer did not issue a written decision for 
another 72 days. It is that delay which Mr. Bell contends violates due process. Nothing 
submitted by Respondent even addresses this issue. 
Respondent's apparent reliance upon an Ohio court's decision does not help its 
cause. (Respondent's Brief at 15-16, citing State v. Powell, 2006 WL 1851710 (Ohio 
Ct. App. June 26, 2006).) If anything, that decision supports Mr. Bell's position. First, 
there is no indication the Ohio ALS statute is anything like Idaho's, and what little 
description there is, clearly indicates it is a substantially different statute. Second, in 
Powell, the driver was not complaining about the length of time it took a hearing officer 
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to render a decision; he was apparently attacking the entire ALS process generally. 
Third, the quotation providing by Respondent strategically omits the portion of the Ohio 
court's reasoning which is contrary to Respondent's argument. 
The paragraph quoted by Respondent actually concludes with this missing 
sentence: "The suspension will last until the initial appearance on the charge, which 
must be held within five days after the arrest, at which time the suspension may be 
appealed." Id. at * 5 (emphasis added). The Ohio court went on to discuss the 
importance of this short time duration. 
In addition, a suspension may be appealed at the initial 
appearance on the charge, which must be held within five 
days. This safeguard limits the duration of any potentially 
wrongful deprivation of the driver's property interest, the 
duration being an important factor in evaluating the impact 
of the state action on the private interest involved. 
Id. (emphasis added), citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975). Mr. Bell's 
situation-which took 102 days from the date of his arrest-is more than 20 times 
longer than the five days discussed in Powell. 
Respondent's reliance upon Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), fairs no 
better. First, Respondent quotes from the case syllabus (Respondent's Brief at 16, 
citing Mackey, 443 U.S. at 2), which expressly states it "constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court." Second, Mackey has nothing at all to do with delay in rendering 
a decision after the administrative hearing. The issue in Mackey was whether due 
process required a pre-suspension hearing when the Massachusetts statute in question 
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granted a post-suspension hearing immediately upon the driver's suspension. Id. at 11-
12. Third, Mackey, citing the same Supreme Court decision relied upon in Powell, also 
acknowledged the importance of any potential delay in the procedural outcome: 
The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a 
property interest is an important factor in assessing the 
impact of official action on the private interest involved. 
Id. at 12 (emphasis added), citing Fusari, 419 U.S. at 389. 
Accordingly, Respondent's argument that an officer is likely to accurately 
convey the facts of the case to the Hearing Officer has nothing at all to do with the 
duration in which the Hearing Officer must render his decision. If Respondent's 
position were correct, the entire hearing and review process is unnecessary because the 
police officer will never make a mistake. But we know that is incorrect, because 
numerous administrative suspensions have never gone into effect or have been vacated 
because the police officer did make a mistake. In any event, Respondent's argument 
does not even respond to the actual issue-whether Mr. Bell was denied due process 
when his driving privileges were suspended for 72 days without a decision. 
If the statute relied upon by Respondent-IDAPA 39.02.72.600.01-stated the 
Hearing Officer could wait 72 days before rendering a decision, there is no doubt the 
statute would be struck as unconstitutional. That is essentially all Mr. Bell is arguing 
here. 
E. Mr. Bell Did Not Delay the Hearing Officer's Decision. 
Recognizing the extensive delay in this case, Respondent seeks to blame the 
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delay on Mr. Bell. (Respondent's Brief at 14.) These allegations are not only untrue, 
they are refuted by documents in Respondent's possession. 
The basis of this argument is Respondent's contention that after the July 23, 
2009 hearing, "a Request for Additional Time for Evidence was issued at the request of 
Petitioner to permit him to obtain and present additional evidence (the case law in 
support of his claims)." Id. at 7 (emphasis added). This assertion is false. Mr. Bell 
never requested additional time. This continuance was initiated sua sponte by the 
Hearing Officer, and when Mr. Bell immediately submitted the requested information 
on that same date, the Hearing Officer waited approximately 10 days before requesting 
Mr. Bell resubmit this same information with pertinent sections "highlighted." This 
delay can only be attributed to the Hearing Officer. It is certainly not attributable to 
Mr. Bell. 
Specifically, during the July 23, 2009 hearing, Mr. Bell's counsel repeatedly 
cited to case decisions with specific page citations in support of his argument. (Tr Vol. 
II, pp. 7, 11-14.) Towards the end of the hearing, the Hearing Officer interrupted Mr. 
Bell's counsel and asked that he submit copies of the case decisions he was relying 
upon. Id. at 14. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Officer voluntarily 
stated the record would be kept open so that Mr. Bell could submit the case decisions, 
to which Mr. Bell's counsel indicated he would submit them within the next 24 hours. 




On that same date, at approximately 2:32 p.m., Mr. Bell's counsel e-mailed each 
of the case decision to the Hearing Officer. Approximately 10 days later, ITO staff 
contacted Mr. Bell's counsel and requested that he resubmit the case decisions with the 
pertinent sections highlighted. On August 7, 2009, Mr. Bell's counsel resubmitted the 
case decisions as requested, and also included a brief filed in the corresponding 
criminal case to further assist the Hearing Officer in summarizing the arguments and 
reliance upon the cases provided. (R pp. 263-274.) Accordingly, nothing by Mr. Bell 
delayed the Hearing Officer in rendering his decision. 
On August 18,2009, having still not received a decision from the Hearing 
Officer, Mr. Bell's counsel submitted a copy of the State's newly filed Motion to 
Dismiss the criminal charge in the "interest of justice" believing it had been filed in 
response to the very same issue raised before the Hearing Officer. (R pp. 275-281.) 
Although heavily relied upon by Respondent as causing further delay, there is 
absolutely no factual basis to contend this one-page document impacted the Hearing 
Officer's ability to render a timely decision. 
Respondent also fails to inform the Court the "Request for Additional Time for 
Evidence" states: 
If the additional evidence is received prior to the expiration 
of the 15 day time frame, the record will be closed at the 
time the evidence is received and a finding of fact will be 
issued. 
(R p. 47) (emphasis added.) Therefore, Mr. Bell had every right to believe the record 
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was closed on July 23, 2009 when his counsel submitted all the information requested 
by the Hearing Officer. It wasn't until the Hearing Officer requested the same 
information be submitted in a different format that Mr. Bell could have even known the 
decision would not be issued in the near future. 
Accordingly, Respondent's attempt to blame Mr. Bell for delaying the Hearing 
Officer in issuing his decision is directly contradicted by the facts. Interestingly, lTD 
failed to make the e-mails documenting these facts as part of the record. These 
documents are part ofMr. Bell's Motion to Augment, filed on January 28,2010 
(requesting the Court augment the record with two e-mails and number them 333 and 
334, respectively). 
F. The Police Officer's Affidavit Does Not Preclude Mr. Bell's Right to Due 
I)rocess. 
In response to the various issues raised by Mr. Bell concerning the Hearing 
Officer's denial of the requested subpoenas, Respondent, citing to the second factor 
listed in Mathews v. Eldridge, seeks protection by merely claiming "in light of the 
statutory safeguards in place and the fact that Officer White complied with these 
safeguards, the risk that Petitioner's license suspension was erroneous is very small." 
(Respondent's Brief at 16, 17, 19,21,23,29, & 37.) This repeated argument is 
inherently flawed. 
First, Respondent fails to address the entirety of the second Mathews factor-the 
risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
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probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 
(Respondent's Brief at 15.) Nowhere in Respondent's brief is the later portion even 
discussed, let alone analyzed. 
Second, Respondent's argument that the State has a strong interest in avoiding 
overly burdensome procedures (Respondent's Brief at 19) has no place here. All the 
Hearing Officer needed to do was issue the requested subpoenas. There is nothing 
"overly burdensome" about that practice which is utilized in nearly every administrative 
license suspension hearing, and in any event, expressly authorized by IDAP A § 
39.02.72.300.01. 
Third, the subpoenas denied by the Hearing Officer merely requested copies of 
documents which are mandated by IDAPA and/or the SOP's to be kept by the officer 
and/or the agency maintaining the breath testing device. For example, the Hearing 
Officer denied subpoenas for Officer White's Intoxilyzer 5000 certification, intoxilyzer 
logs, and calibration checks.' See IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.04 (requiring operator 
certification); SOP § 1.6 ("It is the responsibility of each individual agency to store 
calibration records, subject records, maintenance records, instrument logs, or any other 
records as pertaining to the evidentiary use of breath testing instruments and to 
maintain a current record of operator certification."). Similarly, the Hearing Officer 
, Respondent's argument that the subpoena issued for intoxilyzer log sheets and 
calibration checks between June 3-6, 2009 was sufficient (Respondent's Brief at 19) is 
curious, in that it implies the Hearing Officer somehow knew prior to issuing the 
subpoena that a calibration check would be included in this brief time period. 
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also denied subpoenas establishing the simulator solutions were produced by an 
"approved" provider as required by IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.05 and SOP § 2.2.1. 
Accordingly, there can be no comparison of Mr. Bell's requested subpoenas to 
the subpoena requested in In re Gibbar which the Court of Appeals held was "not 
necessary to support Gibbar's stated challenge to the basis of the BAC test and would 
impose an unreasonable burden on the state when alternative methods of presenting 
such a challenge were available." 143 Idaho at 948, 155 P.3d at 1187. The basis for 
that decision was Mr. Gibbar's requested subpoena sought the testimony of the director 
of the state's breath testing program who was unlikely to testify the State had acted 
unlawfully as argued by Mr. Gibbar. Id. at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. Here, Mr. Bell 
merely sought the basic documents which State law required the law enforcement 
agencies to maintain. Respondent, by merely quoting selected and irrelevant text from 
In re Gibbar, does nothing to help its case. 
Fourth, the "probable value" of the requested information has been established 
by numerous court opinions setting forth the manner in which to attack an 
administrative license suspension. See, e.g., In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476,210 P .3d 
584, 586 (Ct. App. 2009) (failure to comply with rules and regulations sufficient basis 
to attack suspension); Bennett v. State, Dept. oj Transp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505, 
508-09 (Ct. App. 2009) (specific evidence contradicting officer's sworn affidavit 
sufficient basis to attack suspension). By refusing to provide the requested information, 
the State can effectively remove all due process protections at the administrative level. 
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Fifth, Respondent's argument is based entirely on Mr. White's affidavit asserting 
all proper procedures were followed. However, because Mr. White has been deemed 
unreliable by his former employer-the Boise Police Department-there is ample basis 
to suspect the veracity of any sworn statement made by Mr. White. This only further 
erodes Respondent's argument under the second Mathews factor. 
G. The Hearing Officer's Factual Findings That the Boise Police Department 
Complied With the Subpoenas Are Clearly Erroneous; Respondent Cannot 
Circumvent Mr. Bell's Specific Proffers By Misbranding Them As 
Speculation. 
Respondent contends Mr. Bell's position regarding the Hearing Officer's 
findings of fact as to whether the Boise Police Department complied with the Hearing 
Officer's subpoena is based upon "pure speculation." (Respondent's Brief at 21.) 
Respondent is wrong. Mr. Bell's counsel made specific proffers during the 
administrative hearing that an lTD employee, Ms. Downum, informed him that lTD had 
no information in its possession regarding the receipt, source, or corresponding 
subpoena related to the intoxilyzer log sheets (Exhibits L) sent to Mr. Bell's counsel 
immediately before the hearing. (Petitioner's Brief at 6, citing Tr Vol. II, p. 4, Is. 12-
16.) When the Hearing Officer subsequently denied any discovery on this issue-either 
through Ms. Downum's testimony or simply by producing the documents in lTD's 
possession establishing the production of these documents (R p. 20)-he precluded 
himself from making any findings of facts contrary to the proffers submitted by Mr. 
Bell's counsel. 
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More importantly, Respondent does not refute the facts-it merely seeks to avoid 
the issue by claiming it is based upon "speculation." Nothing could be further from the 
truth. The Hearing Officer's findings on this issue are clearly erroneous, and to let 
them stand, would violate due process because Mr. Bell was specifically refused any 
information on this issue after lTD staff provided his counsel information that directly 
contradicts the Hearing Officer's factual findings. 
H. The Hearing Officer Should Not Be Allowed to Deny Petitioner Access to 
Relevant lTD Hearing Decisions, Especially Where Petitioner Has No Other 
Means to Access This Information. 
Mr. Bell merely sought copies of lTD decision which contradicted the Hearing 
Officer's legal conclusion that subpoena non-compliance is not a basis to vacate a 
driver's license suspension. (R pp. 39-40; Petitioner's Briefat 17-18.) Respondent 
contends Mr. Bell is not entitled to this information because these decision "do not 
relate to Petitioner's hearing." (Respondent's Brief at 22.) Respondent is wrong. 
Once the Hearing Officer refused to vacate the suspension based upon subpoena 
non-compliance, Mr. Bell had a lawful right to copies of any lTD decision in which 
other driver's had their suspensions vacated for this reason. In fact, Mr. Bell could 
have requested all such decisions in lTD's possession. Instead, he merely asked for 
those issued within the past 12 months. 
This is especially true here because these decisions are not accessible through 
any published media or electronic database known to Mr. Bell or his counsel. A fair 
analogy to Respondent's argument would be if the Idaho courts kept all of its written 
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decisions locked in its file cabinets and refused the various legal reporters and 
electronic legal research providers access to those decisions; and when an Idaho judge 
claimed there was no legal justification for a certain request, refused to give the 
requesting party access to the other, previous decisions which established that judge's 
statement of the law was incorrect. No court would uphold such action. But that is 
exactly what Respondent is arguing here. 
The information requested by Mr. Bell does "relate" to his hearing because it is 
the only means by which he could challenge the Hearing Officer's legal conclusion. By 
hiding this information from drivers who are facing license suspensions, the 
administrative process loses its ability to provide any meaningful review. 
I. Respondent Does Not Refute That the State Failed to Perform the Required 
Calibration Checks, But Merely Contends the State's Failure to Comply 
With IDAPA And the SOP's Is Irrelevant. 
Respondent spends three pages of its Response confirming the facts and rules 
governing breath testing devices as set forth by Mr. Bell, all merely to then contend the 
intoxilyzer log sheets and calibration checks are "irrelevant." (Respondent's Brief at 
24-26.) Respondent even goes so far to argue any discussion of subsequent calibration 
checks is "ridiculous" and "absurd." Id. at 25 & 26. No matter what Respondent 
argues, it cannot refute the facts. 
The State performed calibration checks 164 samples prior to June 3, 2009 (R pp. 
71-83), and then when it should have conducted a subsequent calibration check on June 
25, 2009, it failed to do so (R p. 104). Granted, we don't know exactly how many 
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samples were tested prior to June 25, 2009, but that is only because the Hearing Officer 
refused to issue a subpoena for those records and Mr. Bell's counsel could only obtain 
records through June 13, 2009 from another source. However, applying one of the 
Hearing Officer's "reasonable inferences," the intoxilyzer log sheets establish the 
breath testing device was on pace for a 0.08 calibration check on or about June 25, 
2009. That, combined with the aborted 0.08 calibration check on June 25, 2009, is 
sufficient evidence a 0.08 calibration check was required on that date. (Exhibit S; R p. 
104.) 
"Respondent agrees that pursuant to the language of the SOP's, 0.08 calibration 
checks are required every 100 samples." (Respondent's Brief at 25.) There is no doubt 
the State failed to comply on both ends of the spectrum surrounding Mr. Bell's 
evidentiary testing. Respondent's attempt to rely on a single calibration check is 
refuted by IDAPA, the SOP's, and Respondent's admission that 0.08 calibration checks 
are required "every 100 samples." That, by definition, makes subsequent calibration 
checks relevant. 
J. If Prior and Subsequent Calibration Checks As Required by IDAPA and the 
SOP's Are Irrelevant, the State's Adopted Procedures Do Not Ensure 
Accuracy and Proper Functioning As Required By Law. 
Respondent contends "the SOP's do contain a requirement to perform calibration 
checks to ensure accuracy and proper functioning of breath testing equipment." 
(Respondent's Brief at 27.) This position is expressly contradictory to Respondent's 
previous arguments 1) that the State's failure to perform a subsequent calibration check 
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is "irrelevant" and 2) that any argument based upon the State's failure to properly 
perform a previous calibration check is "absurd." Id. at 25 & 26. 
As stated in Mr. Bell's brief, Respondent cannot have it both ways. (Petitioner's 
Brief at 23.) IDAPA § 11.03.01.0l3.03 requires the State to establish standards. If the 
Hearing Officer's decision is correct, the State has essentially whittled the SOP's down 
to the point they are meaningless, and therefore, cannot be based upon any scientific 
principles that ensure accuracy and precision. 
K. Respondent Fails to Refute That Repco Marketing, Inc. Was Not An 
"Approved" Provider; Nor Does Respondent Establish That the Hearing 
Officer's Conclusions Are Supported By Substantial Evidence In the Record. 
Respondent merely regurgitates the Hearing Officer's decision regarding whether 
the simulator lot solutions were from an "approved" provider, and fails to address the 
specific points raised by Mr. Bell in his brief. The Hearing Officer refused to issue 
subpoenas that would disclose whether the State was in compliance with IDAPA and 
the SOP's concerning the mandatory use of an "approved" provider. Despite the 
Hearing Officer's reluctance, Mr. Bell affirmatively established the State's contract 
with Repco Marketing, Inc. ("Repco") had long since expired. 
Respondent's sole argument is there is no requirement that a valid contract exist 
for Repco to be an "approved" provider. That mayor may not be the case, but IDAPA 
§ 11.03.01.013.05 and SOP § 2.2.1 requires some sort of approval process. It was those 
documents which Mr. Bell sought. But Mr. Bell was precluded from even looking into 
the issue because the Hearing Officer denied his subpoenas for documents showing the 
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simulator lot solutions used in this case were from an approved provider. (R p. 20 & 
40.) 
The issues before the Court are whether the Hearing Officer's finding that the 
simulator lot solutions used in this case were submitted by an approved provider was 
clearly erroneous, and whether the Hearing Officer's decision exceeded his authority, 
was made upon unlawful procedure, was not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, and was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Exhibits M and N 
clearly establish the Hearing Officer erred in his findings on this issue. (R pp. 84-94.) 
The fact the Hearing Officer denied Mr. Bell access to the approval documents is 
evidence of another due process violation. 
L. Respondent Mischaracterizes Mr. Bell's Position on Forced Blood Draws. 
Respondent mischaracterizes Mr. Bell's position on forced blood draws. 
Respondent states Mr. Bell contends he had a statutory right to refuse to submit to 
evidentiary testing. (Respondent's Brief at 32.) Mr. Bell does not so argue. Instead, 
Mr. Bell established that Idaho courts have recognized the State cannot force someone 
to physically consent to evidentiary testing, and cited to the case law that establishes 
that premise. 2 (Petitioner's Brief at 32-33.) Nor does Mr. Bell contend a forced blood 
draw can never be obtained in a misdemeanor DUI case. (Respondent's Brief at 32.) 
Instead, Mr. Bell established that Idaho law does not allow the State to obtain a forced 
2 Respondent agrees. See Respondent's Brief at 34 ("An individual can physically 




blood draw in every DUI case, and cited to the statutes and case law that establishes 
that premise. (Petitioner's Brief at 31-32.) Respondent either did not understand or 
purposely misstated Mr. Bell's position. Under either scenario, Mr. Bell stands by his 
briefing and arguments contained therein. 
The core of Mr. Bell's position is that the State could not order a paramedic to 
draw Mr. Bell's blood, nor could it engage in a "fist fight" with Mr. Bell to forcibly 
obtain a blood draw. This is clearly established by Idaho Code § 18-8002(6)(b), State 
v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966). When Mr. Bell indicated he would not physically consent to a breath-
alcohol test, Mr. White successfully overcame that decision by convincing Mr. Bell that 
Idaho law allowed Mr. White to order a paramedic to draw his blood and to use any 
amount of force Mr. White wanted to obtain that sample, up to and including a "fist 
fight." It was that conduct that nullified the audio advisory played for Mr. Bell, 
because Mr. White's assertions were contrary to Idaho law. 
Second, Respondent's own characterization of Mr. White's statements confirm 
he misstated the law to Mr. Bell. Respondent states, "Officer White informed Petitioner 
of the penalties for refusing to submit to evidentiary testing, and after Petitioner 
refused, he informed Petitioner that if he didn't provide a breath sample he would have 
someone take his blood." (Respondent's Brief at 32) (emphasis added.) Yet, no police 
officer in Idaho can direct a medical profession to conduct a blood draw in these 
circumstances; the police officer can merely ask, and the medical professional can 
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refuse. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303-04,160 P.3d at 742-43. Mr. White, in telling Mr. Bell 
he was lawfully "forcing" him to submit to evidentiary testing (Petitioner's Brief at 30), 
misstated the law which nullified the advisory. 
Third, Respondent's reliance on State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 
211 (Ct. App. 2002), does nothing to help its case. (Respondent's Brief at 35.) In 
Worthington, the officers and medical staff held him on a table while he was handcuffed 
with a belly restraint. Although Worthington claimed the officer would have to "fight" 
him, no actual fight took place. To the extent Respondent is arguing Worthington 
condones "fist fights" to obtain a blood draw, such an argument is clearly refuted by 
Schmerber, Diaz, and DeWitt, all of which hold a blood draw must be done with 
reasonable force. (Petitioner's Brief at 32.) A "fist fight" can never be reasonable for 
purposes of obtaining a blood sample in a misdemeanor DUI case. State v. DeWitt, 145 
Idaho 709, 713, 184 P .3d 215, 219 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating advisory is intended to 
enforce the driver's previously implied consent without the use of force; the legislature 
provided administrative revocation "rather than condone a physical fight"). 
M. Respondent Incorrectly Believes Consent Can Be Obtained Through Threats 
of Force and/or Police Trickery and Deceit. 
Respondent also attempts to justify Mr. White's trickery and deceit based upon 
case law which has absolutely no application to obtaining one's consent. The cases 
relied upon by Respondent authorize certain, purposeful misstatements by police 
officers during police interrogation, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), in order to 
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gain access to a person's home in an undercover capacity, Lewis v. United States, 385 
U. S. 206 (1966), in order to safely have an occupant answer the door in executing a 
search warrant, United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F .2d 432 (9 th Cir. 1993) and 
United States v. Salter, 815 F .2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1987), and in order to safely enter a 
residence to execute a valid arrest warrant, Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th 
Cir. 1960). However, none of those cases authorize obtaining one's consent through the 
threat of force or through misstatements of the law. 
Here, Respondent admits Mr. White was seeking Mr. Bell's physical consent to 
submit to evidentiary testing. (Respondent's Brief at 34.) Idaho is an implied-consent 
state, but the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated the implied-consent law does not 
permit the State to force an individual to submit to evidentiary testing: 
By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a 
licensed driver to lawfully refuse, but it cannot remove his 
or her physical power to refuse. 
Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v. 
Newton, 636 P.2d 393 (Or. 1981)). 
However, such refusal does not permit the police to obtain an evidentiary sample 
through whatever means they deem necessary. DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 714,184 P.3d at 
220 (holding blood draws must be done in a medically accepted manner and without 
unreasonable force), citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771-72. In fact, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has clearly stated that force-or the threat of force-is not to be used to gather 
such evidence: 
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The purpose of a warning of license suspension following a 
refusal .. , is to overcome an unsanctioned refusal by threat 
instead of force. It is not to reinstate a right to choice, but 
rather to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied 
consent. ... Rather than condone a physical conflict, the 
legislature provided for the administrative revocation of the 
license of an individual who refuses to comply with his 
previously given consent. 
Jd. at 713,184 P.3d at 219 (emphasis added). 
Of course, constitutional protections prohibit law enforcement officers from 
attempting to convince an individual to physically consent to evidentiary testing 
through coercion or duress. See Scheckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) 
("the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force"); see also Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) ('''Consent' that is the product of official 
intimidation or harassment is not consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their 
constitutional rights when they are coerced to comply with a request that they would 
prefer to refuse."). Thus, an individual's "consent" is involuntary ifhis will has been 
overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. State v. Garcia, 
143 Idaho 744, 778, 152 P.3d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 
97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Here, there is no question Mr. Bell informed the officer of his decision not to 
physically consent to evidentiary testing, and that Mr. Bell's will was then overborne 
by the officer's conduct. The cases cited by Respondent do not authorize such 
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"consent." Accordingly, Respondent's argument that "trickery and subterfuge are 
reasonable and lawful actions" (Respondent's Brief at 36) do not apply here. 
And in any event, the advisory information is statutorily mandated and cannot be 
circumvented. I.C. § 18-8002A(2); In re Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 
(Ct. App. 1995) (stating the advisory language must be provided "in no uncertain 
terms"). Respondent's argument here is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent the 
advisory through Mr. White's trickery and deceit. So, even if consent could 
constitutionally be obtain through coercion or duress, it would not allow the state to 
circumvent the advisory in this same manner. 
N. Respondent Confuses Actual Knowledge With Constructive Knowledge. 
Regarding Mr. White's veracity issues and his apparent termination from the 
Boise Police Department for lying under oath, Respondent contends lTD was without 
actual knowledge of this information. Even assuming that is the case, Mr. Bell's 
argument is that lTD had either actual or constructive knowledge of these facts. 
Here, the entire administrative process is based upon the officer's sworn 
affidavit which the Hearing Officer accepts as truthful. In this case, the Hearing 
Officer expressly relied upon Mr. White's affidavit in resolving factual and legal issues 
against Mr. Bell. (See, e.g., R p. 292, ~ 5.) 
The State of Idaho had actual knowledge of Mr. White's veracity issues. Thus, 
lTD had constructive knowledge of this information. It should have been disclosed to 
Mr. Bell and the Hearing Officer should have taken this into account when resolving 
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factual and legal disputes at the administrative level. This issue alone requires remand. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court should set aside the Hearing Officer's 
decision and order that Mr. Bell's driving privileges be reinstated. Because there is 
sufficient evidence that Mr. Bell established his right to prevail at the administrative 
hearing, there is no need to remand this matter. 
DATED this 9th day of February, 2010. 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
D~ ~. By: ________________________ _ 
Dean B. Arnold 
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I hereby certify that on this 9th day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
1087 W. River St., Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701-2865 









for Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
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Dean B. Arnold, ISB #6814 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
300 W. Main St., Suite 250, Office 202 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-1575 
Facsimile: (208) 342-3777 
Attorneys for Defendant Hamish Bell 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVING ) 
PRIVILEGES OF: ) Case No. CV-OT-2009-0018414 
) 




The petitioner, Hamish Allan Bell, through his counsel of record, and pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 30, has filed a Motion to Augment ("Motion") in the above-
entitled case. The Court has reviewed the Motion, and good cause having been found, 
grants the Motion as follows. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Agency 
Record is hereby augmented with the addition of the following documents: 
1. E-mail dated July 23, 2009, from attorney Dean B. Arnold to lTD Hearing 
Officer Dave Baumann; and 
2. E-mail dated August 7, 2009, from attorney Dean B. Arnold to lTD Hearing 
Officer Dave Baumann. 
The additional documents will be numbered pages 333 and 334, respectively. 
DATED this l~day of :iJ.·\M.~ 2010. 
~M'k a . <Uk!r.f4-., 
Judge 
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P.O. Box 2865 0 Overnight Mail 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2865 ~Tel copy (Fax) 
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300 W. Main St., Ste. 250, Office 202 0 Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MA ITER OF THE DRIVING 
PRIVILEGES OF: Case No. CV-OT090018414 
HAMISH ALLAN BELL, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on appeal from an administrative hearing officer's decision to 
sustain the suspension of Hamish Allan Bell's ("Bell's") driving privileges upon finding that the 
requirements of Idaho Code § 18-8002A were met. Bell asks this Court to vacate the suspension 
because the hearing officer failed to provide Bell with due process and because the decision is based 
on en'oneous conclusions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the hearing officer's 
ruling. 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On June 4, 2009, Officer Tucker stopped a vehicle driven by Bell after observing Bell dlive 
the vehicle the wrong way on a one-way street. During the stop, Bell admitted that he had been 
drinking, and Officer Tucker called Officer White for assistance. After Officer White anived, Bell 
again admitted that he had been drinking. Officer White then administered field sobriety tests 
which Bell failed. Officer White placed Bell under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol 
and transported Bell to the Ada County Jail. At the jail, Officer White played the administrative 




























license suspension tape for Bell and then asked him to submit to a breath test. When Bell first 
refused, Officer White informed him that a blood draw would be taken without consent. Officer 
White further informed Bell that he did not take refusals and that he could force Bell to have his 
blood drawn. Bell then submitted to the breath test and gave two (2) breath samples of .154 and 
.157. Officer White then seized Bell's driver's license, gave him a notice of license suspension, and 
issued him a temporary driving permit. 
On June 10, 2009, Bell requested an administrative hearing on the license suspension. In the 
request for hearing, Bell asked for subpoenas for the following information: (1) any audio/video 
tapes in existence in the case; (2) any and all police reports in existence in the case; (3) a copy of the 
log sheet for the testing device used to test Bell's breath including the thirty (30) day periods prior to 
and after Bell's test; (4) a copy of evidentiary results; (5) a copy of the calibration certificate; and (6) 
the testing officer's certification. 
On June 16, 2009, a telephonic hearing was scheduled for June 30, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., and 
subpoenas were issued with compliance dates of June 29, 2009. The subpoenas required the Boise 
Police Department to send the requested information to the Idaho Transportation Department 
("lTD"). 
The hearing officer issued subpoenas for the following information: (1) audio and video of 
the stop/arresUevidentiary testing of Bell; (2) any report regarding the stop/arresUevidentiary testing 
of Bell; and (3) instrument log sheets for the period of June 3, 2009 thru June 6, 2009. However, 
the hearing officer issued an order denying Bell's request for the testing officer's certification card 
upon finding the evidence was not clearly relevant in light of the statement in the probable cause 
affidavit that the officer's certification is valid until December 2010. 





























Later that same day, Bell requested a continuance of the hearing because the compliance date 
on the subpoenas would not give him enough time to review the requested information before the 
hearing. Bell also asked for a new subpoena for a sixty (60) day period of log sheets because the 
existing subpoena for a four (4) day period of log sheets did not satisfy his earlier request and 
because the additional log sheets were necessary to determine whether the calibration had been 
checked in compliance with Idaho law. 
The lTD responded by sending a notice that the telephonic hearing had been rescheduled for 
July 9, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. However, the hearing officer did not respond or otherwise issue the 
requested subpoena. 
On June 25, 2009, the records custodian for the Boise Police Department sent the 
subpoenaed information to the ITD with the exception of the log sheets because custodian did not 
yet have the log sheets for June 3 through June 6, 2009. The ITD then presumably forwarded this 
information to Bell. 
On July 9, 2009 at approximately 8:57 a.m., the lTD faxed log sheets, covering the period 
from April 28,2009 to June 6,2009, to Bell's counsel. 
An hour later, the telephonic hearing began. Bell argued that the log sheets he just recei ved 
should not be entered as exhibits because it was unclear "when those documents were received [by 
the ITD], where they came from, [and] whether the Boise Police Department produced those in 
response to our subpoena." He further argued that the evidence was strong that the Boise Police 
Department did not comply with the subpoena and that the suspension should therefore be vacated. 
However, the hearing officer admitted the log sheets as exhibits and denied the request to vacate the 
suspension for the reason that subpoena issues are not a statutory basis for vacating a suspension. 





As a result of this ruling, Bell felt "forced" to request a continuance to review the log sheets. The 
hearing officer granted the continuance, and the hearing was rescheduled for July 23,2009. 
On July l3, 2009, before the rescheduled hearing, Bell requested additional subpoenas 























specifically, Bell asked for the following: (1) the testimony of Callie Downum, ITD, as to the 
circumstances surrounding the log sheets; (2) all documents reflecting calibration checks from May 
1, 2009 to July 13,2009; (3) the source of the simulator solution used from May 1, 2009 to July l3, 
2009; (4) identification of the provider(s) of the simulator solution used from May 1, 2009 to July 
l3, 2009; (5) documents and correspondence showing when, where, and how the log sheets were 
received; and (6) a copy of all administrative license suspension hearing decisions issued in the last 
twelve (12) months vacating a driver's license suspension for the ITD's failure to comply with a 
subpoena. The hearing officer denied the request for these subpoenas but did require production of 
the Certificate of Analysis for Simulator Solution Lot #8804 and #8101. 
On July 23, 2009, the telephonic administrative hearing was held. Midway through the 
hearing, the hearing officer asked Bell to submit copies of the decisions that he was citing in his 
argument. At the end of the hearing, the hearing officer stated that he would keep the record open to 
allow Bell to submit the case law in support of his argument, and Bell informed the hearing officer 
that he would e-mail the decisions within twenty-four (24) hours. 
Later that same day, Bell e-mailed the decisions to the hearing officer. Approximately ten 
(10) days later, BelJ received a request to resubmit the decisions with the relevant portions 
highlighted. On August 7, 2009, Bell resubmitted the requested decisions 
On August 18, 2009, Bell submitted a copy of the State's newly filed motion to dismiss the 
criminal charges against Bell in the interest of justice. 



























On September 14, 2009, the hearing officer issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order. The hearing officer found that the requirements were met for the suspension of Bell's 





ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether the administrative proceeding, the hearing officer, or the subpoenas violated 
Bell's due process rights. 
1. Whether the subpoenas issued by the hearing officer violated Bell's due process rights. 
2. Whether the hearing officer violated Bell's due process rights by impermissibly 
extending the administrative hearing process. 
3. Whether the hearing officer violated Bell's due process rights by refusing to Issue 
subpoenas regarding Officer White's Intox 5000 certification. 
4. Whether the hearing officer violated Bell's due process rights by refusing to issue 
subpoenas regarding calibration checks. 
5. Whether the hearing officer erred by finding the Boise Police DepaI1ment complied with 
the ITD's subpoena. 
6. Whether the hearing officer erred in concluding that Bell's driver's license suspension 
could not be vacated based upon the Boise Police Department's failure to comply with 
the ITD's subpoenas. 
7. Whether the hearing officer violated Bell's due process rights by refusing to issue 
subpoenas and require production of documents regarding Boise Police Department's 
compliance with the ITD's subpoena. 
Whether the hearing officer was statutorily required to vacate the license suspension if 
subpoenaed information was not timely received. 
Whether the evidence supported vacating Bell's license suspension. 
8. Whether the hearing officer erred in sustaining Bell's driver's license suspension when 
the evidence affirmatively showed the State failed to comply with IDAPA and the 
Standard Operating Procedures. 




























9. Whether the hearing officer erred by sustaining Bell's driver's license suspension when 
the evidence affinnatively showed the State's adopted procedures do not ensure accuracy 
and proper functioning of the breath testing device. 
10. Whether the hearing officer erred by sustaining Bell's driver's license suspension when 
the evidence affinnatively showed the provider of the simulator solutions was not an 
"approved" provider as required by IDAPA and the Standard Operating Procedures. 
11. Whether the hearing officer erred by sustaining Bell's driver's license suspension when 
the evidence affinnatively showed Officer White failed to properly infonn Bell of the 
consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing. 
D. Whether the hearing officer properly relied on Officer White's affidavit. 
12. Whether the hearing officer erred by relying on Officer White's affidavit when the State 
was in actual or constructive knowledge that Officer White had been deemed unreliable 
by the Boise Police Department. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of an agency's 
decision to suspend a person's driver's license. In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937,941,155 P.3d 1176, 
1180 (CL App. 2006); see also Idaho Code §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. When an 
appellate court reviews an agency's decision, the court may not "substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho Code § 67-5279(1). 
Instead, the court must defer "to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." 
Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Comm'rs, l31 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); 
Bennett v. State, 147 Idaho 141, 142,206 P.3d 505, 506 (et. App. 2009). 
Agency action must be affinned on appeal unless the court detennines that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) 
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an 
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abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3); Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142, 206 P.3d at 506. The 
1 
2 
party attacking the agency's decision bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency erred in a 
3 manner specified in section 67-6279(3) and that a substantial right has been prejudiced. Price, 131 
4 Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Bennett, 147 Idaho at 142,206 P.3d at 506. 
5 Agencies are given the authority to make their own determinations of credibility and "to 
6 
place greater or less weight on any particular piece of evidence according to its relative credibility." 
7 
Morgan v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8, 813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991); see also 
8 




12 A. The administrative proceeding, the hearing officer, and the subpoenas did not violate 
Bell's due process rights. 
13 
14 
Bell claims he has a substantial interest in his driver's license that gives him the right to 
15 procedural due process. According to Bell, this right to due process was violated dUling the 
16 administrati ve proceeding because: the hearing officer issued subpoenas designed to prevent the 
17 petitioner from having adequate time to review the subpoenaed information before the hearing; the 
18 hearing officer delayed the hearing in violation of Idaho law when the Boise Police Department 
19 
failed to produce subpoenaed information in a timely manner; the hearing officer failed to issue a 
20 
decision within the time required and before the license suspension had already taken effect; the 
21 
hearing officer did not issue all of the subpoenas requested for relevant information; and the hearing 
22 
23 officer admitted documents into the record over the objection of Bell upon concluding that the 
24 documents were in response to the subpoena and timely complied with the subpoena. Bell contends 
25 that regardless of whether there is a statutory basis for vacating the license suspension, the 
26 




























suspension may be vacated because the administrative proceedings and hearing officer's actions 
violated Bell's right to procedural due process. 
In support of his position, Bell makes four general arguments. First, the compliance date on 
the subpoenas that were issued did not ensure that Bell would have enough time to review the 
information before the hearing and therefore forced him to delay the hearing. Second, the license 
suspension must be vacated if the hearing cannot be held and a decision issued within the mandated 
time frame and before the thirty (30) day temporary license permit expires. Third, the subpoenas 
not issued were necessary to obtain information to challenge Officer White's certification, to 
challenge the accuracy and proper functioning of the lntoxilyzer 5000, and to establish that the 
hearing officer can vacate a driver's license suspension solely for subpoena non-compliance. 
Finally, the log sheets admitted into the record over Bell's objection were not in response to and did 
not comply with the subpoena, and there was no evidence attached to the log sheets indicating that 
they were in fact produced by the Boise Police Department. 
The LTD acknowledges that Bell has a substantial interest in his driver's license but claims 
that there is a low risk that Bell was erroneously deprived of that interest because Officer White 
complied with the procedural safeguards before suspending Bell's license. According to the lTD, 
the procedural delays in the administrative hearing and decision do not change the low risk of error, 
and the information not subpoenaed has no bearing on and is irrelevant to the outcome. 
Furthermore, the low risk of error is outweighed by the State's compelling interest in keeping 
Idaho's roads safe and free from drunk drivers. 
The lTD further denies that Bell's arguments have any merit for four reasons. First, neither 
the Constitution nor IDAPA provide any timeframe in which subpoenaed information must be 
produced, and the issue became moot when the hearing was postponed so Bell could have more 



























time to review subpoenaed information. Second, a license suspension cannot be vacated just 
because a hearing is extended for more than ten (10) days or ajudge does not issue a decision within 
the time required. Third, the information not subpoenaed was irrelevant, unduly repetitious, and 
unnecessary. Finally, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion or act untruthfully in finding 
that the log sheets had been misplaced at the ITD, complied with the subpoena, and could be 
admitted into the record. 
In this case, the parties do not dispute that Bell faced delays and denials of requested 
information throughout the administrative proceeding regarding his license suspension. Instead, 
they dispute whether any of these delays or denials, individually or collectively, constitutes a basis 
for vacating Bell's license suspension. Although the ITD argues that there is no statutory basis for 
vacating the license suspension based on administrative procedures and decisions, whether there is a 
statutory basis for vacating the license suspension is a separate issue that is not relevant in 
determining whether there is a constitutional basis to vacate the license suspension for a due process 
violation. Bell's first seven issues raise constitutional challenges to the license suspension. 1 
As recognized by federal and state courts, a driver has an important interest in his driver's 
license which cannot be taken away without procedural due process. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 
112 (1977); State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 3-4, 704 P.2d 333, 335-36 (1985); In re Gibbar, 143 
Idaho at 945, 155 P.3d at 1184. A driver also has a substantial interest in the continued possession 
and use of his license pending the outcome of a hearing relating to his license suspension because 
the driver cannot be made "whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship suffered 
26 I The only statutory challenge raised in the first seven issues is addressed under section B. 





























by reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through postsuspension review 
procedures." Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). 
If a driver raises a due process challenge to his license suspension, the court must consider 
the following three factors in deciding whether due process was violated: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
Ankney, 109 Idaho at 4,704 P.2d at 336 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
The court must determine not only what the private interest is but also what the impact of official 
action is on that private interest, such as the "duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a 
property interest." Mackey, 443 U.S. at 12. 
Both of Idaho's appellate courts have considered the Mathews factors in relation to 
administrati ve license suspension hearings and have found that the driver's interest in maintaining 
his driver's license may be overcome by the State's strong interest in preventing intoxicated persons 
from driving and the State's interest in protecting the driver's rights with existing and not overly 
burdensome procedures. Id. at 4-5, 704 P.2d at 336-37; Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 190-91, 
804 P.2d 911,919-20 (et. App. 1990). 
1. The subpoenas issued by the hearing officer did not violate Bell's right to due 
process. 
Where a subpoena is not issued or a hearing is unjustifiably delayed, there may be a 
violation of due process. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242; In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 



























1186. Alternatively, where a subpoena is issued and the compliance date on a subpoena does not 
result in a hearing being unjustifiably delayed, there is no basis for finding a due process violation. 
In Gibbar, a driver claimed that he was not given adequate time for discovery before the 
administrative hearing. 143 Idaho at 945, 155 P.3d at 1184. However, the court held that the thirty 
(30) day discovery process was not so short that it amounted to a due process violation because the 
driver received the discovery responses a few days before the license suspension hearing and 
therefore had sufficient time to be able to use them for the hearing. Id. at 948, 155 P.3d at 1187. 
In this case, the compliance date on the subpoena may not have given Bell sufficient time to 
review all of the information by the original hearing date but any potential due process violation was 
remedied when the hearing was delayed by ten (10) days. This delay was permitted by Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A(7) and was not unreasonable because it gave Bell an opportunity to review the 
subpoenaed information and decide whether to use it in his defense. Because the statute permits a 
hearing date to be moved and because the hearing date in this case was moved to accommodate the 
discovery process, the compliance date on the subpoenas did not result in any due process violation. 
2. The delayed hearing and delayed decision did not violate Bell's right to due 
process. 
Where there is a procedural delay in holding a suspension hearing or issuing a decision, 
there may be a constitutional violation of due process. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 
u.s. 230, 242 (1988); Jones v. City of Gary, Ind., 57 F.3d 1435,1444 (7th Cir. 1995). To determine 
whether a delay is justified, the court must "examine the importance of the private interest and the 
harm to this interest occasioned by delay; the justification offered by the Government for delay and 
its relation to the underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision may 
have been mistaken." Mallen, 486 U.S. at 242. 





























With respect to license suspension proceedings, extending a hearing fourteen (14) days 
beyond the effective date of a license suspension does not violate due process because "the risk of 
enor in the initial decision to suspend the license of a driver atTested for driving under the influence 
is insubstantial" and "the state has a compelling interest in highway safety." Fisher, 705 N.E.2d at 
77 (Ill. 1998). With respect to other administrative proceedings, a nine (9) month delay in the 
proceedings does not violate due process if the delay stems in part from the thoroughness of the 
proceedings and there is no evidence that the proceedings are unreasonably prolonged. Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985). Additionally, a hearing held sixth (6) months 
after suspension may be sufficiently prompt if the person requesting the administrative hearing 
contributes to the delay. Jones, 57 F.3d at 1444-45. 
Here, the first delay in Bell's administrative hearing from June 30, 2009 to July 9, 2009 was 
permitted by statute, and it was granted to ensure that Bell would have ample opportunity to review 
the information subpoenaed. Although this first delay meant that Bell's thirty (30) day temporary 
permit expired and the license suspension took effect by the time the July 9, 2009 healing began, 
there is no evidence that this delay was unreasonable or unjustified. 
The second delay in Bell's administrative hearing from July 9,2009 to July 23,2009 was not 
specifically provided for by statute, but it was granted so that Bell could review the subpoenaed 
materials he received an hour before the prior hearing. Again, there is no evidence that this further 
delay was unreasonable or unjustified considering that the delay was requested by Bell to review 
subpoenaed information that was not timely provided. 
Once the hearing was held, the hearing officer delayed issuing a decision until almost two 
(2) months after the hearing. However, there is no indication that this delay was unreasonable even 
though the administrative code generally requires a decision to be issued before the expiration of the 


























thirty (30) day temporary permit. IDAPA § 39.02.72.600.01.2 Instead, the delay seems to have 
resulted from the need for additional time to thoroughly review the record and the cases relied upon 
by Bell. Because Bell raised numerous issues and presented a large amount of materials for review, 
the delayed decision was justified. 
Furthermore, any harm resulting from the interim suspension of Bell's license during the 
delays was minimal considering the low risk of error that Officer White wrongfully suspended the 
license in the first place. Also, Bell's interim interest in his license is outweighed by the State's 
compelling interest in keeping Idaho's roads free from drunk drivers. The duration of the 
proceedings did not increase the risk of error in the outcome and did not last so long that it 
amounted to a due process violation for which Bell's license suspension must be vacated. 
3. The hearing officer did not violate Bell's right to due process by denying some 
of Bell's requests for information. 
Where a subpoena request is denied and the evidence requested is relevant, the exclusion of 
such evidence does not violate due process if the evidence would not decrease the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of a driver's license. In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. In that case, a 
driver sought to use a state employee's testimony to challenge the proper functioning of testing 
equipment, and the hearing officer erroneously concluded that the testimony was not relevant. Id. at 
946-47, 155 P.3d at 1185-86. Nevertheless, the hearing officer did not violate the driver's due 
process rights because the dri ver had other options available for challenging the basis for the breath 
alcohol test, such as obtaining an independent expert. Id. at 947-48, 155 P.3d at 1186-87. The court 
2 Idaho's administrative code provides that a hearing officer "shall issue the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
25 Order prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day temporary permit." IDAPA § 39.02.72.600.01. However, this rule 
also states that the hearing officer's failure to issue the order within thirty (30) days "shall not be grounds for staying or 
26 vacating the suspension." Id. 
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of appeals found that the risk of erroneous deprivation of the driver's license would not have been 
1 
2 
decreased by the admission of the excluded testimony and further determined that permitting the 
3 particular testimony would have imposed an unjustifiably heavy burden on the State. Id. The 
4 driver in that case also claimed that he had been denied due process because he had been denied 
5 access to the log showing the use and maintenance for the breath testing instrument. Id. at 948, 155 
6 
P.3d at 1187. However, because the driver had been provided with a portion of the log and because 
7 
the driver did not argue why the portion provided was insufficient or why other portions were 
8 
relevant, the court declined to address how much of the log the driver was entitled to obtain. Id. 
9 
10 
More recently, the Court of Appeals suggested that an arresting officer's testimony may be 
11 requested but that the officer's testimony is not required in an administrative hearing absent a 
12 request for the officer to be subpoenaed. Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 148 Idaho 378, _, 223 
13 P.3d 761, 766 (Ct. App. 2009). If the officer is not subpoenaed, the officer's sworn statement is 
14 
admissible as evidence without any foundation. Id.; Idaho Code § 67-5251(1). 
15 
Because a driver may challenge whether the probable cause affidavit provides a sufficient 
16 
basis for license suspension under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), a driver may request relevant 
17 
18 
information to challenge that affidavit. See Idaho Code § 67-5251(1); Wheeler, 148 Idaho at _, 
19 223 P.3d at 766; In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 947, 155 P.3d at 1186. Nevertheless, a hearing officer 
20 may exclude evidence that is unduly repetitious. Idaho Code § 67-5251(1).3 The hearing officer 
21 generally "has broad discretion in the extent of discovery he or she orders," but the hearing officer's 
22 
23 
24 3 Idaho Code § 67-5251(1) provides in full: 
The presiding officer may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, unduly repetitious, or excludable on 
25 constitutional or statutory grounds, or on the basis of any evidentiary privilege provided by statute or 
recognized in the courts of this state. All other evidence may be admitted if it is of a type commonly 
26 relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs. 

















decision "must comply with procedural due process guarantees." In re Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 945, 
155 P.3d at 1184. 
a. Officer White's Certification 
In this case, the hearing officer denied Bell's request to subpoena Officer White's 
certification. The hearing officer concluded that the certification card was not relevant because 
"[t]he probable cause affidavit states that Officer White's operator certification is valid until 
December 2010." (R. 19.) Bell argues that the certification card was relevant to confirm whether 
the officer was certified to use the breath testing instrument. 
A license suspension may be vacated if a breath alcohol test was not administered "by a 
laboratory operated by the Idaho state police ... under the provisions of approval and certification 
standards to be set by that department." Idaho Code §§ 18-8002A(7)(d), 18-8004(4). Pursuant to 
the administrative rules governing alcohol testing, "[e]ach individual operator shall demonstrate that 
he has sufficient training to operate the instrument correctly. This shall be accomplished by 











periodically as required by the department." IDAPA § 11.03.01.013.04. 
Because a laboratory may only be operated by a person who can demonstrate sufficient 
training on the machine that person uses, whether a person is properly trained is relevant in 
determining whether a breath test was properly administered. Therefore, the hearing officer erred in 
concluding that Officer White's certification was irrelevant. However, his reliance on the officer's 
affidavit was appropriate; thus requiring production of the certification card was not necessary. 




























h. Log Sheets 
The hearing officer also denied Bell's request for a sixty (60) day period of log sheets for the 
Intoxilyzer 5000 used to test Bell. Though the hearing officer did issue subpoenas for a four (4) day 
period of log sheets, he provided no explanation regarding his decision. Bell claims that the entire 
period of log sheets was necessary to determine whether the Intoxilyzer 5000 was accurate and 
properly functioning. According to Bell, the Boise Police Department's failure to routinely check 
the calibration of the instrument according to SOP requirements necessarily rendered test results 
inadmissible. 
While the proper calibration of an Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument may be relevant in 
determining whether the instrument was accurate and properly functioning, the procedures set forth 
in SOP 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 for checking calibration are not mandatory, and the failure to follow those 
procedures does not alone indicate that the instrument was not accurate or properly functioning. 
Wheeler, 148 Idaho at _, 223 P.3d at 768-69. Instead, expert testimony or other evidence is 
necessary to prove that the failure to follow calibration procedures somehow renders test results 
unreliable. /d. 
Because the Boise Police Department's failure to follow calibration check procedures cannot 
by itself indicate that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was not functioning properly and because Bell does not 
claim that he could or would have produced other evidence to establish the unreliability of the 
instrument based on irregular calibration checks, additional evidence regarding the timing of 
calibration checks would not have provided any basis for establishing that the instrument was not 
accurate or functioning properly. As a result, additional log sheets would have been irrelevant for 
Bell's stated purpose. 
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Additionally, the log sheets that were subpoenaed and produced show that the Intoxilyzer 
1 
2 5000 was calibrated approximately two (2) days prior to Bell's breath test.
4 The log sheets do not 
3 indicate that the instrument was not working, and Bell does not establish how additional log sheets 
4 could indicate that the instrument was nonetheless unreliable. 
5 In sum, there is no indication that the production of additional log sheets could have 
6 decreased the risk that Bell was erroneously deprived of his driver's license. Therefore, the hearing 
7 





c. Documents Related to Subpoena Compliance 
11 
The hearing officer also denied Bell's request for documents regarding the source of the log 
12 
sheets that were admitted into the record and for documents showing that non-subpoena compliance 
13 
14 
is a basis to vacate a license suspension. Bell argues that he is entitled to challenge the source of the 
15 log sheets, which were admitted over his objection, and to establish that in administrative license 
16 suspension hearing decisions, the hearing officer can vacate a driver's license suspension solely for 
17 subpoena non-compliance. 
18 None of these requested documents would have provided any basis for establishing that 
19 
Bell's license suspension should have been vacated under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7), and none of 
20 
these requested documents would have reduced the risk that Bell was erroneously deprived of his 
21 
driver's license. Consequently, the hearing officer did not abuse his discretion or otherwise violate 
22 
23 any due process right by refusing to subpoena these documents. 
24 
25 4 The subpoena required the Boise Police Department to provide log sheets for June 3 to June 6, 2009, and the log sheets 
indicate that calibration checks were run for .20 and .08 reference solutions on June 3, 2009. (R. 83.) Bell's breath test 
26 took place on June 5, 2009. 




























4. The hearing officer did not violate Bell's right to due process by admitting the 
log sheets into the record. 
Where evidence "is of a type commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of 
their affairs," such evidence may be admitted into the record in an administrative proceeding. Idaho 
Code § 67-5251(1). "The Hearing Officer assigned to the matter may, upon written request, issue 
subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary or tangible 
evidence at a hearing." IDAPA § 39.02.72.300.01. 
In this case, the hearing officer issued a subpoena for log sheets upon the written request of 
Bell. The subpoena required the Boise Police Department to send log sheets to the lTD by June 29, 
2009, and the lTD bore the responsibility of forwarding the information to Bell. Log sheets were 
sent to Bell on July 9, 2009, and the hearing officer found that these log sheets were in response to 
the subpoena. According to the hearing officer, these log sheets came from the Boise Police 
Department and had been misplaced by the lTD before they were sent to Bell. 
There is no indication or reason to doubt that the log sheets were originally provided by the 
Boise Police Department to the lTD in response to the subpoena. To require city and state officials 
to testify as to the source of these documents would create an unreasonable and unnecessary burden 
on the State and it would not provide any basis for questioning the validity of Bell's license 
suspension. Furthermore, whether or not log sheets were timely sent to Bell is irrelevant in 
determining whether there is a basis for vacating Bell's license suspension. 
Because Bell was given an opportunity to review the log sheets before the hearing, the 
hearing officer did not abuse his discretion or otherwise violate Bell's right to due process by 
admitting the log sheets into the record. 





























B. The hearing officer was not statutorily required to vacate the license suspension if 
subpoenaed information was not timely received. 
Bell also argues that the hearing officer was required to vacate his license suspension 
because the subpoenaed information was not timely received and thereby prevented the hearing 
from being held within the time required by Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7). 
The ITD argues that the hearing officer may only vacate the license suspension if he finds 
beyond a preponderance of the evidence that one of five statutory bases for the suspension was not 
met under Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(a)-(e). 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets forth procedures governing an administrative hearing and 
the basis for vacating a license suspension. "If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held 
within twenty (20) days of the date the hearing request was received by the department unless this 
period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten (10) day period." Idaho 
Code § 18-8002A(7). Although this statute does not allow for more than one extension, the statute 
does not give the hearing officer the option of vacating the suspension if the hearing cannot be held 
within this time frame. See id. Rather, the statute provides that the hearing officer may only vacate 
a suspension if one of the five (5) requirements for the suspension is not met under subsections (a)-
(e). ld.; Kane v. State, 139 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d 130, 134 (Ct. App. 2003). Consequently, the 
failure to timely hold a hearing does not constitute a basis for the hearing officer to vacate the 
suspension. Cf Kane, 139 Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134 ("[A] hearing officer is not authorized to 
vacate a suspension based upon technical flaws in documents delivered to the ITD.") 
In this case, the hearing was delayed a second time because subpoenaed information was not 
provided in a timely manner. To have allowed the first extended hearing to proceed would have 
prevented Bell from fully presenting his case because Bell did not have adequate time before the 





























healing to review the information and to determine whether to use the information in his case. 
Thus, delaying the proceeding protected Bell's due process rights and did not provide a statutory 
basis for vacating the license suspension. 
c. The hearing officer did not err in his findings or in sustaining Bell's driver's license 
suspension. 
Bell next claims that the hearing officer erred in not finding a statutory basis for vacating the 
suspension based on the evidence admitted, in relying on a boilerplate affidavit where there was 
contradictory evidence, and in not subpoenaing evidence necessary to further support vacating the 
license suspension. According to Bell, the license suspension should have been vacated under Idaho 
Code § 18-8002A(7)(d) and (e) because the breath testing instrument was not operated "under the 
provisions of approval and certification standards" set by the Idaho State Police as required by Idaho 
Code § 18-8004(4) and because Bell was not properly informed of the consequences of submitting 
to evidentiary testing. 
More specifically, Bell argues that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was not accurate and properly 
functioning because the instrument was not checked and calibrated according to the established 
schedules and procedures and because the simulator solution used in the instrument was not 
supplied by an approved source. He also argues that Officer White misrepresented the law by 
claiming that he could forcefully require a blood test if Bell did not submit to a breath test. 
Conversely, the ITD argues that the evidence admitted does not support Bell's claims and 
that the additional evidence Bell requested was irrelevant. According to the ITD, the calibration 
check performed two (2) days before Bell's breath test demonstrates compliance with the 
requirements; a calibration check was not necessary to ensure accurate and proper functioning; and 
the source of the simulator solutions was an approved provider. Additionally, the ITD contends that 























Officer White's statements were consistent with Idaho law because drivers do not have a statutory 
right to refuse an evidentiary test and because blood draws can be forced. 
A person whose driver's license is suspended may request an administrative hearing on the 
matter, but that person bears the burden of proving that there was no legal basis for the suspension. 
Idaho Code § IS-S002A(7). The hearing officer may only vacate the suspension if he finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that one of the five (5) requirements for the suspension is not met: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol ... in violation of the provisions of section IS-
S004, IS-S004C or 18-S006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration 
violation of section IS-S004 ... Idaho Code; or 
in 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration ... administered at the direction 
of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance with the 
requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing 
equipment was not functioning properly when the test was 
administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
lei. If the petitioner does not meet his burden of proving that one of these requirements was not met, 
then the hearing officer must sustain the suspension. /d. 
21 1. The evidence supports a finding that Intoxilyzer 5000 was functioning properly and 
was administered properly. 
22 
23 
There is no evidence that the Intoxilyzer 5000 was not functioning properly when the breath 
24 test was administered. First, the instrument was calibrated two (2) days before Bell's breath test, 
25 and there is no indication or evidence that the machine was not working when it was checked or 
26 




























when it was used two (2) days later. Second, the alleged failure of the ITD to follow procedures 
before and after Bell's breath test does not provide evidence that the instrument was not working at 
the time of Bell's breath test. See Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 148 Idaho 378, _, 223 P.3d 
761, 766. Finally, whether the solution came from an approved provider is irrelevant in determining 
whether the instrument was functioning properly. 
Additionally, there is no evidence that Officer White did not administer the test in 
accordance with the requirements of 18-8004(4). Whether the Boise Police Department followed 
proper procedures for checking the instrument's calibration and whether they used solution from an 
approved provider is irrelevant in determining whether Officer White performed his job as required. 
Therefore, there is no evidentiary basis for vacating the license suspension under Idaho Code 
§ 18-8002A(7)(d). 
2. The evidence supports a finding that Officer White properly informed Bell of the 
consequences of submitting to a breath test. 
There is no evidence that Officer White did not properly inform Bell of the consequences set 
forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2) for submitting to and failing a breath test or refusing to submit 
to a breath test. Rather, the undisputed evidence is that Officer White played an audio advisory 
infOlming Bell of the statutory consequences. Although Officer White subsequently stated that he 
could force Bell to submit to a blood draw, his various statements to that effect did not negate the 
advisory because they did not alter the statutory consequences. By informing Bell that he would not 
accept a refusal, Officer White essentially told Bell that he was not allowing the statutory 
consequences for refusal to take effect. Such statements successfully coerced Bell's peaceful 
compliance without creating grounds for vacating the license suspension. 





An officer is required to inform a person of the consequences of submitting to and failing a 
breath test and of refusing to submit to an evidentiary test. Idaho Code § 18-8002A(2), (7)(e). An 
officer's failure to so inform a person is grounds for vacating a license suspension. Idaho Code § 























evidentiary test may be forced and not refused, the officer's statements do not constitute grounds for 
vacating the suspension because they do not alter the consequences for failing a test or for 
successfully refusing a test. See Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(e). 
Although Idaho statutes provide consequences in the event of refusal, these statutes are 
designed to discourage physical conflict in the event of a physical refusal rather than to gi ve a right 
of refusal. See Idaho Code §§ 18-8002(2), 18-8002A(2); Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373, 775 P.2d at 
1215; DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 713, 184 P.3d at 219. The purpose of these statutes is to obtain 
compliance by threat rather than force, not to "hamstring the ability of law enforcement to properly 
investigate and obtain evidence." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373, 775 P.2d at 1215. 
Any person driving a vehicle in Idaho gives his or her implied consent to a blood alcohol test 
where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Idaho Code §§ 18-8002(1), -8004(1). Once a person chooses to drive a vehicle, that 
person gives up any right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent. State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 
368, 372, 775 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1989); DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 712-13, 184 P.3d at 218-19. A person 
has no statutory right to refuse an evidentiary test, and an officer may obtain an evidentiary test by 
coercion. See Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214; State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 409-
10,973 P.2d 758,761-62 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Because Officer White informed Bell of the statutory consequences under Idaho Code § 18-
8002A(2) and because Office White's comments about forcing an evidentiary test did not alter or 



























contradict the consequences, there is no evidentiary basis for vacating the license suspension under 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(e). 
D. The hearing officer did not err in relying on Officer White's affidavit. 
Finally, Bell claims that the hearing officer erred in relying on Officer White's affidavit 
because Officer White had been terminated from the Boise Police Department for not being 
credible. He argues that the ITD, as a political subdivision of the State, had actual or constructive 
knowledge that Officer White made false statements during an internal investigation and that the 
hearing officer should have therefore found Officer White not credible. 
The ITD argues that it had no actual or constructive knowledge of Officer White's actions 
and that the risk that Officer White lied about the facts of Bell's arrest is very small. 
Bell fails to cite any law in support of his position or otherwise explain how reliance on 
Officer White's affidavit constitutes error which should not be affirmed on appeal. He does not 
argue that the hearing officer's reliance on the affidavit violated a constitutional or statutory 
provision; was in excess of statutory authority; was made upon unlawful procedure; was not 
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
of discretion. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the ITD had actual knowledge regarding false 
statements allegedly made by Officer White during an internal investigation that it should have 
passed on to Bell. Because the ITD did not have knowledge of these statements and because the 
hearing officer may properly rely upon a sworn affidavit, the hearing officer did not err in relying 
upon Officer White's affidavit. 




2 For the reasons stated above, the Court affirms the hearing officer's decision. 
3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTA TION, ) 
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Respondent-Respondent on Appeal. ) 
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TO: THE RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORA TION, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named petitioner, Hamish Allen Bell, appeals against the 
above-named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision 
and Order filed in the above-entitled matter on the 15 th day of June, 2010, by the 
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, Ada County District Judge. 
2. The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments 
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to 
LA.R. lI(f). 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then 
intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not 
prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
a. Did the subpoenas issued by the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due 
process rights? 
b. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by 
impermissibly extending the administrative hearing process? 
c. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing 
to issue subpoenas regarding Officer White's Intox 5000 certification? 
d. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process ri ghts by refusing 
to issue subpoenas regarding calibration checks? 
e. Did the Hearing Officer err by finding the Boise Police Department 
complied with ITO's subpoena? 
f. Did the I-Iearing Officer err in concluding that Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension could not be vacated based upon the Boise Police 
Department's failure to comply with ITO's subpoenas? 
g. Did the Hearing Officer violate Mr. Bell's due process rights by refusing 
to issue subpoenas and produce documents regarding Boise Police 
Department's compliance with ITO's subpoena? 
h. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State failed to 
comply with IDAPA and the Standard Operating Procedures? 
I. Did the Hearing Officer err in sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the State's adopted 
procedures do not ensure accuracy and proper functioning of the breath 
testing device? 
J. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed the provider of the 
simulator solutions was not an "approved" provider as required by IDAPA 
and the Standard Operating Procedures? 
k. Did the Hearing Officer err by sustaining Mr. Bell's driver's license 
suspension when the evidence affirmatively showed Officer White failed 
to properly inform Mr. Bell of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing? 
1. Did the Hearing Officer err by relying on Officer White's affidavit when 
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the State was in actual or constructive knowledge that Officer White had 
been deemed unreliable by the Boise Police Department? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? NO. 
(Two reporter's transcripts of the administrative hearing that occurred before 
the hearing officer are already part of the record, and should be lodged 
pursuant to LA.R. 31(a)(2).) 
6. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28: 
a. Order (augmenting the record), filed February 10, 2010. 
b. Although the entire ITO Record should be included pursuant to I.A.R. 
31 (a)(2), the appellant specifically requests that Record pages 333-334 
pursuant to Order be included as well. These pages are attached to the 
original Motion to Augment, filed January 28, 2010. 
c. Audio Recording of Oral Argument, dated April 19, 2010, at 2:00 p.m., 
before Ada County District Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen. 
7. 1 certify: 
a. That all appellate filing fees and estimated fees for preparation of the 
clerk's record have been paid as required by the clerk accepting this 
document for filing. 
b. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20 (and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to I.C. § 67-
1401 (1 », as reflected on the attached certificate of service. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 2010. 
Law Offices of Dean B. Arnold 
By: ~ ~. 
Dean B. Arnold 
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